STRENGTHENING TNI’s PROFESSIONALISM

Indonesia National Army (TNI) is the frontline in defending the territorial sovereignty of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). As a major defense component, the military sought to strengthen its military capability into a more respected and formidable form of military force in the world, particularly in Southeast Asia.

However, despite some efforts to build a solid force, the military also must improve itself, given the number of problems that tarnished the professionalism of the TNI in this country.

Amid a number of problems facing the nation today, the TNI continues to conduct internal reforms. The process is still ongoing, although some people still doubt that the internal reforms. There are some records that need to be seen

However, a number of achievements can be seen from several indicators. First, this year, The Defense Ministry with the TNI Headquarters finalizes the plan of Indonesia's defense (which defense strategy should meet the minimum essential force / MEF) until 2024. The main obstacle which had been inhibited in the realization of the MEF is the budget requirements. Since 1966 until now, the defense budget tends to decrease, even no more than 1% of GNP. Ironic, considering that the average defense budget of the other countries in the Asia Pacific region have reached up to more than 1% of their GNP.

However, in 2012, the national defense budget will increase, although not significant. Good faith of the Government and Parliament should be appreciated. In the 2012 draft budget, defense spending is allocated to 64, 4 trillion rupiah. The budget is 35.7% up from the year 2011, which was 47, 5 trillion rupiah. In the Ministry / Agency Work Plan and Budget (RKA-KL) 2012, Ministry of Defense to obtain share for 3.33 trillion rupiah budget, Headquarters to obtain a budget of 7.12 trillion rupiah, the Army Headquarters to acquire a budget of 28.8 trillion dollars, the Navy Headquarters to obtain a budget of 13.6 trillion rupiah, and the Air Force Headquarters would get for about 11.4 trillion rupiah. For the next five years, the government will distribute 150 billion for strengthening major weapons systems equipment. By increasing the budget, it means that the implementation of planning MEF will be well-facilitated.

Second, this year, the ministry of defense attempts to re-invigorate the performance of national defense industries. Increasing the quantity and quality of the domestic defense industrial production will greatly affect the performance of the TNI as a major component of defense in performing their duties. Commitment of government and Parliament to strengthen the defense industries is clearly visible in meeting the needs of military defense equipment. Fulfillment of defense equipment, the bulk should come from domestic defense industries than those imported from abroad. It could be seen from the demand from the army for military rockets in 1000 to be produced by PT. Pindad for the next 3 years.

Third, this year, third-generation update of military weapon system has gained in maintaining the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia territory. Army personnel had had six multipurpose transport helicopter of type M1-17 V5 from Russia. Helicopter air wing will strengthen the ground forces, and will be served to support military operations of war (OMP) or military operations other than war (OMSP). This year the Navy successfully tested Russian-made supersonic anti-ship missiles Yakhont, last April. These missiles are a medium range types that can achieve a maximum distance of 350 miles in six minutes. The missile is capable of providing vibration effects for countries around Indonesia. Meanwhile, for the Air Force itself, this year is the momentum of the resurrection. Moreover, the Air Force awarded a grant 24 types of aircraft the F-16 Block 25, where 6 of them will be upgraded to F-16 block 52 of the United States. F-16 fighter aircraft will then be used to keep the Homeland airspace by conducting observations and monitoring, especially in the points leading the Homeland. Furthermore, this year, the Air Force has also inaugurated the use of helicopter simulators Superpuma NAS 332. That is the first simulator for the Air Force that will support the skills and abilities in performing tasks of military and non-military helicopter pilots.

Besides the three above progress, this year marks 13 years of national security sector reform. Security sector reform is an attempt to put all components of national security to perform the role and functions as mandated by the constitution. TNI becomes a major actor, given the task of national defense become the principal task of the TNI, while the role of police is safeguarding national security.

Some of the reformation agenda that has not been resolved among other things is the implementation of a number of national regulations related to the military, such as military businesses, reform of military justice, and abuse of human rights.

Mandate related to the military takeover by the government and the abolition of the military's business contained in Law no. 32/2004 on the TNI. In Article 2 of the law explains that the professionalism of the TNI is not business related. Meanwhile, in article 76 the same law, requiring all military businesses takeover shall be conducted over 5 years since enacted in 2004. Following up on the mandate of the law, the President established the National Team of Military Business takeover through Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No.7/2008. In 2009 before the deadline for the takeover, the government issued Presidential Regulation No. 43/2009 related to military business conquest. So far, in the field, there still contained a number of military businesses that have not been touched, such as Engineering at private firms, foundations and some other forms.

In two recent regulations, there has not seen a strong commitment from the government to take over the military's business. This example can be seen from lack of transparency from the takeover team, especially on data related to a number of military businesses.

