Two Different Paths toward Democracy in Egypt and Indonesia

Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge

the 2012 Arryman Fellow and visiting scholar at Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois

Democracy does not automatically come after electing a new president and reforming a constitution as happened in Egypt. There are many challenges following the transition and consolidation period. One of biggest obstacles during transition and consolidation period in newly democratizing countries is controlling and redirecting the military as a legacy of the authoritarian regime. This is often easier said than done. However, only a few countries can overcome legacies of military intervention during the transition and consolidation period. Indonesia is one of the success stories in transforming from an authoritarian regime to a democracy regime by redirecting the military to focus on its primary function. In Egypt and Indonesia, the role of the military was the same during the transition but different in the consolidation period. I will highlight the role of the military in a transition period and at the earliest of the consolidation period in both countries.

During the transitional period earlier in January 2011, Egypt’s military stood with the people in ousting the former president Hosni Mubarak. The signature event of the people’s movement was 18 days uprising. The military was in charge from that period through the emergence of a democratically elected civilian government. The military also supported to charge Hosni Mubarak in jail, even though Mubarak was a former military officer. However, the most important role of the military was its not shooting the demonstrators. It was a crucial decision for the future of democracy in Egypt.

In Bahrain, by contrast, the military stood by the ruling monarchy. Because it repressed civilian demonstrators brutally, the Bahraini monarchy survived. In Libya, the military split with some officers refusing to fire on civilians, others willing to shoot in defense of Muammar Gaddafi. The result was civil war. In Syria, the story is still unfolding, the military have managed to hold together the regime and continued to repress.

Indonesia’s process of transition was similar as happened in Egypt in terms of the role of the military. In Indonesia the military had played a key role in organizing controlled transfer of power from the authoritarian regime to the democratic regime. People were out in the streets. A large number of people took an opposition stance against the regime under President Soeharto. In May 1998 the central question was how the Indonesian Armed Forces would position itself vis a vis the instability surrounding the succession as in Egypt. In Indonesia at that time, the critical role of the military was whether to shoot or support the people. Moreover, the Indonesian’s military had the legitimacy that was given by Soeharto to stabilize the country. That role was proved after the former commander in chief general Wiranto has been given a letter by Soeharto to impose the order within the state (Winters, 2012). It means at that time, the military actually has the legitimacy to run the country, but they did not want to use it. Eventually, as we saw at the end of Soeharto’s period, the military took the stand not to shoot the people. It means they had the capacity even legitimacy, but not the will. If they had the will to shoot the people and stand with the regime, the path to democracy would never have occurred in Indonesia or it might have taken a much longer time to achieve democracy.

The decision not to shoot people relates to the capacity and the will of the military. The capacity of the military relates to its coercive apparatus includes some elements, such as good training, expertise in using weapon systems, and assistance from international countries. The will of the military relates to the level of institutionalization of the coercive apparatus. The military has the institutional interests, such as to maintain internal cohesion, discipline, and morale within the corps, to protect its image, prestige, and national legitimacy (Bellin 2012). Shooting civilians would have been potentially costly for the military in Egypt. In Indonesia, we know that with the support of the people, TNI defended the constitution and successfully contained a potentially calamitous slide into widespread domestic instability and violence. 

In general, using lethal force against civilians threatens to undermine the image of the military as defender of the nation. Immediately following the preparation of the first general election since 1957, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and the army took crucial steps by introducing a compulsory constitution and disbanding the People’s Assembly. The compulsory constitution gave the military more power than other institutional agencies. This fact showed that the SCAF and the army in general constitute a significant component of the state’s political apparatus beyond their primary function as the guardian of the state from outside threats. Given this condition, the military still maintains its role to control the regime, even though Egyptians disagree with the new constitution. For those who do not like the changes to the constitution, they will be dealt with harshly by the military.

In Indonesia, the election took place in 1999 involving 48 parties with different platforms. The winner was a secular party, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). With that election, Indonesia completely finished its transition process by electing a new government. Indonesia started to enter the consolidation period by strengthening the newly-elected government. At the beginning of the consolidation period, the military made its internal reforms, such as leaving the parliament, liquidating positions related to political affairs, and starting to give some businesses they owned to support the civilian government. These reforms stemming from the consciousness of the internal officers followed the crucial decision not to shoot people as aforementioned. Some officers realized that the military no longer was a dominant actor in political and social life beyond its traditional function. In contrast, the military leaders in Egypt protected the army’s interest at the beginning of consolidation period.

In both countries, the role of the military is one of the crucial aspects in transforming the regime to democracy. In Egypt the future of democracy still remains a question about when the military is willing to give power to the civilian government.  In Indonesia, although the military no longer plays a role in political life, they still have a potency to turn back as one actor in the decision making process within the state. As mentioned by Edward Gibson, once you give a political chance to the military, it is hard to deprive it at all even in the well-established democratic countries (Gibson, 2012).

First published at the Jakarta Post (http://www2.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/12/28/different-paths-toward-democracy-egypt-and-indonesia.html)