Similar Problems with Reconciliation in Thailand and Indonesia

Both Thailand and Indonesia have been in a period of transition to more progressive form of government. On the one hand, in Thailand, the concept of democracy has repeatedly been tested. Even though several prime ministers have been elected constitutionally since the 1980s, the problem of military coups and strong grassroots protest against governments remain steady. On the other hand, Indonesia has generally been undertaking tremendous efforts to reform its political system.

Since the collapse of long-time ruler Suharto in 1998, Indonesia has transformed itself to become an example of modern democracy among other developing countries across the world. Additionally, these two countries differ in their treatment of long-ruling leaders. Interestingly, though he faced public anger at times, Suharto could head back to his beloved house in Cendana peacefully after handing over the presidency to his successor. In sharp contrast, former prime minister of Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra has been in exile since a military coup toppled him in 2006.

However, both countries face deep grievances within society after an era of corrupt governments. In Thailand, Thaksin has been creating a sharp division within society by splitting the country into two camps, namely his proponents, a group known as the Red Shirts as his opponents, the Yellow shirts.  In Indonesia, for Suharto, there has been a clear demarcation between the victims of past gross violations of human rights and the alleged perpetrators of those violations.

Furthermore, these cases show how the democratic governments deal with the national reconciliation process.  Reconciliation depends on the capacity of elected government to establish or restore democratic relationships; it is critical to the pursuit of peacemaking domestically. In the pursuit of reconciliation, the value of justice has to be upheld together with the value of national stability. To achieve this, two important steps can be undertaken, namely proposing a genuine apology and enforcing a legal prosecution.

In the case of Thailand, Yinluck has failed to build a national reconciliation by issuing an apology as she promised in her first address as prime minister. The Yinluck administration has no political will to prosecute those responsible for the 2010 crisis that brought Thailand to deep political stand-off. A bloody crisis in 2010, in which 98 people died, was initially expected to be turning point for Yinluck Shinawatra’s government to achieve a national reconciliation. Yet, the result has been slower progress. No one from the military or the previous government has been held accountable for the violent suppression of the protests. While the Yinluck administration has provided monetary compensation to the effected families, it has given no official apology.

Meanwhile, of the 1,019 protesters that were arrested during the crackdown, 20 still remain in prison (World Politics Review, 2013). This situation has been aggravated by the government’s arrangement to “protect” the military by granting them a major role in security matters without exercising much oversight, including of its annual budget allocation. 

On the other hand, the intention of Yinluck administration’s intention to reconcile Thailand by granting amnesty, instead triggering political opposition. This is the irony of democracy in which a worthy intention of the elected leader to reconcile the country instead draws strong protests from society. The main reason for this rejection is that Thaksin, Yinluck’s brother, will be allowed to return to Bangkok. This intention instantly received strong protest from the elite and educated people who have long been seen as initiators of local protests against the Thaksin’ backed government since 2006. They view Yinluck as similar as his brother who governed amid corruption and constrained citizens’ freedom.

In the Indonesian cases, the reconciliation is also still easier said than done. Since the end of Suharto government, the Indonesian government has failed to achieve reconciliation at the national level.  There is no genuine apology from the current government for what have been seen as past shocking abuses of human rights, particularly during the Suharto period. One particular case is sided in the report completed by the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas Ham) regarding the 1965 massacre carried out by the state. This report’s recommendation that the government issue an apology but it was overlooked, and there was no further investigation by the government.

In terms of pursuing legal prosecution, neither Thailand nor Indonesia ever shows strong political will to consistently enforce laws. There are a number of initiatives since the end of Suharto rule to deal with grassroots human rights violations, such as forming a truth and reconciliation commission and introducing human rights bill, but these have served particular interest groups. In this regard, the two countries have aims to “protect” particular groups, such as the military who are known to have a constant impunity. In Papua’s case for instance, no apology has been offered by the Indonesian government for the state’s exploitation and intimidation of Papuans since they became part of Indonesia.