Second, reform of military court of justice. So far, the military court in Indonesia is still far from the standard of equal justice before the law. In some cases a trial of gross violations of human rights committed by military forces, the final verdict is still heavily influenced by the command line, not based on the principles of justice and fairness before the law. The result, many military personnel involved in the case, such severe persecution that resulted in death, just gets a prison sentence of not more than 3 years. Ironic, because it’s based on Act number 49 of 2009, the military court should be under the authority of the judiciary and is under the supervision of the Supreme Court.

Third, human rights abuse committed by military forces against civilians. Based on data from National Human Rights Commission, in March 2011, the number of military violence is reported to reach 38 cases. The amount still describes the maintained repressive cultures approach towards civil society. Despite the inclusion of the concept of human rights in military education curriculum, however, the correlation of education and human rights implementation in the field is still not connected.

In times to come, the military is expected to not only become a major defense component in implementing the task of maintaining the sovereignty of Republic of Indonesia, but also able to run it professionally and proportionately according to the spirit of Sapta Marga.

Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge

The writter is a Project Officer for Civil Society Studies at Pacivis, University of Indonesia

Indonesian Military returns to politics?

A debate surrounding the 2009 general elections has revolved around the role of the Indonesian Military (TNI) in political parties where almost every major political party has former military officers sitting as board members or as chairman. This begs the question: Is the Indonesian Military returning to politics?
In the past few weeks, a debate surrounding the 2009 general elections has revolved around the role of the Indonesian Military (TNI) in political parties where almost every major political party has former military officers sitting as board members or as chairman.
For example, the Golkar Party is now spearheaded by Vice President Jusuf Kalla as chairman and Lt. Gen. (ret) Sumarsono as secretary-general, while former military officers are filling the Hanura and Gerindra party leadership under retired generals Wiranto and Prabowo, respectively.

In addition, this military ?omeback?coincides with the growing trend of former military men contesting local elections. Marcus Mietzner, a lecturer at the Australian National University, found that in 2006, 8 percent of the candidates contesting 50 local polls were retired military and police officers.

This begs the question: Is the Indonesian Military returning to politics? Although officially banned from day-to-day politics, the military has always been considered Indonesia? most powerful political institution by virtue of its institutional strength, especially its territorial command structure.

In this regard, it might not be a question of whether the military has returned to politics, but a question of how it plays politics under the new rules of the game. In other words, one could argue it never actually left the political scene.

If this is the case, what then explains the phenomenon of an apparent military ?omeback?in politics?

First, as argued by Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, a professor at the National Institute of Sciences, it might be an indication of a post-power syndrome among officers who were once part of the ruling elite ?or it might only involve a handful of high-ranking former officers rather than indicate a general trend plaguing the entire officer corps.

Second, it could also be seen as the result of politicization, and even commercialization, of the officer corps, which is instigated not only by the political leadership? intervention in internal military affairs ?as was the case during the terms of presidents Sukarno, Soeharto, and Abdurrahman Wahid ?but also due to the nature of the military education and its territorial command system.

The fact that the majority of the Army is utilized for staff positions in the territorial command structure suggests that the career experience of the majority of the officer corps is actually related to social, business, and political issues in the regions.

Although the process of military education reform is currently underway, the curricula at the military academies all the way through the staff and command colleges since the 1960s have always emphasized social-political subjects. This suggests that some, if not most, military officers would be prepared for ?ociopolitical?tasks, and hence, by implication, might not be well trained in other skills required for an alternative livelihood after retirement other than politics or business.

Finally, the military prevalence in politics highlights the failure of the civilian leadership ?whether to provide stability and improve welfare, or to overcome their lack of political confidence ?because they continue to drag the military back in.

On the one hand, we hear the oft-repeated accusation from the military establishment that the civilian politicians are a prime source of the nation? problems ?which the public seems to agree with. A Kompas poll in 2007 noted that 46.6 percent of the public would vote for a military figure as the next president. On the other hand, the charge might not have credibility had it not been for the fact that corruption among civilian politicians is increasing while basic prices are skyrocketing.

Meanwhile, the ?nferiority syndrome?suffered by civilian politicians highlights two points: First, the weakness of the civilian defense community to adequately support the civilian leadership; and second, the cliche that military men are financially and politically omnipotent ?regardless of the current debate challenging the leadership skills possessed by former military officers.

What does all this mean for Indonesia? fledgling military reform and delicate civilian-military relations?

First, although the focus on removing the military from day-to-day politics and regulating their commercial activities is certainly a worthy cause, the issue of military education reform should be the top priority of decision makers in Jakarta.

Without a complete overhaul and integration of the military curricula ?as well as a civilian teaching staff ?military officers will always reserve the potential to play a sociopolitical role.

Second, although the territorial command structure cannot be plausibly erased entirely due to the prevalence of internal security threats and separatism, a mechanism should be enforced within the existing regulations to ?solate?military men assigned to regional staff positions to prevent them from being utilized or dragged into local social, political and business activities.

