The Potential Threat of the Coercive Apparatuses

The clash between the police and the Indonesian military forces has proliferated as a commonplace event. The latest case that took place in Ogan Komering Ulu, South Sumatra depicts the high friction between these two state agencies that have been separated since 1999. These agencies have been complicit in a conflict that repeats itself annually for a decade with different causes. Two mainstream explanations for the most recent clash are the access to resources and the structural problems that lead to the accumulation of social jealousy. However, both the military and police should exercise their duties in protecting citizens based on their functions as state coercive apparatus. One direct corollary from the military-police conflict is concerns about the incapacity of the state to exercise coercive power effectively over these agencies. The recent clash signifies the problem of legitimation of the state, and it affects the democratization process.

Both the military and the police practice their organizational function based on their duties and rights. These functions lead to a plethora of both important and petty rules which seek to control and guide officers’ actions within the department as well as on either military missions or policing the street. Both agencies employ leadership, supervisory, and management techniques, and typical rewards and sanctions to ensure officer accountability, increase efficiency, and limit the abuse of power. In contrast, the organizational function is breached when these agencies misuse their force against each other and other state actors. In this regard, they abuse coercive power by exercising force that is more repressive than protective.

In the case in South Sumatra, the traffic police abused its power by shooting to death a military officer who violated a traffic law. The shooting sparked subsequent action by more than a hundred military officers to abuse their power by attacking the police station and police officers (the Jakarta Post 3/10/2013). Even the chiefs of both institutions were surprised about the extent of the conflict on ground. This clash and the rising number of unpredictable conflicts between these state apparatuses represent the failure of the state to control its apparatus and undermine its legitimacy.  The use of force by both state agencies against each other leads to further public distrust and revives the image of an unmanageable state.

The repressive and protective forces that are embodied within the coercive apparatuses shape the state legitimacy of exercising power throughout its population and territory. As pointed out by Otwin Marerin, the repression functions largely in a directly instrumentalist way for the state, but ultimately also can have legitimating or delegitimating consequences. Protection, in contrast, mainly affects the ideological processes through which states become legitimized (Greenberg & Mayer, 1990). By upholding the traffic law, the police officer exercised his function toward another agency that violated that law. The police exercised the protective function. However, shooting to death was not an appropriate way to deal with that issue. The later responses by the military officers exacerbated the misuse of the repressive function. On the other hand, the protective function of the police has declined following external pressure from citizens regarding the significant number of allegations of corruption among generals.

Coercive legitimation can be applied just as effectively as coercive apparatus performance and social norms. However, it can be reduced or disappear entirely when the legitimation of the state is exercised as happened in South Sumatra. The overused repressive force of these agencies, as aforementioned, undermines the eminent principle of exercising duty as a protector of state and citizenry. It has been highlighted by allegations raised by some groups about the use of torture by the police special counterterrorism unit Densus 88 to interrogate suspected terrorists. Meanwhile, the Indonesian military forces are allegedly violating the human rights of the indigenous Papuan people. This method reinforces the concerns about the misuse of repressive forces.

The repeated conflict between these state agencies severely affects the quality of democracy within the state. After the 13-year reform period, Indonesia is still facing the problem of the unmanageability of these agencies. The more they divert from the principles of the Constitution by wielding the repressive forces, the more the democratic consolidation process will be in danger. The state would be stateless if the dominant roles of government were not able to tackle the problem of the misuse of state authority by its apparatuses.

The military overlooked its primary function as the protector of state institutions by attacking the police. One prominent feature of the democratic consolidation process is the tight control of the elected government over its state apparatuses to exercise their primary duties. This does not mean the government can intervene in the organizational process within the state apparatuses, but instead, it should ensure that these state agencies exercise their duties based on their interest as state institutions in line with constitutional requirements.

By towing the line of the Constitution, both the military and the police uphold the democratic quality of the state. It is noteworthy that the source of power over these agencies is primarily coercive power. This is largely different from other state agencies that do not have the same source of power. Accordingly, the military and the police have the capacity to exercise their power without any control. This situation is immensely harmful for the existence of other state agencies and civil society groups. To a certain degree, the state is allowing radical groups to act violently toward other social groups has empowered the military and the police to act in a similar disobedient fashion. The state response in both cases has been insufficient to deal with this issue. In the quest for a stable democratic system, the state must ensure that all societal components, in particular the military and the police act in a principled manner.

By: HYRW

Cebongan: An Opportunity to Reform the Military Justice System?

Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge

 2012 Arryman Fellow at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

All speculations about the mastermind behind the Sleman prison killings have come to an end after Brig. Gen. Unggul K. Yudhoyono, the head of the Army’s investigative team, announced that 11 of the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus) personnel have been proved to be behind the killing of the four detainees in a jail (Jakarta Post, 04/04/2013). In further explanation, it was revealed that the main reason behind this atrocious assault was an act of revenge in response to the murder of their comrade. The spirit of corps that is essentially defined in the positive way of forming a sense of purpose and comradeship, have become a legitimation to overuse their repressive function instead of promoting their protective function. This violation of the spirit of corps reflects the military as an institution that controls every single unit within it; the culpability does not rest solely with the personnel involved. 

            The latest case in Cebongan prison that claimed the lives of four detainees along with the attack on the police station in Ogan Komering Ulu, South Sumatra, depict the abuse of coercive power by the military toward both civilian and other state institutions. However, the results released by the Army’s investigative team about the Cebongan case have to be highly appreciated in line with the upholding of the national justice system in Indonesia. The next question is the extent to which this commitment can be undertaken to bring a true sense of justice towards those who are suspected in this case. This question arises following the Army’s decision to bring these personnel to face a military court. However, as we know, from the new order era to the reform era, the military justice system has become a public concern based on its performance.  Two main arguments can be proposed about this concern, namely empowering the civilian justice and breaking down the military court as a safe haven for military officers.

Command Structure Inclination

Military justice in Indonesia is still a matter of the law enforcement system in Indonesia. The main indicator of the problem is the decision-making process; the final verdict determined by the military judges was not in accordance with the principles of democracy and human rights. During the new order, the whole military justice process from investigation to prosecution by military prosecutors was extremely closed. In the reform era, this situation still occurs. In addition the military tribunals follow the line of command instead of acting as an institution of the public conscience.

In the past, the highest judicial power in a military court was under the Armed Forces Commander. This judicial power shifted to the Supreme Court in September 2004 and the change was reinforced by the Presidential Decree Number 56 in 2004 as well as the mandate of Law Number 49 Year 2009 regarding Judicial Power. Based on these two regulations, supervision of the military court is under the Supreme Court, while discipline and career guidance for the members of the military are supposed to be submitted to the Department of Defense. However, the typical verdicts delivered by military judges still tend to be based on the TNI command line rather than on considerations of the Supreme Court as the holder of the highest judicial authority in the country.

Under the oversight authority of the Supreme Court, the final judgment of the military tribunals should be based on a common criminal consideration, not a command line. Command influence occurs when a military authority tries to influence, obstruct or deliberately direct the administration of justice. In this regard, the Law Development Board (Babinkum) under the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Headquarters controls the military corps system of law, including prosecutors and courts. Unfortunately, this structure leads to a legal process that is mostly influenced by the command of the military.

Safe Haven

Furthermore, the military court still is presumed to be a “safe haven” for officers who violate the country’s laws.  Based on Indonesian policy studies reports conducted by Imparsial, during the years 2001-2006 there were 46 cases of human rights violations committed by members of the military and police officers who received an average sentence of less than 4 years in prison. Whereas reports of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission found 11 cases of violations by the military against civilians in all provinces from 2009 until the beginning of 2011, only 5 were processed in military courts.

According to the two aforementioned reports, the significance of military justice for criminal acts committed by military personnel is still far from expectations. Military justice has become a safe haven for the resolution of these criminal cases. Disciplinary action taken by the judges of military courts is very minimal when compared to the acts themselves, including even those that have led to death. A typical sentence is merely adding external assignments to their institutional duties. Such sentences do not provide a deterrent effect for other soldiers even though a deterrent effect is one of the goals of justice in a democratic country.

The public expects fair and democratic values and human rights. Empowering the civilian justice and abolishing the military court as a safe haven would meet such public demands. Moreover, the Cebongan’s case is an opportunity to boost the spirit of military internal reforms launched after the ousted of the authoritarian regime in 1998.     