Ironically, instead of declaring a genuine apology and enforcing legal prosecution, the current government has initiated giving national hero status to Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, a former special forced commander and also father-in-law of the current president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Wibowo is considered responsible for ordering the death of thousands of Indonesians in 1965. This fact amplifies the assumption that impunity in Indonesia has become very much embedded into the nation’s political culture.

Both countries have been practicing a similar refusal to seek a national reconciliation. If Thailand has been facing a prolonged crisis due to the absence of a genuine apology and legal prosecution, Indonesia also has the potential to have long-term deep grievances turn unexpectedly into social conflict. Eventually, these two countries cannot build a strong transition and consolidation, if reconciliation is still absent, particularly at the national level.

By: Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge
    published in the Jakarta Post, Dec. 9, 2013

Jokowi: Between a Traditional Elite and an Oligarchy

 Discussing a national political landscape over the last two years is so much fascinating in terms of looking at the much-discussed political competition. Heading to the 2014 election, everyone in Indonesia is keeping their eyes on Joko “Jokowi” Widodo’s performance and his opportunity to run for president.
  
Jokowi, as various opinion polls have shown, holds the keys to victory. It would be foolish for the party to leave him behind in the 2014 race.  Apparently, the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) sees Jokowi as the only tactic to uphold votes in both legislative and executive elections.

However, as a political student and for some Indonesians, the aforementioned scenario raises concerns regarding the internal dynamic between populism derived from Jokowi’s direct popular appeal and the prevailing patronage system within PDIP. It is largely obvious that during the Party’s coordination meeting couple months ago, there were two camps: those who supported Megawati to run for the third times as the PDIP’s presidential candidate and those local PDIP cadres who favor the former Solo mayor as the prominent candidate.

Given the aforementioned description, there are two possible questions. First, what is the political consequence if the PDIP is willing to back Jokowi’s bid to run for office and second, how can Jokowi exert and maintain his popularity amid the domination of small wealthy people or oligarchs on the national political landscape.

PDIP is a traditional party that has been maintaining its appeal among its followers by looking back to Soekarno and his nationalist vision. However, it is virtually assured that this party is only controlled by Soekarno descendants. Since it was established in 1999, PDIP has been in the hands of Megawati and her family members. Every single policy has been overseen by Megawati and she has been viewed as the symbol of unity within the party. Jokowi knows exactly what his party requires to back presidential candidates and he knows he has to maintain close relations with Megawati. This fact is pivotal in analyzing the way the party or to lesser extent its charwoman shapes what is Indonesia’s future under Jokowi if he latter becomes president next year.

That scenario will likely happen given certain basic facts. It is collectively known recently, Megawati is accompanying Jokowi on visits to see what is happening at the grassroots level.  This fact is unique given her profile as an elite; Megawati has never done such activities except during political campaigns. Megawati is trying to emulate what Jokowi has been doing so far. Jokowi also spends time frequently to visit Megawati’s house to discuss many topics ranging from international to local issues (Tempo: 2013).  Jokowi even reported the progress of certain projects such as, Pluit Dam and relocation of Tanah Abang textile market, to the former Indonesian president.

Looking ahead, it is hard to judge what sort of president Jokowi would make. However, these aforementioned facts lead to prospect of Jokowi if he is elected constitutionally as the Indonesian president. Megawati will tend to influence Jokowi’s policy, particularly in crucial polices, such as appointing cabinet ministers and high state institutional officers. This is more likely to occur given the close relationship between those two prominent figures. Jokowi himself so far has exhibited how Megawati is highly important in his tenure as Jakarta’s governor as well as the PDIP’s cadre.

Beside the close relationship between Jokowi and his chairwoman, another crucial issue that should be highlighted is that Jokowi’s popularity and its effect amid the existence of oligarchy.

As we know, the key power resource that brings Jokowi to the national level is his popularity. He does not have the same tremendous material power as his counterparts, such as Prabowo Subianto, Aburizal Bakrie, Surya Paloh and Jusuf Kalla. On the one hand, the popularity is crucial for Jokowi to mobilize support from the middle and lower class of society as was proved in the Jakarta election in 2012. Jokowi emerged when the current government fails to address the needs of a large constituency. It created conditions ripe for populism. In other words, it was a movement, a reaction to a deficient political system. The people felt neglected in some way by their government; the populist leader appealed to this, suggesting he could better represent their political desires.