When it comes to civilian-military relations, observers have noted this ?omeback?phenomenon could be seen positively as far as military politics are concerned because with former generals running their own campaigns, the military might not be able to present a unified front. Hence, as the argument goes, civilian leadership could be strengthened at the expense of a ?ractured?military establishment.

However, a strong civilian leadership cannot be fully achieved without the strengthening of a civilian defense community that could bridge the civilian-military divide while assisting both sides in dealing with national security issues. At the same time, the civilian leadership also needs to overcome its ?nferiority syndrome?and stop bringing the military back into politics.

Finally, public exhaustion over corrupt civilian politicians might lead to disillusionment with democratic ideals and civilian supremacy over the military ?premised upon distinct ?ivilian?and ?ilitary?realms.

Eventually, if this dichotomy is increasingly blurred, a reconsideration of civilian-military relations that for the past decade has been centered upon establishing a civilian supremacy over the military might be required.

In the end, whether a civilian-military ?artnership?would be the best form of relationship and whether such partnership would prove more productive for Indonesia? future in the long run remains to be seen.

 Evan A. Laksmana

Published at The Jakarta Post and CSIS, http://www.csis.or.id/Publications-OpinionsDetail.php?id=757

Military postings are now less political

Though personnel management may stabilise in the next few years as the 1976-1981 classes take charge, the fact that subsequent classes, from 1983 to 1991, are larger, averaging around 250 officers per year, means that post availability and promotion policies will remain a potential time bomb.
AWAY from the glare of the headlines, a fundamental shift has quietly taken place in the Indonesian military (TNI).

In the last three months, there have been at least four waves of personnel changes. The first, on Oct 23, involved 46 officers. Another reshuffle on Nov 17 involved 11 officers; on Nov 30, 72 officers; and Dec 29, 51 officers.

The transfers affected a wide range of commands and brought about changes in posts across the board, including those of the three service chiefs, the chief of general staff, the chief of military intelligence, the commander of army special forces (Kopassus), and the regional commanders of Papua, Sulawesi, Aceh, West Java and Central Java, to name a few.

The changes arise from trends in the TNI's personnel system over the past five years, sparked initially by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's election in 2004; the new TNI Law of 2004, which raised the military retirement age from 55 to 58; and the end of the Aceh insurgency in 2005.

A 2008 study by the editors of Cornell University's Indonesia journal showed that between September 2005 and March 2008, there were at least three big waves of personnel moves in which President Yudhoyono and then-army chief Djoko Santoso slotted their classmates from the 1974 and 1975 classes of the Indonesian Military Academy into strategic posts.

The decision to favour these two classes could be seen as a way to relieve their frustration: Though the classes were large (the class of 1974 had 434 members and 1975, 304), the number of strategic posts had shrunk.

The end of the Aceh insurgency in 2005, as well as the abolishment of many socio-political posts after former leader Suharto's fall, did not make things easier. Logjams in promotions began to appear.

The Cornell Indonesia journal study argues that it was the need to provide new posts that prompted the greater use of postings to the defence and non-military ministries as well as the expansion of the territorial command structure in the last few years.

The shortage of posts also explains the frequency of personnel reshuffles in the last few months, so officers can be cycled through posts more rapidly. Younger officers from the classes of 1976 to 1980 have been moved into many key positions in the recent reshuffles.

From the class of 1976, we have generals George Toisutta (army chief) and Suryo Prabowo (deputy army chief). From the class of 1977, there are generals Hotma Marbun (Papua commander) and Hotmangaradja Pandjaitan (Bali commander).

The class of 1978 is represented by generals Soenarko (infantry centre commander), Hari Krisnomo (Sulawesi regional commander), Gerhan Lentara (commander of 2nd Division of the Army Strategic Reserve), Budiman (Central Java regional commander) and Marciano Norman (presidential guard commander).

The first officer from the 1980s generation to win a general's star is Pramono Edhie Wibowo (class of 1980), Dr Yudhoyono's brother-in-law who was recently appointed the West Java commander after his tenure in Kopassus. The new Kopassus chief Lodewijk Freidrich Paulus is from the class of 1981. Many from the classes of 1980 and 1981 fill the sub-regional military commander posts.

Given the smaller sizes of the 1976-1981 classes, which averaged around 100 officers per class, their members are likely to feel more secure about their careers than their seniors. They realise that as long as they do their jobs well, strategic posts are within their grasp.

In another change from the Suharto era, when intelligence officers were favoured, the Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) and Kopassus have become the most prestigious postings. It is interesting to note that Dr Yudhoyono, TNI commander Djoko Santoso, army chief George Toisutta, as well as his predecessor Agustadi Sasongko, all served in Kostrad.

Officers from the navy and air force - two services known for technically oriented professionalism - are also playing a growing role. Rear-Admiral Tedjo Edhy Purdijanto was appointed the TNI's chief of general staff in 2007. Indeed, from 2006-2007, the number of non-army generals in strategic inter-service positions has risen dramatically.

