The Potential Threat of the Coercive Apparatuses

The clash between the police and the Indonesian military forces has proliferated as a commonplace event. The latest case that took place in Ogan Komering Ulu, South Sumatra depicts the high friction between these two state agencies that have been separated since 1999. These agencies have been complicit in a conflict that repeats itself annually for a decade with different causes. Two mainstream explanations for the most recent clash are the access to resources and the structural problems that lead to the accumulation of social jealousy. However, both the military and police should exercise their duties in protecting citizens based on their functions as state coercive apparatus. One direct corollary from the military-police conflict is concerns about the incapacity of the state to exercise coercive power effectively over these agencies. The recent clash signifies the problem of legitimation of the state, and it affects the democratization process.

Both the military and the police practice their organizational function based on their duties and rights. These functions lead to a plethora of both important and petty rules which seek to control and guide officers’ actions within the department as well as on either military missions or policing the street. Both agencies employ leadership, supervisory, and management techniques, and typical rewards and sanctions to ensure officer accountability, increase efficiency, and limit the abuse of power. In contrast, the organizational function is breached when these agencies misuse their force against each other and other state actors. In this regard, they abuse coercive power by exercising force that is more repressive than protective.

In the case in South Sumatra, the traffic police abused its power by shooting to death a military officer who violated a traffic law. The shooting sparked subsequent action by more than a hundred military officers to abuse their power by attacking the police station and police officers (the Jakarta Post 3/10/2013). Even the chiefs of both institutions were surprised about the extent of the conflict on ground. This clash and the rising number of unpredictable conflicts between these state apparatuses represent the failure of the state to control its apparatus and undermine its legitimacy.  The use of force by both state agencies against each other leads to further public distrust and revives the image of an unmanageable state.

The repressive and protective forces that are embodied within the coercive apparatuses shape the state legitimacy of exercising power throughout its population and territory. As pointed out by Otwin Marerin, the repression functions largely in a directly instrumentalist way for the state, but ultimately also can have legitimating or delegitimating consequences. Protection, in contrast, mainly affects the ideological processes through which states become legitimized (Greenberg & Mayer, 1990). By upholding the traffic law, the police officer exercised his function toward another agency that violated that law. The police exercised the protective function. However, shooting to death was not an appropriate way to deal with that issue. The later responses by the military officers exacerbated the misuse of the repressive function. On the other hand, the protective function of the police has declined following external pressure from citizens regarding the significant number of allegations of corruption among generals.

Coercive legitimation can be applied just as effectively as coercive apparatus performance and social norms. However, it can be reduced or disappear entirely when the legitimation of the state is exercised as happened in South Sumatra. The overused repressive force of these agencies, as aforementioned, undermines the eminent principle of exercising duty as a protector of state and citizenry. It has been highlighted by allegations raised by some groups about the use of torture by the police special counterterrorism unit Densus 88 to interrogate suspected terrorists. Meanwhile, the Indonesian military forces are allegedly violating the human rights of the indigenous Papuan people. This method reinforces the concerns about the misuse of repressive forces.

The repeated conflict between these state agencies severely affects the quality of democracy within the state. After the 13-year reform period, Indonesia is still facing the problem of the unmanageability of these agencies. The more they divert from the principles of the Constitution by wielding the repressive forces, the more the democratic consolidation process will be in danger. The state would be stateless if the dominant roles of government were not able to tackle the problem of the misuse of state authority by its apparatuses.

The military overlooked its primary function as the protector of state institutions by attacking the police. One prominent feature of the democratic consolidation process is the tight control of the elected government over its state apparatuses to exercise their primary duties. This does not mean the government can intervene in the organizational process within the state apparatuses, but instead, it should ensure that these state agencies exercise their duties based on their interest as state institutions in line with constitutional requirements.

By towing the line of the Constitution, both the military and the police uphold the democratic quality of the state. It is noteworthy that the source of power over these agencies is primarily coercive power. This is largely different from other state agencies that do not have the same source of power. Accordingly, the military and the police have the capacity to exercise their power without any control. This situation is immensely harmful for the existence of other state agencies and civil society groups. To a certain degree, the state is allowing radical groups to act violently toward other social groups has empowered the military and the police to act in a similar disobedient fashion. The state response in both cases has been insufficient to deal with this issue. In the quest for a stable democratic system, the state must ensure that all societal components, in particular the military and the police act in a principled manner.

By: HYRW

Cebongan: An Opportunity to Reform the Military Justice System?

Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge

 2012 Arryman Fellow at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

All speculations about the mastermind behind the Sleman prison killings have come to an end after Brig. Gen. Unggul K. Yudhoyono, the head of the Army’s investigative team, announced that 11 of the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus) personnel have been proved to be behind the killing of the four detainees in a jail (Jakarta Post, 04/04/2013). In further explanation, it was revealed that the main reason behind this atrocious assault was an act of revenge in response to the murder of their comrade. The spirit of corps that is essentially defined in the positive way of forming a sense of purpose and comradeship, have become a legitimation to overuse their repressive function instead of promoting their protective function. This violation of the spirit of corps reflects the military as an institution that controls every single unit within it; the culpability does not rest solely with the personnel involved. 

            The latest case in Cebongan prison that claimed the lives of four detainees along with the attack on the police station in Ogan Komering Ulu, South Sumatra, depict the abuse of coercive power by the military toward both civilian and other state institutions. However, the results released by the Army’s investigative team about the Cebongan case have to be highly appreciated in line with the upholding of the national justice system in Indonesia. The next question is the extent to which this commitment can be undertaken to bring a true sense of justice towards those who are suspected in this case. This question arises following the Army’s decision to bring these personnel to face a military court. However, as we know, from the new order era to the reform era, the military justice system has become a public concern based on its performance.  Two main arguments can be proposed about this concern, namely empowering the civilian justice and breaking down the military court as a safe haven for military officers.

Command Structure Inclination

Military justice in Indonesia is still a matter of the law enforcement system in Indonesia. The main indicator of the problem is the decision-making process; the final verdict determined by the military judges was not in accordance with the principles of democracy and human rights. During the new order, the whole military justice process from investigation to prosecution by military prosecutors was extremely closed. In the reform era, this situation still occurs. In addition the military tribunals follow the line of command instead of acting as an institution of the public conscience.

In the past, the highest judicial power in a military court was under the Armed Forces Commander. This judicial power shifted to the Supreme Court in September 2004 and the change was reinforced by the Presidential Decree Number 56 in 2004 as well as the mandate of Law Number 49 Year 2009 regarding Judicial Power. Based on these two regulations, supervision of the military court is under the Supreme Court, while discipline and career guidance for the members of the military are supposed to be submitted to the Department of Defense. However, the typical verdicts delivered by military judges still tend to be based on the TNI command line rather than on considerations of the Supreme Court as the holder of the highest judicial authority in the country.

Under the oversight authority of the Supreme Court, the final judgment of the military tribunals should be based on a common criminal consideration, not a command line. Command influence occurs when a military authority tries to influence, obstruct or deliberately direct the administration of justice. In this regard, the Law Development Board (Babinkum) under the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Headquarters controls the military corps system of law, including prosecutors and courts. Unfortunately, this structure leads to a legal process that is mostly influenced by the command of the military.

Safe Haven

Furthermore, the military court still is presumed to be a “safe haven” for officers who violate the country’s laws.  Based on Indonesian policy studies reports conducted by Imparsial, during the years 2001-2006 there were 46 cases of human rights violations committed by members of the military and police officers who received an average sentence of less than 4 years in prison. Whereas reports of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission found 11 cases of violations by the military against civilians in all provinces from 2009 until the beginning of 2011, only 5 were processed in military courts.

According to the two aforementioned reports, the significance of military justice for criminal acts committed by military personnel is still far from expectations. Military justice has become a safe haven for the resolution of these criminal cases. Disciplinary action taken by the judges of military courts is very minimal when compared to the acts themselves, including even those that have led to death. A typical sentence is merely adding external assignments to their institutional duties. Such sentences do not provide a deterrent effect for other soldiers even though a deterrent effect is one of the goals of justice in a democratic country.

The public expects fair and democratic values and human rights. Empowering the civilian justice and abolishing the military court as a safe haven would meet such public demands. Moreover, the Cebongan’s case is an opportunity to boost the spirit of military internal reforms launched after the ousted of the authoritarian regime in 1998.     

First published at The Jakarta Post Newspaper http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/04/09/reforming-military-justice-system.html 

Two Different Paths toward Democracy in Egypt and Indonesia

Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge

the 2012 Arryman Fellow and visiting scholar at Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois

Democracy does not automatically come after electing a new president and reforming a constitution as happened in Egypt. There are many challenges following the transition and consolidation period. One of biggest obstacles during transition and consolidation period in newly democratizing countries is controlling and redirecting the military as a legacy of the authoritarian regime. This is often easier said than done. However, only a few countries can overcome legacies of military intervention during the transition and consolidation period. Indonesia is one of the success stories in transforming from an authoritarian regime to a democracy regime by redirecting the military to focus on its primary function. In Egypt and Indonesia, the role of the military was the same during the transition but different in the consolidation period. I will highlight the role of the military in a transition period and at the earliest of the consolidation period in both countries.