On the other hand, this popularity is apparently not quite strong enough to tame the oligarchic which have continued to influence and even “hijack” Indonesia’s democracy after the downfall of Soeharto (Hadiz & Robinson; Winters: 2012). Jokowi is popular due mainly to heavy media coverage since he was the Solo mayor. He will be vulnerable amid the domination of oligarchs in Indonesia, needing to acknowledge the financial backing and other support would be given to him during his presidential campaign.

If the PDIP allows Jokowi to run for the 2014 election, a financial support is the crucial factor to think about. The 2012 gubernatorial election was the best example how the Jokowi’s candidacy received a financial backing from the oligarchs.  In its report, weekly based magazine Tempo published a revealing article focusing on the oligarchs backing Jokowi’s candidacy (Who Owns Jokowi?” Tempo, July24 2012). Though, Jokowi’s campaign team refused that report, it is widely known that Indonesia’s democracy is highly cost democracy. Oligarchs will provide a vast amount of money to Jokowi and in turn, he has to give reward to those small wealthy people who support his political campaign.  This leads to concern, the extent to which Jokowi will distance himself from the existence of oligarchy.
  

Jokowi has to cut the circle of elites and oligarchs even though it will take long time. Democracy does not merely require electability and popularity but the competency to become an independent figure amid the prevailing elitists and oligarchy domination within the democratic system. 

By: Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge

        published in the Jakarta Post, November 18, 2013

The Military Ruling Ambition in Egypt and Indonesia

Though the current spotlight is pointing to Syria’s civil war, the crisis in Egypt is still far away from coming to an end. The crisis currently hitting Egypt can be discussed in several points, such as fragmentation among civil and political societies, mainly between the ousted president Morsi’s supporters against anti-Morsi groups, the inadequacy of the interim government to manage the country, growing distrust among Egyptians toward state institutions, and military activity. In terms of government transition, what is happening in Egypt appears to be a comparative case with what was happening after the collapse of Suharto’s regime in Indonesia in 1998. 

Looking at these two cases, one variable that should be concerned with is military ruling ambition, mainly during transition and democratic consolidation periods. The desire - whether stemming from the armed forces as an institution or from individual officers, to play the dominant roles or to influence policies, and even to overthrow the incumbent government - drives the military to engage in social, economic, and prominently political daily life. There are two elements that need to be considered regarding the military ruling ambition both in Egypt and in Indonesia, the way to channel and to reduce the military political ambition during consolidation period.

Personal politicization done by former Colonel Gamal Abdul Nasser to entangle the military as a crucial foundation in building modern Egypt gave a significant effect to the military to develop its political ambition that finally became largely obvious when they overthrew the longtime ruler Husni Mubarak in 2011. In the early months after the revolution, the military formed as its political channel, a 21^st Century junta: the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces (SCAF).

SCAF declared the complementary constitution that returned itself all legislative powers and gave itself a veto over a wide range of political and security issues. That constitution gave strong power to the military to control the country. It caused instability in the country after the massive protests by Egyptians. The new constitution was a shelter of the military against the desire of the people to end the legacy of the old regime, particularly the military. Given that privilege, the military reasserted its domination in political affairs. It was also reinforced by a growing fragmentation among civilian actors.

In every nascent democracy, a sense of loyalty or political attachment to the country’s newly-formed democratic process is vital. In the case of Egypt, during the consolidation period, the military clearly overlooked a constitutional process or via the ballot box to overthrow the unpopular elected president, yet by force. This was the second time for the military to force the incumbent president to step down. It was different from the first phase of Egypt’s revolution in which the military took SCAF as its political body. Shortly after Morsi’s collapse, the military led by Egypt’s ruling General, Abdel Fatah Al-sisi, whom himself was appointed minister of defense by Morsi-named the chief justice of Egypt’s Supreme Constitutional Court Adly Mansour as interim president, thus putting a civilian face on a military coup. In this regard, the military continues to play political role not through a specific body, yet expressing its grip directly throughout the country by imposing a tight security approach to manage the country. In sum, the military is still being a dominant player and it seems unlikely to be deprived.