Such developments suggest that there has been a slow shift in the military's personnel selection system away from what used to be a highly political process, with those with good elite connections or who hailed from domestic intelligence being favoured.

If this trend continues, the younger generation of officers may be more inclined to prove themselves professionally. They may even seek new areas, such as counter-terrorism and border security, where they can shine.

Though personnel management may stabilise in the next few years as the 1976-1981 classes take charge, the fact that subsequent classes, from 1983 to 1991, are larger, averaging around 250 officers per year, means that post availability and promotion policies will remain a potential time bomb.

In the absence of a complete overhaul of the military's personnel planning system, the road to a stable form of renewal appears a long and winding one.

Evan A. Laksmana
Published at The Straits Times - 01 February 2010 and CSIS, http://www.csis.or.id/Publications-OpinionsDetail.php?id=764

Reforming Indonesia's Military: Going Beyond Cash, Guns, and Ballots

The depoliticisation and defence management reforms represent short- and medium-term solutions which overlook the fundamental problems of professional military capacity building.

THIS month, Indonesia celebrates the 10th anniversary of the reformasi movement that toppled president Suharto and ushered in democracy. One of the key issues then was reforming the country? military.
Reform has focused thus far on three major areas: bringing the military under democratic civilian control, curbing the military? economic activities and restructuring the defence management process.

Although much remains to be done ?reforming of the territorial command structure, for instance ?there has also been much progress.

Serving military officers are now required to step down before holding political office. Also, the military? ?ual function?doctrine as well as its ?ocial political?offices have been officially abolished.

Meanwhile, military-run businesses have been banned and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has established a team to take over these. The government is also trying to raise the annual defence budget.

But the depoliticisation and defence management reforms represent short- and medium-term solutions which overlook the fundamental problems of professional military capacity building.

There are two issues here: military education and the strengthening of a civilian defence community. Education is perhaps the single most important long-term issue that can change the military? underlying culture and behaviour, as well as its ability to function as a professional force.

Of special concern are the curricula of the Military Academy, Staff and Command Colleges and National Resilience Institute. A recent study notes that, since the 1960s, 53 per cent of the academy? curriculum and 64 per cent of the command staff and college curriculum covered political and social subjects. This suggests that military education was not aimed at producing professional soldiers but rather at preparing them to play a ?ocial-political?role.

Thus, one can surmise that while there are many politically savvy officers in Jakarta, there are few technical experts. One indicator of the impact of such politically heavy curricula can be seen in the fact that the Defence White Paper is mostly formulated by civilian academics.

The percentage of technical military courses should be raised and integrated into Indonesia? national defence and military doctrines.

The welfare of the rank-and-file soldiers must also be improved. Reform will be pointless if soldiers are preoccupied with securing additional funding to support their families.

Another aspect of military education reform is the need to gradually ?ivilianise?the teaching staff of the military academies. But this cannot be accomplished without a strong civilian defence community.

Unfortunately, Indonesian civil society is lacking in this regard. Although there are some highly qualified defence academicians, very few are trained in technical, strategic or military studies.

Civilians need to move away from their ?nti-military?attitude. If they do, perhaps more civilians would be willing to study military- related subjects, thereby providing a pool of people able to assist the military in policy-making.

For example, such a community could conduct studies on issues that practical military officers may not be able to carry out themselves. They could also help distinguish between short-term and long-term strategic issues, as well as project trends and future threats.

A strong civilian defence community is sorely needed to overcome the inferiority syndrome which civilians seem to suffer from whenever they have to deal with the military.

Reforming military education and creating a strong civilian defence community are important.

A large budget, plenty of weapons and a politically neutral officer corps are not enough to ensure that Indonesia? military functions as a thoroughly professional and modern force.

Evan A. Laksmana
Published at The Straits Times and CSIS, http://www.csis.or.id/Publications-OpinionsDetail.php?id=759

Looking For National Security System

Purchasing of 100 main battle tank  with the type A26 Germany-made, into one of two issues seized public attention related to defence and security since the end of 2011. Other issues of interest to be listened to and examined the Draft national security legislation ( RUU Kamnas)). The bill became one of four Kamnas regulatory politics in the field of defence and security in the national legislation program in 2012. Three other bills are  a reserve component of the Bill, the Bill’s defense industry and security, and the Bill’s State secrets.

In recent months occurred many cases of violence involving national security actors in some areas, such as Papua, Mesuji, Bima, as well as the deaths of two sisters in the Sijunjung, West Sumatra. A number of events were increasingly expresses the need of a national security-related regulations in the country.

However, the public debate concerning Draft national security legislation tends to be the primary substance only on reducing the substansives of the Bill. National security issues just described as the question of the authority of one institution in this country. Whereas, pursuant to the bill submitted to the Ministry of Defense, main substance which must be known and discussed the public is looking at the creation of a national security system (siskamnas).