During the transitional period earlier in January 2011, Egypt’s military stood with the people in ousting the former president Hosni Mubarak. The signature event of the people’s movement was 18 days uprising. The military was in charge from that period through the emergence of a democratically elected civilian government. The military also supported to charge Hosni Mubarak in jail, even though Mubarak was a former military officer. However, the most important role of the military was its not shooting the demonstrators. It was a crucial decision for the future of democracy in Egypt.

In Bahrain, by contrast, the military stood by the ruling monarchy. Because it repressed civilian demonstrators brutally, the Bahraini monarchy survived. In Libya, the military split with some officers refusing to fire on civilians, others willing to shoot in defense of Muammar Gaddafi. The result was civil war. In Syria, the story is still unfolding, the military have managed to hold together the regime and continued to repress.

Indonesia’s process of transition was similar as happened in Egypt in terms of the role of the military. In Indonesia the military had played a key role in organizing controlled transfer of power from the authoritarian regime to the democratic regime. People were out in the streets. A large number of people took an opposition stance against the regime under President Soeharto. In May 1998 the central question was how the Indonesian Armed Forces would position itself vis a vis the instability surrounding the succession as in Egypt. In Indonesia at that time, the critical role of the military was whether to shoot or support the people. Moreover, the Indonesian’s military had the legitimacy that was given by Soeharto to stabilize the country. That role was proved after the former commander in chief general Wiranto has been given a letter by Soeharto to impose the order within the state (Winters, 2012). It means at that time, the military actually has the legitimacy to run the country, but they did not want to use it. Eventually, as we saw at the end of Soeharto’s period, the military took the stand not to shoot the people. It means they had the capacity even legitimacy, but not the will. If they had the will to shoot the people and stand with the regime, the path to democracy would never have occurred in Indonesia or it might have taken a much longer time to achieve democracy.

The decision not to shoot people relates to the capacity and the will of the military. The capacity of the military relates to its coercive apparatus includes some elements, such as good training, expertise in using weapon systems, and assistance from international countries. The will of the military relates to the level of institutionalization of the coercive apparatus. The military has the institutional interests, such as to maintain internal cohesion, discipline, and morale within the corps, to protect its image, prestige, and national legitimacy (Bellin 2012). Shooting civilians would have been potentially costly for the military in Egypt. In Indonesia, we know that with the support of the people, TNI defended the constitution and successfully contained a potentially calamitous slide into widespread domestic instability and violence. 

In general, using lethal force against civilians threatens to undermine the image of the military as defender of the nation. Immediately following the preparation of the first general election since 1957, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and the army took crucial steps by introducing a compulsory constitution and disbanding the People’s Assembly. The compulsory constitution gave the military more power than other institutional agencies. This fact showed that the SCAF and the army in general constitute a significant component of the state’s political apparatus beyond their primary function as the guardian of the state from outside threats. Given this condition, the military still maintains its role to control the regime, even though Egyptians disagree with the new constitution. For those who do not like the changes to the constitution, they will be dealt with harshly by the military.

In Indonesia, the election took place in 1999 involving 48 parties with different platforms. The winner was a secular party, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). With that election, Indonesia completely finished its transition process by electing a new government. Indonesia started to enter the consolidation period by strengthening the newly-elected government. At the beginning of the consolidation period, the military made its internal reforms, such as leaving the parliament, liquidating positions related to political affairs, and starting to give some businesses they owned to support the civilian government. These reforms stemming from the consciousness of the internal officers followed the crucial decision not to shoot people as aforementioned. Some officers realized that the military no longer was a dominant actor in political and social life beyond its traditional function. In contrast, the military leaders in Egypt protected the army’s interest at the beginning of consolidation period.

In both countries, the role of the military is one of the crucial aspects in transforming the regime to democracy. In Egypt the future of democracy still remains a question about when the military is willing to give power to the civilian government.  In Indonesia, although the military no longer plays a role in political life, they still have a potency to turn back as one actor in the decision making process within the state. As mentioned by Edward Gibson, once you give a political chance to the military, it is hard to deprive it at all even in the well-established democratic countries (Gibson, 2012).

First published at the Jakarta Post (http://www2.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/12/28/different-paths-toward-democracy-egypt-and-indonesia.html)