Some political analysts are comparing the Egypt’s path with Indonesia’s in 1998 in terms of undertaking political transition. In his article Lessons for Cairo from Jakarta, Manila, and Elsewhere published at the New York Times, Michael Vatikiotis argues that the security forces remain as a prominent actor not only under authoritarian regime but more decisive during a transitional period in both countries. Furthermore, Vatikiotis says the Egypt’s military should take a similar path to its counterpart, the Indonesian military in underpinning the democratic transition and reforming its institution (TheNew York Times, 07/08/13). 

However, the Jakarta Post commentary highlights the possibility of Indonesia’s turning back to disorder and chaotic situations in 1998 as it has happened in Egypt currently, given its political chaos, systemic corruption at all bureaucratic levels, attacks upon religious minorities, and so forth (The Jakarta Post 07/30/13). These problems are deemed as driving forces for the military to take over the government. It is quite different from Egypt, the Indonesian military draws its ambition from birth right principle in which the military sees itself as an essential component to attain the independence.

Moreover, the military received its prominent status during the New Order under Soeharto. The military political ambition had been channeled through Golkar as its formal political vehicle. However, after the collapse of Soeharto, the military through its former officers either formed or developed many political parties as the way to express their political views and interests. When General (retired) Edy Sudrajat launched the Indonesian Justice & Unity Party (PKPP) in 2004 outside Golkar, it marked the shift of the military ruling ambition.

The political ambition of the military, though has been restricted constitutionally since 2002, is still evident as indicated by the fact that a number of former military officers are running for legislative and executive positions, ranging from regency to national elections. Heading to the 2014 election, some former generals have taken their bids for the presidency supported by their own political vehicles, such as former Indonesian Military Commander General Wiranto with Hanura, Gerindra-backed candidate Lieutenant General (retired) Prabowo Subianto, Former General Endiarto Sutarto with his bid for Democratic presidential convention, and former General Sutiyoso as a Chairman of the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI). Interestingly, the younger brother of Ani Yudhoyono, the Indonesia’s current First Lady, General (retired) Pramono Edhie Wibowo who repeatedly rejected a proposal for presidency during his tenure as Army Chief of Staff, eventually joined democratic partyboard of committee. Though he graduated from class of 1984 of the Indonesian Military Academy, which was presumed as a reformation class in which the military’s dual functions had been gradually reduced in the military curriculum and proposed more elements on professionalism values, Pramono still finds it hard to deprive his natural military ambition in his blood. 

Across the board, the military ruling ambition in these two cases should be reduced. In this regard, the institution, individual, or external constraints are available to be applied in both countries. Indonesia took an institutional constrain launched in 2004 by internal military reform as the way to curb political ambition of certain groups or individual officers. In addition, the military cohesion which arose some reform generals, such as Susilo Bambang Yudoyhono, Agus Widjojo and Agus Wirahadikusumah helped to change the military mindset to underpin the democratic system. Generally, this effort has significant impacts to promote professionalism values to reduce the military political ambition. However, to some extent, the military still could not block its former officers’ political intention as seen by those retired generals as aforementioned.

Conversely, the institutional and individual constraints apparently do not apply to solve the military regime in Egypt. The Egypt’s military remains intact so far. Accordingly, there is no faction or reform group within the military to pose a “threat” to de facto ruling generals who now control the government. Furthermore, the external factor is previously considered as the only way to push the military back to its barrack. In this regard, the Obama administration is a key to end the prolonged crisis in Egypt. Nevertheless, Obama has been playing with semantics by refusing to call Morsi’s ouster a ‘coup’. Under provision of the Foreign Assistance Act, the US is required to cut aid to any country that undergoes a military-backed coup d’etat. In fact, the United States is still being hesitant to “punish” Egypt, though it has been obvious that more than 100 people have been killed under the martial law imposed by the government since July 2013.