National security system should be a major debate in view of the nation-state, in the process of political transition and democratization regime. Currently, Indonesia can be categorized as vulnerable, because of the weakness of the regime's power of the nation-state that is in the process of transitioning democratization. One proof of the insecurity is a distrust of the community of a number of State institutions, in particular the institutes which have the functions and responsibilities in the fields of defence and national security. It is envisaged in various cases of violence that occurred from Aceh to Papua's district but involves the security apparatus,. Therefore, it takes a pretty public space to discuss the concept of the ideal related national security for the country.

National security system is a system of mapping, arrangement, coordination, implementation and monitoring of the various threats the multidimensional, doing by different actors on the basis of the principles of security's sourced from national values. National security system provides an instrument for the State to take measures to safeguard the sovereignty of the State's strategic, territorial integrity, the safety of the nation and the State of any form of threat.

In the bill, there are three main substance in understanding the direction of national security systems. First, the setting up of a national security dimension and the actors of defense and security were involved. The bill’s national security rests on national security terminology which became the central concept in the national security system. Security is seen as a multidimensional concept that features four interconnected dimensions, namely the defence dimension, the dimension of the stability of the country, the dimension of public order, and safety dimension of human. Four of these dimensions should be an integral part of the national security system by not eliminating the possibility of developing national systems developed by other countries that can be used to solve security problems in the lower levels of escalation.

In the exercise of these paradigms is required security actors. In managing national security system, the President is assisted by the National Security Council (NSC). NSC function assists the President in determining problems can be categorized as a national security issue and recommend alternative policies in addressing national security concerns. Based on recommendations of such policy, the President can use institutions that already exist (such as Armed Forces, Police, intelligence agencies, and departments) to address the issue of national security.

Second, the national security system will build mechanisms and work procedures that are specific in each level of danger or a State of emergency escalation. The mechanism and procedure of the security work can be developed to establish a State of emergency that different for each level of conflict escalation. Establishment of a State of civil emergency, orderly, civil, martial law, and war emergency need to be formulated in detail.

In addition, mechanisms and procedures for national security work also needs to be developed having regard to the security functions that would take precedence at each level of escalation. Security functions include early warning functions, action, recovery, and stabilization. Early warning and prevention functions should have been more escalation levels take precedence when conflicts are still in normal levels or crisis. The function of action was forced to rely on the escalation of conflict escalates toward open conflict. Recovery and stabilization functions should be performed when the parties have an agreement to leave the conflicted already violent methods and entry to the stage of the peace.

Thirdly, the involvement of the national security actors. Basically, the deployment and use of national security forces should be based on a political decision based on the statutory rules applicable. Setting about the deployment and use of the national security force is needed to provide certainty as to the form of authorization, the time and the deployment of the forces of the Indonesian situation. Such certainty is needed to ensure that any use of the national security forces carried out within the framework of a democratic political system. The certainty it also needed to ensure that any use of the national security forces received strong political support from the State institutions, in particular the Executive and the legislature.

So far, Police are likely to join hands with the members of Parliament and civil society components to resist the process of formulation of the bill national security. It is due to the perception of Police that the Bill reduces the role of the national police and shaking the internal organization of Police.

Should go hand in hand with the Indonesian National Police and Indonesian Armed Forces will be (as well as BIN) to offer a strong network of institutional work which effectively can solve the problems of national security. While the People’s Representative Council (DPR) will build alliances with civil society components in order to prevent the accumulation of repressive national security instrument in the hands of the State and offer the principles of human rights, civil liberties, transparency and accountability.

Hipolitus Wangge
Program Officer Civil Society Studies at Center for Global Civil Society Studies (Pacivis), University of Indonesia

EFEKTIFITAS KOMANDO TERITORIAL

Pada Hut TNI ke 66, Presiden Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono menghimbau diefektifkan kembali komando-komando teritorial di seluruh wilayah Indonesia. Tujuannya adalah membantu pihak kepolisian mencegah dan memberangus terorisme. Himbaun tersebut memiliki sejumlah konsekuensi lanjut terhadap reformasi militer yang masih terus berjalan sejak tahun 1998 dan penguatan  pertahanan nasional berdasarkan Kekuatan Pertahanan Minimal (Minimum Essential Force/MEF).

Salah rekomendasi reformasi TNI sesuai UU No. 2 Tahun 2002 tentang pertahanan nasional adalah melikuidasi struktur komando teritorial di daerah yang tidak rawan konflik, mulai dari struktur terkecil hingga teratas (babinsa, koramil, kodim, korem, dan kodam) . Rekomendasi tersebut didasarkan pada evaluasi kinerja koter pada era orde baru.