First published at The Jakarta Post Newspaper http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/04/09/reforming-military-justice-system.html 

Two Different Paths toward Democracy in Egypt and Indonesia

Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge

the 2012 Arryman Fellow and visiting scholar at Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois

Democracy does not automatically come after electing a new president and reforming a constitution as happened in Egypt. There are many challenges following the transition and consolidation period. One of biggest obstacles during transition and consolidation period in newly democratizing countries is controlling and redirecting the military as a legacy of the authoritarian regime. This is often easier said than done. However, only a few countries can overcome legacies of military intervention during the transition and consolidation period. Indonesia is one of the success stories in transforming from an authoritarian regime to a democracy regime by redirecting the military to focus on its primary function. In Egypt and Indonesia, the role of the military was the same during the transition but different in the consolidation period. I will highlight the role of the military in a transition period and at the earliest of the consolidation period in both countries.

During the transitional period earlier in January 2011, Egypt’s military stood with the people in ousting the former president Hosni Mubarak. The signature event of the people’s movement was 18 days uprising. The military was in charge from that period through the emergence of a democratically elected civilian government. The military also supported to charge Hosni Mubarak in jail, even though Mubarak was a former military officer. However, the most important role of the military was its not shooting the demonstrators. It was a crucial decision for the future of democracy in Egypt.

In Bahrain, by contrast, the military stood by the ruling monarchy. Because it repressed civilian demonstrators brutally, the Bahraini monarchy survived. In Libya, the military split with some officers refusing to fire on civilians, others willing to shoot in defense of Muammar Gaddafi. The result was civil war. In Syria, the story is still unfolding, the military have managed to hold together the regime and continued to repress.

Indonesia’s process of transition was similar as happened in Egypt in terms of the role of the military. In Indonesia the military had played a key role in organizing controlled transfer of power from the authoritarian regime to the democratic regime. People were out in the streets. A large number of people took an opposition stance against the regime under President Soeharto. In May 1998 the central question was how the Indonesian Armed Forces would position itself vis a vis the instability surrounding the succession as in Egypt. In Indonesia at that time, the critical role of the military was whether to shoot or support the people. Moreover, the Indonesian’s military had the legitimacy that was given by Soeharto to stabilize the country. That role was proved after the former commander in chief general Wiranto has been given a letter by Soeharto to impose the order within the state (Winters, 2012). It means at that time, the military actually has the legitimacy to run the country, but they did not want to use it. Eventually, as we saw at the end of Soeharto’s period, the military took the stand not to shoot the people. It means they had the capacity even legitimacy, but not the will. If they had the will to shoot the people and stand with the regime, the path to democracy would never have occurred in Indonesia or it might have taken a much longer time to achieve democracy.

The decision not to shoot people relates to the capacity and the will of the military. The capacity of the military relates to its coercive apparatus includes some elements, such as good training, expertise in using weapon systems, and assistance from international countries. The will of the military relates to the level of institutionalization of the coercive apparatus. The military has the institutional interests, such as to maintain internal cohesion, discipline, and morale within the corps, to protect its image, prestige, and national legitimacy (Bellin 2012). Shooting civilians would have been potentially costly for the military in Egypt. In Indonesia, we know that with the support of the people, TNI defended the constitution and successfully contained a potentially calamitous slide into widespread domestic instability and violence. 

In general, using lethal force against civilians threatens to undermine the image of the military as defender of the nation. Immediately following the preparation of the first general election since 1957, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and the army took crucial steps by introducing a compulsory constitution and disbanding the People’s Assembly. The compulsory constitution gave the military more power than other institutional agencies. This fact showed that the SCAF and the army in general constitute a significant component of the state’s political apparatus beyond their primary function as the guardian of the state from outside threats. Given this condition, the military still maintains its role to control the regime, even though Egyptians disagree with the new constitution. For those who do not like the changes to the constitution, they will be dealt with harshly by the military.

In Indonesia, the election took place in 1999 involving 48 parties with different platforms. The winner was a secular party, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). With that election, Indonesia completely finished its transition process by electing a new government. Indonesia started to enter the consolidation period by strengthening the newly-elected government. At the beginning of the consolidation period, the military made its internal reforms, such as leaving the parliament, liquidating positions related to political affairs, and starting to give some businesses they owned to support the civilian government. These reforms stemming from the consciousness of the internal officers followed the crucial decision not to shoot people as aforementioned. Some officers realized that the military no longer was a dominant actor in political and social life beyond its traditional function. In contrast, the military leaders in Egypt protected the army’s interest at the beginning of consolidation period.

In both countries, the role of the military is one of the crucial aspects in transforming the regime to democracy. In Egypt the future of democracy still remains a question about when the military is willing to give power to the civilian government.  In Indonesia, although the military no longer plays a role in political life, they still have a potency to turn back as one actor in the decision making process within the state. As mentioned by Edward Gibson, once you give a political chance to the military, it is hard to deprive it at all even in the well-established democratic countries (Gibson, 2012).

