The Military Ruling Ambition in Egypt and Indonesia

Though the current spotlight is pointing to Syria’s civil war, the crisis in Egypt is still far away from coming to an end. The crisis currently hitting Egypt can be discussed in several points, such as fragmentation among civil and political societies, mainly between the ousted president Morsi’s supporters against anti-Morsi groups, the inadequacy of the interim government to manage the country, growing distrust among Egyptians toward state institutions, and military activity. In terms of government transition, what is happening in Egypt appears to be a comparative case with what was happening after the collapse of Suharto’s regime in Indonesia in 1998. 

Looking at these two cases, one variable that should be concerned with is military ruling ambition, mainly during transition and democratic consolidation periods. The desire - whether stemming from the armed forces as an institution or from individual officers, to play the dominant roles or to influence policies, and even to overthrow the incumbent government - drives the military to engage in social, economic, and prominently political daily life. There are two elements that need to be considered regarding the military ruling ambition both in Egypt and in Indonesia, the way to channel and to reduce the military political ambition during consolidation period.

Personal politicization done by former Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser to entangle the military as a crucial foundation in building modern Egypt gave a significant effect to the military to develop its political ambition that finally became largely obvious when they overthrew the longtime ruler Husni Mubarak in 2011. In the early months after the revolution, the military formed as its political channel, a 21^st Century junta: the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

SCAF declared the complementary constitution that returned itself all legislative powers and gave itself a veto over a wide range of political and security issues. That constitution gave strong power to the military to control the country. It caused instability in the country after the massive protests by Egyptians. The new constitution was a shelter of the military against the desire of the people to end the legacy of the old regime, particularly the military. Given that privilege, the military reasserted its domination in political affairs. It was also reinforced by a growing fragmentation among civilian actors.

In every nascent democracy, a sense of loyalty or political attachment to the country’s newly-formed democratic process is vital. In the case of Egypt, during the consolidation period, the military clearly overlooked a constitutional process or via the ballot box to overthrow the unpopular elected president, yet by force. This was the second time for the military to force the incumbent president to step down. It was different from the first phase of Egypt’s revolution in which the military took SCAF as its political body. Shortly after Morsi’s collapse, the military led by Egypt’s ruling General, Abdel Fatah Al-sisi, whom himself was appointed minister of defense by Morsi-named the chief justice of Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court Adly Mansour as interim president, thus putting a civilian face on a military coup. In this regard, the military continues to play political role not through a specific body, yet expressing its grip directly throughout the country by imposing a tight security approach to manage the country. In sum, the military is still being a dominant player and it seems unlikely to be deprived.

Some political analysts are comparing the Egypt’s path with Indonesia’s in 1998 in terms of undertaking political transition. In his article Lessons for Cairo from Jakarta, Manila, and Elsewhere published at the New York Times, Michael Vatikiotis argues that the security forces remain as a prominent actor not only under authoritarian regime but more decisive during a transitional period in both countries. Furthermore, Vatikiotis says the Egypt’s military should take a similar path to its counterpart, the Indonesian military in underpinning the democratic transition and reforming its institution (TheNew York Times, 07/08/13). 

However, the Jakarta Post commentary highlights the possibility of Indonesia’s turning back to disorder and chaotic situations in 1998 as it has happened in Egypt currently, given its political chaos, systemic corruption at all bureaucratic levels, attacks upon religious minorities, and so forth (The Jakarta Post 07/30/13). These problems are deemed as driving forces for the military to take over the government. It is quite different from Egypt, the Indonesian military draws its ambition from birth right principle in which the military sees itself as an essential component to attain the independence.

Moreover, the military received its prominent status during the New Order under Soeharto. The military political ambition had been channeled through Golkar as its formal political vehicle. However, after the collapse of Soeharto, the military through its former officers either formed or developed many political parties as the way to express their political views and interests. When General (retired) Edy Sudrajat launched the Indonesian Justice & Unity Party (PKPP) in 2004 outside Golkar, it marked the shift of the military ruling ambition.

The political ambition of the military, though has been restricted constitutionally since 2002, is still evident as indicated by the fact that a number of former military officers are running for legislative and executive positions, ranging from regency to national elections. Heading to the 2014 election, some former generals have taken their bids for the presidency supported by their own political vehicles, such as former Indonesian Military Commander General Wiranto with Hanura, Gerindra-backed candidate Lieutenant General (retired) Prabowo Subianto, Former General Endiarto Sutarto with his bid for Democratic presidential convention, and former General Sutiyoso as a Chairman of the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI). Interestingly, the younger brother of Ani Yudhoyono, the Indonesia’s current First Lady, General (retired) Pramono Edhie Wibowo who repeatedly rejected a proposal for presidency during his tenure as Army Chief of Staff, eventually joined democratic partyboard of committee. Though he graduated from class of 1984 of the Indonesian Military Academy, which was presumed as a reformation class in which the military’s dual functions had been gradually reduced in the military curriculum and proposed more elements on professionalism values, Pramono still finds it hard to deprive his natural military ambition in his blood. 

Across the board, the military ruling ambition in these two cases should be reduced. In this regard, the institution, individual, or external constraints are available to be applied in both countries. Indonesia took an institutional constrain launched in 2004 by internal military reform as the way to curb political ambition of certain groups or individual officers. In addition, the military cohesion which arose some reform generals, such as Susilo Bambang Yudoyhono, Agus Widjojo and Agus Wirahadikusumah helped to change the military mindset to underpin the democratic system. Generally, this effort has significant impacts to promote professionalism values to reduce the military political ambition. However, to some extent, the military still could not block its former officers’ political intention as seen by those retired generals as aforementioned.

Conversely, the institutional and individual constraints apparently do not apply to solve the military regime in Egypt. The Egypt’s military remains intact so far. Accordingly, there is no faction or reform group within the military to pose a “threat” to de facto ruling generals who now control the government. Furthermore, the external factor is previously considered as the only way to push the military back to its barrack. In this regard, the Obama administration is a key to end the prolonged crisis in Egypt. Nevertheless, Obama has been playing with semantics by refusing to call Morsi’s ouster a ‘coup’. Under provision of the Foreign Assistance Act, the US is required to cut aid to any country that undergoes a military-backed coup d’etat. In fact, the United States is still being hesitant to “punish” Egypt, though it has been obvious that more than 100 people have been killed under the martial law imposed by the government since July 2013.

The society pressures both from internal and from external, which in turn lead to a national arrangement is the last resort to end the conflict, to re-build a democratic government and more notably to reduce the military ruling ambition. It will definitely take time, but it will give the opportunity for those parties, particularly the military to give back the authority to the democratically elected civilian government.

By: HYRW