Koter pada awalnya didesain untuk memberdayakan seluruh sumber daya dan potensi yang ada di suatu wilayah untuk digunakan demi kepentingan pertahanan nasional. Namun, pada era orde baru, koter digunakan untuk mendukung kepentingan politik rezim tersebut. Koter digunakan sebagai mobilisator dukungan pada saat  pemilu.  Koter digunakan untuk mengawasi seluruh kegiatan masyarakat, khususnya kegiatan-kegiatan masyarakat yang dinilai mengancam stabilitas nasional. Pendekatan represif menjadi salah satu ciri pelaksanaan fungsi koter di era orde baru.

            Pasca era orde baru, TNI melakukan reformasi internal. Sejumlah regulasi TNI dibuat, seperti UU No. 2 tahun 2002 tentang Pertahanan Nasional dan UU No. 32 Tahun 2004 tentang TNI, serta Buku Putih Pertahanan Indonesia tahun 2008.  Dalam regulasi-regulasi tersebut, secara tersirat mengamanatkan penataan kembali sejumlah koter di berbagai wilayah Indonesia. Namun, implementasinya sangat sulit dilakukan. Terdapat dua alasan utama.

Pertama, masih dipertahankannya doktrin pertahanan nasional, sistem pertahanan semesta (sishanta). Doktrin ini mengasumsikan seluruh komponen dan sumber daya nasional digunakan untuk mempertahankan kedaulatan NKRI. Hal tersebut membuat koter menjadi “tulang punggung” dalam memetakan dan memberdayakan seluruh komponen dan sumber daya di setiap wilayah negeri ini. Kedua, tidak terdapatnya keinginan yang kuat dari jajaran pimpinan angkatan darat untuk menata kembali seluruh koter. Koter dipandang masih perlu untuk mengamankan seluruh wilayah NKRI dari berbagai potensi ancaman yang muncul dari dalam masyarakat, termasuk terorisme.

Di era reformasi dengan pilihan demokrasi seperti sekarang, fungsi pemberdayaan wilayah mampu dijalankan oleh pemerintah daerah (pemda) setempat. Dalam kerangka otonomi, pemda setempat mampu memetakan dan memberdayakan baik komponen pendukung maupun komponen cadangan, serta seluruh sumber daya lokal untuk menunjang fungsi pertahanan. Untuk menanggulangi ancaman teror, pemda memiliki alat kemananan negara, yakni kepolisian. Dukungan seharusnya diberikan kepada pihak kepolisian untuk menangani persoalan keamanan nasional, sesuai amanat konstitusi. TNI sendiri harus mendukung peningkatan kapasitas sipil untuk melakukan fungsi pemberdayaan wilayah pertahanan.

Keberadaan koter, tidak perlu lagi digelar sampai tingkatan desa (babinsa). Fungsi teritorial, jika perlu dipertahankan, cukup sampai tingkatan kabupaten (kodim). Hal tersebut mengingat fungsi koordinasi dan mobilisasi seluruh pasukan regular di daerah, berada di bawah kewenangan komando daerah militer (kodam) dan komando resort militer (korem). Keberadaan koter cenderung untuk mempertahankan status quo militer di daerah, yang telah bertahan sejak diterapkan sitem wehrkreise (kantong-kantong pertahanan) pada zaman  revolusi.

Penolakan para petinggi angkatan darat, berbanding terbalik dengan kenyataan di daerah. Keberadaan koter di beberapa daerah tidak rawan konflik ternyata, menimbulkan keresahan, bahkan tindak pelanggaran ham terhadap masyarakat. Berdasarkan laporan Komnas Ham tahun 2010 sampai Maret 2011, terdapat 88 kasus indikasi pelanggaran ham, baik yang melibatkan personil, staf, maupun institusi teritorial di seluruh wilayah Indonesia.

Sejumlah pelanggaran ham yang diadukan diantaranya perebutan lahan, pembongkaran paksa sejumlah bangunan,  tindakan asusila, tindakan pengeroyokan, bahkan mengakibatkan kematian. Selain itu, berdasarkan laporan Human Rights Watch tahun 2009, keberadaan komando-komando teritorial di berbagai daerah berhubungan dengan keberadaan bisnis militer. Sejumlah koter digunakan untuk mempertahankan sejumlah bisnis militer yang belum dilukuidasi atau diambilalih oleh Pemerintah sesuai amanat Peraturan Pemerintah Nomor 23 tahun 2009 tentang Pengambilahan Aktivitas Bisnis Militer.

Dalam rangka membangun Kekuatan Pertahanan Minimal (MEF), keberadaan koter perlu dikaji kembali. Asumsi yang selama ini dibangun adalah dua zona pertahanan, yakni zona 1 penyangga (ZEE hingga wilayah musuh)  dan zona 2 pertahanan utama (wilayah perairan teritori Indonesia), dimana angkatan laut dan anagkatan udara menjadi aktor-aktor sentral, tidak bisa dipertahankan. Hal tersebut membuat penguatan terutama dilakukan terhadap zona 3 perlawanan (wilayah darat teritori Indonesia), dimana angkatan darat melalaui koter menjadi aktor utama pertahanan nasional. 