First published at the Jakarta Post (http://www2.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/12/28/different-paths-toward-democracy-egypt-and-indonesia.html)

Politicizing military history: A monumental mistake

President Yudhoyono, while officiating the latest war monuments in Jakarta, asked that all of us cherish and reflect on Indonesia? military history, reminding us that while we may prefer ?oft power? we should also be ?eady for war? Some notes can then be offered here.
Last Friday, President Yudhoyono, while officiating the latest war monuments in Jakarta, asked that all of us cherish and reflect on Indonesia? military history, reminding us that while we may prefer ?oft power? we should also be ?eady for war?
Here, the three monuments were meant to commemorate our ?truggles?with Malaysia, East Timor and the Dutch.

Some notes can then be offered here.

First, there is no doubt that history of crucial importance to the military profession. Ignoring history or not educating officers to have a ?istorical mind?can have disastrous consequences ?this much military history has taught us ?and the mess in Iraq is a vivid reminder.

The President is right to promote an appreciation of history, and in saying that ?he past is the prologue?to our present and future strategic circumstances.

Although, it must be remembered that the future, as Macgregor Knox claims, is not an object of knowledge, and no amount of ?rocessing power will make the owl of history a daytime bird?

Thus, military history should be studied (not just read) by officers and civilians alike, for its ability to help shape our intellectual fitness ?and not to find ready-made ?chools of solutions?

Second, military history should not be politicized ?even though the military (like other state institutions) often become hostages to the political sensitivities and prejudices of those they serve, and history has a bad habit of upsetting both.

However, to then politicize military history, whether to simply glorify parts of our past while ignoring others, or to serve realpolitik interests, would not only be disrespectful to the memories of our heroes, but also it would deny us crucial lessons that we might learn for future planning and wars.

Unfortunately for Indonesia, military history has taken a back seat to political interests.

One example, as historian Katharine Mcgregor argued, is when Soeharto? New Order regime used history to not only unify the military plagued with inter-service rivalries in the 1960s, but also to further legitimize his rule. It was this neglect of military history, combined with the intensive politicization of the officer corps, which led to the disastrous conditions surrounding Soeharto? fall in 1998.

Sadly, this politicization of military history is ?ollowed?by scholars studying the Indonesian military, who, for far too long, have focused on military politics and issues of civil-military relations ?though not without merit.

Consequently, there are very few scholarly studies that look at Indonesia? long and rich battlefield experiences (some claim to be within the hundreds) or why some of our joint-military operations were so successful in some cases and not in others.

With these three points in mind, there are three expectations in regards to our new monuments.

First, the memorials are nothing more than our sincere effort to honor our fallen heroes, and must not be used as a vehicle to politicize our military history for short-term political interests ?as has been implicitly argued by some observers recently. Especially since we consider that our neighbors might feel a little uneasy when reminded of our ?ggressive?behavior in the past ?which the three monuments symbolize.

Second, in terms of military history, we learn from both our failures and successes, or anything in between ?which I hope those three monuments would eventually lead to.

Here, there is much to learn from what scholars have described as one of our most successful post-independence military campaigns: the integrated joint-operations under Ahmad Yani to crush the PRRI-Permesta rebellion in the late 1950s.

The strategic, operational and tactical successes during this operation could provide us with ?ata richness?to develop our newly integrated joint-operations doctrine for example.

Meanwhile, there is also much to learn from our longest counter-insurgency campaign in East Timor that lasted for decades. Though it is hard to describe our experiences here as strategically or operationally successful, there is a wealth of information that we could study considering our ever-present focus on internal security and separatism.

On the other hand, we could also learn from those campaigns that were not clear victories or losses for us, as the case in our Konfrontasi with Malaysia and our planned operations against the Dutch. While it is hard to measure success or failure here, the planning stages of these operations that were plagued with difficulties could provide us lessons on future logistical planning for joint-operations.

Finally, no doubt we have lost our men during these operations and their memory should not be lost in vain. But for me, the best way to honor them is to continue on the long and winding road to inculcate a ?istorical mind?in our officers, which should be part of a strategic process to eventually incorporate the notion of a ?oldier-scholar?in our lexicon.

Ultimately, the increasingly complex strategic challenges facing us today and in the future require that we study military history for what it is and not for what political interests it could serve.