The society pressures both from internal and from external, which in turn lead to a national arrangement is the last resort to end the conflict, to re-build a democratic government and more notably to reduce the military ruling ambition. It will definitely take time, but it will give the opportunity for those parties, particularly the military to give back the authority to the democratically elected civilian government.

By: HYRW 

The "Floating Elites" in Democratic Party

Prior to the Democratic Party's national convention in September, many prominent figures are emerging on the public scene, hoping to be elected as the presidential candidate from this "mercy" party. Some of them are external figures, such as Mahmud M.D, Gita Wiryawan, Dahlan Iskan, Irman Gusman Pramono Edhie Wibowo, and just recently Jusuf Kalla, and also an internal figure, namely Marzuki Alie, are waiting for the invitation to run as the Democratic Party's candidate in the upcoming national election. It is interesting to look at the opportunity of these floating elites to run as a presidential candidate from the ruling party and its effects on the national political constellation. 

In political science the term “floating elite” is used to describe the existence of certain elites who do not have a party as their basis for attaining power in office. Nevertheless, by maintaining their positions based on power resources, such as financial, popularity, and mobilization capability, these elites display the ability to uphold their images as figures who are worthy to compete in the elections (Michels, 1911). In the same vein, the internal party system allows these elites to mobilize supports from the grassroots in order to achieve the majority in the elections. This process occurs particularly when the party has a great need for these kinds of figures amid the decline of its images, as is currently happening with the Democratic Party.

Shortly after many eminent Democrats’ figures, such as Nazarudin, Angelina Sondakh, Andi Malarangeng, and even the former party chief Anas Urbaningrum, were allegedly involved in the  corruption scandals, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY), chief of the party's supreme assembly, took the lead to clean up the pervasive corruption within the party. As a typical newly established party, there is no strong plan for managing the crisis period. The Democratic Party had to choose its new chief and selected the incumbent president of the country, SBY. It also appointed an acting chief, the incumbent Minister of Cooperatives and Small and Medium Enterprises, Syarif Hassan, to manage the party’s daily political activities. This fact illustrates that there is no strong organizational pattern within the party that allows its own cadres besides SBY and his inner circle to lead the party.

As a result, the corruption within the party and the reliance on a single political leader are two main reasons why the party has declined in drawing support from the public. This view is supported by the latest survey conducted by Center for Security and International Studies (CSIS) that shows the Democratic Party’s electability currently at the lowest margin of public support at 7.1 percent, a dramatic loss from their 21 percent support in 2009 when the public was willing to vote for the Democratic Party. Based on these facts, one of the rescue plans that has been devised involves establishing an open primary convention from which someone from either the  internal cadres or from external figures will go on to compete as the  Democrats presidential candidate in the 2014 election.

The outstanding figures trying to appeal to the Democrats cadres and constituencies in order to acquire a "ticket" for the presidential race highlight an important issue. Mahmud MD, the former Constitutional Court Chief Justice is presumed to be the most prominent figure who can help the ruling party lift its reputation in the society. With his unblemished personal background and his record of integrity as a former minister and a former constitutional judge, Mahmud is seen as the most acceptable figure to raise the Democratic standing. With the split in his former party, Nation Awakening Party (PKB), Mahmud’s only realistic opportunity to enter the race is through the Democrats primary convention. However, winning the primary is a large challenge not only for him but also for other external figures because of the absence of cadres support for those not rooted in the party.

Moreover, among the internal candidates, Marzuki Alie is the most eminent figure for the Democrats, based on this career in the party. He is one of the loyal cadres. However, his reputation as an elite and his elite positions in the party since 2004, leaves him with no basic grassroots constituency. This challenge for him is fortified by the split among the cadres into two camps, those who are loyalists of former chief Anas Urbaningrum and those who affiliate with the current chief SBY. In sum, the current situations--corruption cases, a personalistic party, and a split among the cadres--within the Democratic Party are real challenges for elevating its position in the upcoming election.