Padahal, agresi militer musuh akan dengan mudah memasuki dan menghancurkan zona 3 pertahanan Indonesia, jika dua zona terdepan tidak dikuatkan.  MEF berusaha merespon hal tersebut, dengan memperkuat kekuatan baik personil maupun peralatan kedua angkatan tersebut. Penguatan seharusnya dilakukan terhadap  detasemen detasemen jala mengkara (denjaka) TNI AL dan detasemen bravo-90 (denbravo-90) TNI AU, bukan lagi pada penguatan struktur teritorial, yang cenderung tidak efektif. Struktur teritorial selama ini hanya menjalankan fungsi administratif pembinaan wilayah.

Kedua satuan elit tersebut harus dilihat secara luas sebagai bagian dari penguatan dua zona pertahanan, termasuk upaya penanganan terorisme. Ditambah detasemen khusus 88, seharusnya yang dilakukan adalah koordinasi antara satuan elit yang memiliki keahlian penagangan teror, bukan pada penguatan struktur teritorial. Apalagi anggaran pertahanan nasional yang dialokasikan untuk penyelengaraan fungsi teritorial cukup besar, yakni 20,6 miliar pada tahun 2012 mendatang. Anggaran sebesar itu, akan lebih efektif jika digunakan untuk kebutuhan militer lainnya yang sangat mendesak, seperti kesejahteraan personil maupun kemampuan alat utama sistem persenjataan (alutsista).

Efektifitas komando teritorial tidak lagi relevan seperti pada era revolusi. Alasan “penghidupan” kembali koter untuk penanganan teror cenderung dipaksakan. Diperlukan kajian yang lebih komprehensif terkait penggunaan struktur teritorial dalam menghadapi terorisme.

HW

Peneliti Pacivis, Universitas Indonesia

Pendekatan Kesejahteraan versus Pendekatan Keamanan di Papua

Terbentuknya Unit Kerja Percepatan Pembangunan Papua dan Papua Barat (UP4B), pada awal Oktober  kemarin setidaknya memberikan harapan bagi penyelesaian masalah-masalah yang terjadi Papua dan Papua Barat.  Pembentukan UP4B ini merupakan pelaksanaan dari Perpres 65 Tahun 2011 tentang Percepatan Pembangunan Provinsi Papua dan Papua Barat. Sebulan setelah terbentuk, ketua UP4B, Bambang Dharmono menyatakan perlunya memberikan rasa aman bagi masyarakat Papua sebelum menjalankan pendekatan kesejahteraan bagi masyarakat di bumi Cendrawasih tersebut.

Berikutnya peringatan 50 tahun hadirnya entitas politik Papua sejak keluarnya Belanda pada tahun 1961, yang diperingati kemarin (1/12) menjadi tantangan bagi penegakkan keamanan di Papua. Dilaporkan  bahwa  telah terjadi  baku tembak antara pihak TNI-Polri dengan kelompok OPM di daerah Paniai dan meninggalnya anggota kepolisian pasca pemukulan oleh kelompok tidak dikenal. Kedua peristiwa tersebut menjadi gambaran bahwa keamanan masih menjadi titik tolak utama dalam menyelesaikan masalah di tanah Papua.

Terdapat dua hal yang bertolak belakang dari pernyataan ketua UP4B dan peritiswa peringatan 50 tahun hadirnya entitas politik Papua. Di satu sisi, pendekatan kesejahteraan dinilai tepat menjadi salah satu solusi penyelesaian masalah Papua. Strategi pembangunan daerah, melalui priorotas pembangunan infrastruktur dan pembangunan sumber daya manusia dalam bingkai otnomi khusus, dinilai menjadi kunci penyelesian masalah Papua yang berlaru-larut. Pendekatan tersebut sesuai dengan arahan presiden bahwa, pendekatan kesejahteraan harus segera dipercepat untuk menyelesaikan masalah di Papua.

Namun, di sisi lain terlihat jelas masih adanya upaya dari pihak-pihak tertentu, baik pihak yang tidak bertanggung jawab maupun pihak aparat keamanan yang tidak sesuai dengan agenda besar pendekatan kesejahteraan dengan mengedepankan rasa aman masyarakat Papua. Sealin dua contoh tindak kekerasan yang terjadi di Papua pada saat peringatan 50 tahun entitas politik Papua,  sejumlah kekerasan lain telah terjadi sebelumnya. Penganiyaan oleh 7 anggota yonif 755 Merauke terhadap 12  orang warga distrik Kurulu Kabupaten Jayawijaya,yang sedang melakukan pertemuan adat (2/11), penembakan terhadap seorang petugas keamanan di areal  PT Freeport (7/11), dan penggeledahan paksa  tanpa surat izin di asrama Papua Menteng oleh pihak kepolisian, (10/11), merupakan gambaran kontraproduktif terhadap rencana penyelesaian masalah-masalah Papua berlandaskan rasa aman masyarakat Papua. Semangat membangun berdasarkan pendekatan kesejahteraan, terkesan berjalan di tingkatan elit, tetapi tidak dilaksanakan secara efektif.