In the end, to paraphrase retired general Paul Van Riper, soldiers fight better when they fight smarter.

Military history is too serious a business to be left to politicians.

 Evan A. Laksmana
Published at The Jakarta Post and CSIS, http://www.csis.or.id/Publications-OpinionsDetail.php?id=753

Will a military coup happen in Indonesia?

Given Indonesia? turbulent history and past conflictual relationship between the military and political leadership, the question of whether a military coup could and will happen is certainly worth looking into.
In late August, the Indonesian press aired an age-old debate about the possibility of a military coup in Indonesia. The issue was sparked by President Yudhoyono? announcement of a 1.6 trillion rupiah (US$ 1.6 billion) budget cut in defence spending next year.
Observers have noted that a budget cut could hamper Indonesia? fledgling military reform as it slows down effort to create a minimum essential force. Some even went further by saying that if this trend continues, there is a possibility that the Indonesian military (TNI) could follow the coup path of the Thai military (Kompas, 25/08/08).

Subsequently, Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono stated that a military coup is out of the question as the TNI are the ?eople? army? It was a sentiment shared by high-ranking military officers as they claim that any military coup was simply not in the TNI? lexicon.

However, given Indonesia? turbulent history and past conflictual relationship between the military and political leadership, the question of whether a military coup could and will happen is certainly worth looking into.

A military coup in the offing?

Let? look more closely at the argument that the recent budget cuts might lead to a military coup as it threatens the military? financial corporate interests. This argument however overlooks other factors that could inhibit a military takeover.

Theoretically, a military coup ?or other forms of military intervention in politics ?could occur if three factors are present. These are the supporting motives, the capacity of the officer corps, as well as the opportunity provided in the domestic political arena to do so.

Firstly, in terms of motive, a military? intention to launch a coup generally stems from two overlapping logics: the logic of rationality and the logic of appropriateness. In the former, the military might rationally intervene mainly to defend its ?orporate?interests. In the latter, military behaviour is measured in terms of the congruence with its internalized norms.

A coup might not be entirely acceptable to all members of the officer corps due to embedded and internalized norms within the corps which sees a military coup as unacceptable to the Indonesian people. This view stems from the TNI? ethos as the ?eople? army?and ?uardian?of the people.

Thus, any coup attempt might potentially shatter military cohesion and ruin its public image ?two things that the military leadership has been trying to recover gradually and painstakingly in the post-Suharto period.

The military? corporate interests cannot be measured solely by the level of military spending. If so, a coup could have happened decades ago since from the 1950s, Jakarta was never able to provide the military with adequate funding. Moreover, it has generally been acknowledged that the bulk of the military? financial sources comes from off-budget sources, especially its commercial activities. Efforts are being made to regulate these activities.

Thus, although recent budget cuts might affect the TNI? operational readiness, it does not necessarily threaten the military? corporate interests. Also, there are other multi-faceted issues that the military sees to be more ?undamental,?such as the promotion and appointment policies, the territorial command structure, or investigation into past human rights abuses.

Secondly, in terms of capacity, any coup attempt will be determined by the degree of cohesion among the officer corps, since a coup ?essentially a showdown with the political leadership ?requires a unified front to be effective and acceptable to the military leadership. In this regard, as scholars have argued, the TNI has been divided throughout its history, especially during President Suharto? last decade.

Takashi Shiraishi, a professor at Kyoto University, argued that during the New Order, Mr. Suharto took measures to ensure that the officer corps never developed into a unified front ?a tactic of divide and rule that some attributed to President Abdurrahman Wahid as well. Hence, to some extent, the shadow of a divided military lingers on that could hinder a coup attempt.

Finally, in terms of opportunity, a coup move is usually preceded by a deep domestic political and economic crisis ?often cited as reasons that ?ropel?the military to intervene. Today however the TNI is in a cordial working partnership with the President, who himself is a retired general, and the domestic conditions are more stable than before. Thus, the opportunity, and justification, to launch a coup is almost non-existent today.

Therefore, even if one could argue that the military were ?orced?to contemplate a coup, the military? organizational norms, its multi-faceted institutional interests, and the legacies of a divided military, might hinder such eventuality in the near future.

Implications for civil-military relations

However, the historically turbulent, and often conflictual, relationship between the political and military leaderships indicates that the balance between the two is delicate, and often reflects a mutual distrust.

Thus, to safeguard against future conflicts, a new balance is needed to preserve a working relationship in a post-Suharto democratic setting. In this regard, a civilian defence community could complement the existing balance between the political and military leaderships.