Furthermore, amidst the patrimonial based system among the parties in Indonesia, the revival of external figures outside the party can be presumed as another and prospective channel for supporting a more robust political landscape in Indonesia's consolidation period. After the ouster of President Soeharto in 1998, the Indonesian political  landscape has been controlled by a dominant closed-party system in which only those who have particular sources of power can lead, maintain, and, more importantly, decide who can run in legislative and presidential elections. From 1999 until 2009, certain party members have maintained elite roles or have even created new political parties to channel their intentions to acquire government office. Only one party, namely Golkar, even held the conventions in 2004 and 2009, and the candidates still stemmed from internal elites. 

The emergence of the external figures reveals the opportunity for outsiders to compete in the internal party conventions leading to the presidential election.  Their existence turns around the Indonesia's old fashioned elite configuration. Even though these elites face a lack of internal supports, particularly from the cadres, they nonetheless exemplify another option for fortifying the quality of democracy in Indonesia, allowing external elites to express their various visions and draw supports from the grassroots.

Eventually, we will see a shift in the Democratic Party's constituencies. This shift will be quite interesting as well as important, remembering the majority of ballots that the party received in the 2009 election. Amidst this uncertain political condition, the ballots from certain constituencies from particular parties will affect legislative and presidential elections next year.

By: HYRW

first published in http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/06/11/the-floating-elites-democratic-party.html

The Oxford Effects on Papua

Many responses have arisen following the opening of the Papua separatist organization’s office (OPM) in the city of Oxford in the United Kingdom. Two camps are dealing with this issue: those who are calling on the Indonesian government to take decisive actions toward the British government, even if it means freezing diplomatic relations; and those who are standing for the right of freedom of expression. Looking closely at this issue, two arguments emerge, namely the inability of Indonesian government to counter the second-track diplomacy that has been undertaken by Benny Wenda and, more importantly, the effects of this situation on the future of peaceful dialogue between the central government and the Papuan people.

What happened most recently by opening the Papua separatist organization’s office is not inconsistent with what Wenda has done for more than decade since he left Papua for the  United Kingdom in 2002. Since Wenda took diplomatic actions by establishing international parliaments for West Papua in 2008 (IPWP) and traveling to Melanesian countries in the South Pacific (such as Fiji, Vanuatu, Solomon Islands, Papua New Guinea) to get support, the Papua’ issue has become more international, with more international intentions to examine what is happening in this eastern province of Indonesia. The latest journey of Wenda to Melanesian countries followed the lifting of his Interpol Red Notice status in 2012. One of the purposes of his undertaking those diplomatic actions has been to pressure the Indonesian government to abandon the security approaches it has been taking to solve the Papua problems.

All of these actions and Wenda’s opening the office in the United Kingdom highlight the weakness of the Indonesian government to exercise its diplomatic instruments. In the first track diplomacy, Indonesia seems unable to raise its image as a sovereign state over Papua. As we know, the government has strengthened its efforts to cooperate with Melanesian Spearhead Group (MSG) since this group of countries has spoken very frequently about human rights conditions in Papua. However, this growing Indonesian diplomatic effort in the region cannot prevent these countries in the Pacific region from supporting the expressions of the Papuans toward obtaining their independence. The Papuan goal was fortified by the MSG’s plan to give Papua observer status in the MSG in their June 2013 meeting in New Caledonia. Meanwhile, human rights conditions in Papua have also become a main concern for many international agencies, such as Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International, and for certain outstanding figures, such as Bishop Desmond Tutu and MIT Professor Noam Chomsky, who have urged the Indonesian government to respect Papuan indigenous rights.  

Furthermore, it is noteworthy to look at the Oxford office’s impact on the future of peaceful dialogue through actions it has been undertaking since 2010. Initially, the idea of peaceful dialogue was launched by the Papuan intellectual Neles Tebay in accordance with The Indonesian Institute of Science. This effort has embarked on an initiative to use active dialogue to rectify ongoing historical, political, cultural and economic grievances in the eastern half of the island of New Guinea. By holding workshop and public discussion within the province as well as lobbying the national government for support for the enterprise, this strategy pushes for a positive environment in which dialogue can take place from both top-down and bottom-up approaches. However, the challenges are still numerous, including the fragmentation of the large number of parties.