Berdasarkan fakta masa lalu, bahwa sebagian besar agenda pembangunan di Papua dinilai gagal, bukan hanya karena tidak dijalankannya kebijakan otonomi khusus di Papua, tetapi juga karena munculnya resistensi masyarakat setempat terhadap proses pembangunan tersebut. Masyarakat menolak penyelesaian masalah Papua berdasarkan paradigma Jakarta. Pendekatan kesejahteraan dibangun dengan terlebih dahulu memberikan rasa aman bagi masyarakat Papua. Rasa aman tersebut dimulai dengan mengurangi bahkan menghilangkan trauma masa lalu dan menghentikan seluruh aksi kekerasan baik penembakan tidak bertanggung jawab maupun reprsifitas aparat keamanan terhadap masyarakat Papua. Dengan munculnya rasa aman, diyakini seluruh agenda pembangunan di Papua dapat diterima dengan baik, tanpa adanya resistensi masyarakat.

Rasa aman bagi masyarakat Papua tidak hadir begitu saja tanpa menghilangkan beban dan trauma masa lalu. Sejak menjadi bagian dari NKRI, Provinsi Papua (Irian Jaya) memiliki beban sejarah terkait aksi-aksi kekerasan, khususnya yang dilakukan oleh pihak aparat keamanan masih tersimpan dalam memori kolektif masyarakat setempat.  Berbagai aksi kekerasan yang terjadi di Papua tidak pernah mendapatkan pengakuan berupa pengadilan militer bagi aparat yang melakukan tindakan-tindakan kekerasan tersebut. Salah satu agenda besar reformasi sektor keamanan, yakni reformasi peradilan militer dengan memberikan hukuman setimpal terhadap aparat yang terbukti melakukan tindakan-tindakan pelanggaran ham, ternyata tidak efektif dilaksanakan di Papua. Trauma dan beban sejarah masa lalu tersebut tidak pernah hilang, bahkan dipertegas dengan sejumlah aksi pelanggaran ham sampai dengan hari ini.

Memberikan rasa aman bagi masyarakat Papua, harus lebih diarahkan dengan menghargai keberadaan masyarakat tersebut sebagai warga negara yang memiliki hak dan kewajiban yang sama dengan semua warga negara lain di bumi pertiwi ini. Penghargaan itu dilakukan dengan terlebih dahulu mengidentifikasi beban sejarah dan trauma kolektif masyarakat setempat. Selanjutnya, mengadakan rekonsiliasi persaudaraan antara pemerintah, aparat dan masyarakat setempat. Proses rekonsiliasi dimulai dengan permintaan maaf melalui proses peradilan yang layak bagi para aparat keamanan yang terbukti melakukan tindakan melanggar ham terhadap masayarakat Papua. Hal tersebut akan dilihat sebagai bukti dan komitmen pemerintah terhadap  masyarakat Papua yang selama ini berada dalam kondisi tertekan akibat sejarah dan trauma kolektif.

Proses yang mendamaikan tersebut ditindaklajuti dengan menghilangkan stigma separatisme terhadap masyarakat Papua yang masih tertanam dalam benak pihak keamanan yang bertugas di Papua. Memberikan rasa aman bagi masyarakat di Papua tidak berarti hanya menjaga hak hidup, hak sosial, hak ekonomi, tetapi juga memberikan ruang bagi artikulasi dan  ekskpresi bagi masyarakat Papua yang selama ini diperlakukan secara tidak layak sebagai warga negara Indonesia. Rutinitas dan aktivitas masyarakat harus dipandang sebagai bagian dari dinamika kehidupan masyarakat setempat yang sama statusnya dengan aktifitas masyarakat di berbagai belahan negeri ini. Paradigma kesejahteraan dan penghargaan sebagai warga negara Indonesia harus dimiliki dan dilaksankan secara konsisten, khususnya oleh aparat keamanan di tanah Papua.

Pada akhirnya, seluruh upaya yang akan dilakukan oleh UP4B dapat menjadi jembatan bagi penyelesaian masyarakat Papua yang merindukan kedamaian dan ketentraman. Rasa aman bagi masyarakat Papua, bukan hanya pada persoalan ketiadaan ancaman, tetapi juga menghilangkan trauma kolektif yang selama ini menjadi beban bagi masyarakat setempat. Menjadikan Papua sebagai bagian dari NKRI harus dibuktikan dengan komitmen yang kuat dari Pemerintah Pusat terhadap penyelesaian berbagai masalah yang sudah mengakar sejak lama di bumi Cendrawasih. 

HW

Peneliti-Pacivis Universitas Indonesia Jakarta