The triangular balance might create what scholars call a ?oncordance?civil-military relation where the government, officer corps, and civil society have a cooperative relationship stressing dialogue, accommodation, and shared values. This could be initiated through several steps.

First, the political leadership should reduce the suspicion and grievances among the officer corps by not politicizing the military and not interfering excessively into internal military affairs. Excessive politicization and interference in internal military affairs could, as it did before, factionalize the officer corps and deepen grievances.

Second, the military should maintain the trust extended by the political leadership by continuing the momentum of military reform, including the regulations of military commercial activities and military tribunals. Abrupt and outright rejection of reform efforts might increase mistrust among the political leadership.

Finally, the civilian defence community should bridge any differences between the political and military leaderships. This could be done for example by assisting both leaderships in formulating defence strategies, while at the same time providing checks and balances. The absence of a credible civilian defence community instead might hinder communication between the two leaderships which could bring back old feuds.

In the end, the urgency for such a balance perhaps could be seen in the warning made by Andi Widjajanto, a noted Indonesia military observer, that the TNI is currently ?aiting in the wings?and simply ?bserving?the political arena ?a situation which could change if domestic conditions deteriorate further.

 Evan A. Laksmana
Available from http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/perspective/rsis1202008.pdf

The Indonesian Military Court Reform : Bridging the Gap among Justice Values

Military court reform in Indonesia is part of the national security sector reform. As  part of the entire national agenda, improvement of military justice has to be an element of the effort to reorganize the functions, structure and culture of institutions responsible for security, in accordance with the values of democracy and human rights.

Aspects of fairness in the military justice scheme has been the main focus since the commencement of security sector reform in 1998. In addition to the separation of the TNI (National Army) -Police in 2000 and the abolition of dual function of ABRI (Former Name of National Army) in 2004, following the reform agenda is the reform of military justice in Indonesia is the legal umbrella of Act No. 31 of 1997 on Military Justice.

That agenda should be performed soon, as a countermeasure to several cases of military misconduct by members of the TNI. While in the other hand, the status quo tend to immunize TNI from the logic of the society. One of the highlights is the case of the military judicial process on nine members of the Battalion 744/Satya Bhakti Yuda, who committed maltreatment against civilians. The tragedy was resulted in several death-toll in Atambua, Belu regency, West Timor. on March 11, 2011.

Following the verdict of the Military Court judges Kupang against the nine members of the Military Justice Infantry Battalion (Yonif) 744/Satya Bhakti Yuda, ENT public spotlight focused on Indonesia's military justice system, particularly drawn from the military tribunal process that occurs in Kupang, on Tuesday, July 21, 2011. At the very least, the family of Charles Mali (21 years) was saddened by the decision of the judges, which was considered away from the principle of fairness and equality before the law. Pro-democracy community groups and human rights actvists expressed rejection of the court decision.
Then, the batallion members were punished by an average sentence in prison under 1 year, with jail term cut and only one member who was disabled from active duty Army. This decision was based on the fact the trial that there had been a negligence committed by 9 Infantry Battalion soldiers 744/SYB and wounded in that task by persecuting civil institutions which lead to casualties (vivanews.com).

It’s lucid that Indonesian Military Trial is likely similar to the civil one, which is far from justice fundamentals and law impartiality. The verdict has broken the people’s heart, particularly the victims’ families. That case of military misconduct has left one with wonder, will this injustice continues?
There are reasons why problem of the military court reform still lingers. The court is supposed to become a securing place for those army members who committ crimes, including violation of human rights. While on the other side, the Law no.31/1997 --which already existed to maintain the court—has less sufficient contextual rule.


Military Law Enforcement Issues
Military justice in Indonesia is still a matter of law enforcement system in Indonesia. The main indicators of the problem are the decision making process and the final verdict read by military judges are not in accordance with the principles of democracy and human rights. During the whole new order of military justice process, from investigation to prosecution by military prosecutors are very closed. In the reform era, the closure of military courts is still happening. Another difference was wounded justice communities are in the process of reform era military tribunals prefer the command line instead of an institution of public conscience, which became the main considerations in the process. It boils down to read the decision by the judges.