One of the biggest obstacles for consolidating a dialogue is bringing all the parties concerned with Papua to sit together and start discussing and eventually find the best solution. Looking back at Papua's history, there have been many initiatives, from central and local government as well as from the non-governmental organizations, to arrange an active dialogue, but these efforts have faced similar obstacles related to political fragmentation among Papuans. Benny Wenda’s involvement as an actor involved in Papua’s independence raises a concern about the role of the party in the dialogue between the national government and the Papuan people.

Moreover the existence of OPM's office in Oxford, England makes the road to peaceful dialogue more complex.  On the hand, the process becomes more complex because Wenda will literally refuse the dialogue scheme under the provincial authority of Papua. On the other hand, until now, the British government can do little to disband the activity within the OPM office, because of national laws that respect and guarantee its citizens’ rights—and Wenda is a British citizen.  In this situation, ignoring the existence of Free West Papua office is impossible. All the British government can do is to make a public statement at a diplomatic level affirming its respect for the sovereignty of Indonesia over Papua.  Wenda and his group will continue to campaign for the separation of Papua at the international level.  Wenda’s involvement is a real challenge for the Indonesian government and for other parties who are struggling to achieve a peaceful dialogue in Papua. Constructive communication, including with those who have been exiled, is more likely to occur through discussions as one united country. 

It is hoped that the consternation over the opening of the Free West Papua office does not incite an escalation of conflict in Papua. This concern is all the more grave considering the recent military shooting and killing of several Papuans on May 1, coincided with the peaceful commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the handover of Papua to the Indonesian government by the United Nations Temporary Executive Authority. Although it has no direct correlation, the issue of opening the Free West Papua office in Oxford can lead to a high degree of oversight over the Papuan people by the security apparatuses that in turn can cause friction within the society.

By: HYRW & Agustinus Kambuaya

First published in the Jakarta Post http://m.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/05/15/effects-oxford-opm-office-papua.html

The Potential Threat of the Coercive Apparatuses

The clash between the police and the Indonesian military forces has proliferated as a commonplace event. The latest case that took place in Ogan Komering Ulu, South Sumatra depicts the high friction between these two state agencies that have been separated since 1999. These agencies have been complicit in a conflict that repeats itself annually for a decade with different causes. Two mainstream explanations for the most recent clash are the access to resources and the structural problems that lead to the accumulation of social jealousy. However, both the military and police should exercise their duties in protecting citizens based on their functions as state coercive apparatus. One direct corollary from the military-police conflict is concerns about the incapacity of the state to exercise coercive power effectively over these agencies. The recent clash signifies the problem of legitimation of the state, and it affects the democratization process.

Both the military and the police practice their organizational function based on their duties and rights. These functions lead to a plethora of both important and petty rules which seek to control and guide officers’ actions within the department as well as on either military missions or policing the street. Both agencies employ leadership, supervisory, and management techniques, and typical rewards and sanctions to ensure officer accountability, increase efficiency, and limit the abuse of power. In contrast, the organizational function is breached when these agencies misuse their force against each other and other state actors. In this regard, they abuse coercive power by exercising force that is more repressive than protective.

In the case in South Sumatra, the traffic police abused its power by shooting to death a military officer who violated a traffic law. The shooting sparked subsequent action by more than a hundred military officers to abuse their power by attacking the police station and police officers (the Jakarta Post 3/10/2013). Even the chiefs of both institutions were surprised about the extent of the conflict on ground. This clash and the rising number of unpredictable conflicts between these state apparatuses represent the failure of the state to control its apparatus and undermine its legitimacy.  The use of force by both state agencies against each other leads to further public distrust and revives the image of an unmanageable state.