The verdict delivered yesterday judges tend to be based on the TNI command line rather than on considerations of the Supreme Court as the holder of the highest judicial authority in the country. The highest judicial power in a military court under the Supreme Court held the delivery of judicial power by a military court in September 2004 the Armed Forces Commander and the Presidential Decree. 56 of 2004, as well as the mandate of Law Number 49 Year 2009 regarding Judicial Power. Based on these three rules of law, supervision of the military court under the Supreme Court, while the discipline and career guidance should be submitted to the Department of Defense.

Under the oversight authority of the Supreme Court, the final decision should be based on the military tribunal process judgment common criminal, not a command line. Coaching Corps Military Law committed by TNI headquarters through Law Development Board (Babinkum) associated with the military career of military personnel in the environment likely influenced the command of Military Justice in law enforcement and justice in the military environment. Command influence occurs when a military authority to influence, obstruct or deliberately directed to the incorrect administration of justice. Influence of the military command not only in military courts, but military prosecutors are in organization and administration which is part of Babinkum TNI based in TNI Headquarter.


Safe Haven
Based on reports in Indonesia policy studies conducted by Imparsial, during the years 2001-2006 there were 46 cases of human rights violations committed by military and police officers with an average sentence under 4 years in prison. While reports of Komnas Ham, kekrasan conducted military against civilians in the province from 2009 until the beginning of 2011 reached 11 cases, only 5 of which are processed in a military court.

Based on the two reports shows that the significance of military justice for criminal acts of the military personnel are still far from expectations. Military justice become safe haven for the resolution of criminal cases committed by military members. Disciplinary action taken by the judges of military courts is very low when compared to the criminal acts committed by members of the military, and even lead to death. The same sentence was given to military members, both in capacity and institutional duty assignment outside the institution. Given sentence is not automatically provide a deterrent effect to the soldiers who did this crime. In fact, the deterrent effect is one of the goals of justice in a democratic country. It is a domino effect on the emergence of a variety of other criminal acts, such as that experienced by Charles Mali and his colleagues, even very open to future possibilities of violence that afflicts other civil society rights violations, particularly in West Timor.

The credibility of the military justice is tarnished in the public eye, because in some cases, including in the case of the death of Charles Mali has been unable to capture the sense of justice and put it in the judge's decision.

Law No. 31 of 1997
One of the main legal basis of military justice in Indonesia are Law No. 31 of 1997, in addition to Law No. 49 of 2009 on Judicial Power. The law of military justice should now be changed, because the rule of law is a product of the regime established by the military domination. In the New Order era, the military court is part of the military hegemony in various areas of community life of Indonesia.

In the early period of the security sector reform, various laws new order dominated by the military to change. The emergence of MPR-RI No.: VI/MPR/2000 of Separation Military and Police, Law No. 3 of 2002 on the TNI and Law No. 34 of National Defence is attempting to regulate the governance of military institutions, including the military court order accordance with the spirit of reform and democracy. Mandate to make changes to military justice is reflected in the TAP MPR No. VII of 2000 on the role of the TNI and the Police Role. In Article 3 (4) (a) declare the Indonesian National Army soldier is subject to the authority of the military justice in violation of military law and subject to the general judicial power in terms of the general criminal law violations. However, to this day attempt to change the Military Justice Act is still confronted with obstacles. One major obstacle is the strong desire to distinguish the TNI military personnel with civilians. In fact, the bill is addressed to the Military Tribunal in 2007 was hit by the strength of the military status quo in the current logic of democracy that give priority to civilian rule and respect for human rights.

Looking at the military court in Kupang on 9 members of Battalion 744 encourages community efforts to revive the spirit of changes in Law No. 31 of 1997 is. General crime committed military forces should use the logic of civil penalty to put the military as an ordinary citizen who has the same status in the eyes of the law (equality before the law). The military is part of ordinary citizens who have the same status in the eyes of the law. Therefore, it should in general crime, such as assault causing death, the verdict is given based on the logic of common criminal.

Military judicial process against the nine members of Battalion 744 and the penalty imposed, encourage the holding of the correction of military justice in Indonesia. Various considerations above are simple considerations that are expected to arouse consciences of all components, especially the NTT law enforcement efforts to encourage a fair and democratic values and human rights.


Hipolitus Wangge, 
Researcher at  Pacivis University of Indonesia
This piece is formerly published at Pos Kupang, August 27, 2011

The US Political Stance on TNI’s Reform Agenda

On these previous few weeks, the media reports the US diplomats’ lobby to match the military retirees to the former ministry of finance, Sri mulyani Indrawati (SMI), now served as Excutive Director of World Bank. The mix and match strategies is on purpose for the next presidential election. The lobby continues on, approximately since a year ago. It’s considered as a part of trial-and-error negotiation with the military cliques, to map the support of the military to SMI.

The aspects of the negotiaion could be divided into three parts : the support of US lobby to the military, the US preference to the military, and the influence of the compromise to the efforts of military reform.


Support of US lobby to the military
National history of Indonesia is strongly linked to the foreign countries intervention. Clandestinely, foreign parties often act as free riders, using the military as a vehicle to support their own goals. While, the military stands as one of the sturdiest political powers in this country.

On 1958, a group of military higher-ups lead by Commander Ahmad Husein and Colonel Maludin Simbolon, rejected the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), government centralization in Java, as well as refusing the AH Nasution leadership over the Army. The most fundamental strike over this country is to build the Republic of Indonesia’s Revolutionary Government (PRRI) on Bukittinggi, West Sumatera.

This intrusion created an open door for US intervention to crush the communist entities and President Sukarno’s leadership. Following the financial and military aid, the US government under President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, fully supported PRRI/Permesta to overthrow the Soekarno’s Leadership. However, the AH Nasution’s troops could take control over the rush.

The role of military politics on the dual function of the Army (1959-1998), has a legitimate sustain from the US government trhough the RAND’s seminars on Forth Leavenworth, Kansas on 1959. The product of the seminars is a book titled The Role of the Military Underdeveloped Countries, edited by John J. Johnson. The book depicts the role of military as the agent of modernization in developing countries. The book was even used as a reading material to the US Military schools in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Essentially, the military function like that is ignoring the fundamental philosophy on civil-military relations on the west. The relations should be an objective civil control, which placed the military as the subordinate of the civilian.
On 1965, the US involvement was re-detected to indirectly support the defeat of PKI, by providing the think-tanks for the coup d’etat attempt by the September 30 Faction. It is strange that the coup d’etat, which was executed by the military criminals, did not receive international action or embargo from the US, a human rights and democracy champion.

The support of US lobby to the military
There are motives to take the military. First, due to its anti-fundamentalism and anti-communism posture. The September 30 coup d’etat reflected the US maintain over the military role to disband the PKI. On the other side, on 50’s decade, the military was also able to contain thr Darul Islam movement under SM Kartosoewiryo. The Islamic Fundamentalism was on the spotlight of US foreign policy on southeast Asia, which also become the second front of the US national policy (Rice : 2006).

The Fundamentalist faction has uncovered again their momentum since the previous one decade, especially post new-order era. Several series of violence, including the bombing case and destroying worship buildings, stand as a serious threat to US foreign policy in Indonesia, and generally in South East Asia.

Secondly, some of the military high officers (active or have retired) had tasted the US education overseas. Eventually, some of TNI’s executive doctrine were adapted from The US under the Pentagon arrangement (Syahnakri : 2011). A fraction of the military retirees is also identified to have received US education in its school of Commanding. The Command of Special Militia (Kopassus) had ever practiced routinely in the US before it was suspended following the Santa Cruz tragedy in Dili, East Timor on 1991. The military experiences in the US are then be seen as a psychological familiarity and key to have a same comprehensive view towards the national government succession on 2014.

The TNI Military Reform
The initial move to actualize the TNI to become the professional power in this country will be conflicted if there are any retiree taking part in government jobs. As a retiree, those people are acknowledged to have political rights under the constitution. Nevertheless, the TNI might as well provide indirect support to the senior retirees who are pursuing government position. Even though there are no command powers for the retired army members, the emotional and cultural bond have the potential to draw sympathy and preservation from active military members.

The TNI reform serves as a re-maintenance of its function as a main defense component in defending the Republic of Indonesia’s sovereignity, professionally and proportionally. It should have noticed that eventhough the reform attempt from 1998-2004 in considered sucsessfull, the spirit of the reform should keep on proliferated. In the middle of its improvement, the US lobby intention to draw the military support has an oblique obstacles to the spirit of reform. The government jobs which are filled by military retirees, in a way contradicts with the courage to reform. It’s due to some possibilities to restore the military networks to draw support for 2014 presidential election.

By that means, one should view what lies beneath US agenda in the midst of Indonesian civic conducts. For the betterment of the country, each nation’s element should respect the constitution by knowing their constituted position and duty.

Hipolitus Wangge, 
Writter as a Project Officer Civil Society Advocacy-Researcher at Pacivis University of Indonesia.

Published at Jawa Pos 3rd September 2011