The repressive and protective forces that are embodied within the coercive apparatuses shape the state legitimacy of exercising power throughout its population and territory. As pointed out by Otwin Marerin, the repression functions largely in a directly instrumentalist way for the state, but ultimately also can have legitimating or delegitimating consequences. Protection, in contrast, mainly affects the ideological processes through which states become legitimized (Greenberg & Mayer, 1990). By upholding the traffic law, the police officer exercised his function toward another agency that violated that law. The police exercised the protective function. However, shooting to death was not an appropriate way to deal with that issue. The later responses by the military officers exacerbated the misuse of the repressive function. On the other hand, the protective function of the police has declined following external pressure from citizens regarding the significant number of allegations of corruption among generals.

Coercive legitimation can be applied just as effectively as coercive apparatus performance and social norms. However, it can be reduced or disappear entirely when the legitimation of the state is exercised as happened in South Sumatra. The overused repressive force of these agencies, as aforementioned, undermines the eminent principle of exercising duty as a protector of state and citizenry. It has been highlighted by allegations raised by some groups about the use of torture by the police special counterterrorism unit Densus 88 to interrogate suspected terrorists. Meanwhile, the Indonesian military forces are allegedly violating the human rights of the indigenous Papuan people. This method reinforces the concerns about the misuse of repressive forces.

The repeated conflict between these state agencies severely affects the quality of democracy within the state. After the 13-year reform period, Indonesia is still facing the problem of the unmanageability of these agencies. The more they divert from the principles of the Constitution by wielding the repressive forces, the more the democratic consolidation process will be in danger. The state would be stateless if the dominant roles of government were not able to tackle the problem of the misuse of state authority by its apparatuses.

The military overlooked its primary function as the protector of state institutions by attacking the police. One prominent feature of the democratic consolidation process is the tight control of the elected government over its state apparatuses to exercise their primary duties. This does not mean the government can intervene in the organizational process within the state apparatuses, but instead, it should ensure that these state agencies exercise their duties based on their interest as state institutions in line with constitutional requirements.

By towing the line of the Constitution, both the military and the police uphold the democratic quality of the state. It is noteworthy that the source of power over these agencies is primarily coercive power. This is largely different from other state agencies that do not have the same source of power. Accordingly, the military and the police have the capacity to exercise their power without any control. This situation is immensely harmful for the existence of other state agencies and civil society groups. To a certain degree, the state is allowing radical groups to act violently toward other social groups has empowered the military and the police to act in a similar disobedient fashion. The state response in both cases has been insufficient to deal with this issue. In the quest for a stable democratic system, the state must ensure that all societal components, in particular the military and the police act in a principled manner.

By: HYRW

Cebongan: An Opportunity to Reform the Military Justice System?

Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge

 2012 Arryman Fellow at Northwestern University, Evanston, Illinois.

All speculations about the mastermind behind the Sleman prison killings have come to an end after Brig. Gen. Unggul K. Yudhoyono, the head of the Army’s investigative team, announced that 11 of the Army’s Special Forces (Kopassus) personnel have been proved to be behind the killing of the four detainees in a jail (Jakarta Post, 04/04/2013). In further explanation, it was revealed that the main reason behind this atrocious assault was an act of revenge in response to the murder of their comrade. The spirit of corps that is essentially defined in the positive way of forming a sense of purpose and comradeship, have become a legitimation to overuse their repressive function instead of promoting their protective function. This violation of the spirit of corps reflects the military as an institution that controls every single unit within it; the culpability does not rest solely with the personnel involved. 

            The latest case in Cebongan prison that claimed the lives of four detainees along with the attack on the police station in Ogan Komering Ulu, South Sumatra, depict the abuse of coercive power by the military toward both civilian and other state institutions. However, the results released by the Army’s investigative team about the Cebongan case have to be highly appreciated in line with the upholding of the national justice system in Indonesia. The next question is the extent to which this commitment can be undertaken to bring a true sense of justice towards those who are suspected in this case. This question arises following the Army’s decision to bring these personnel to face a military court. However, as we know, from the new order era to the reform era, the military justice system has become a public concern based on its performance.  Two main arguments can be proposed about this concern, namely empowering the civilian justice and breaking down the military court as a safe haven for military officers.

Command Structure Inclination

Military justice in Indonesia is still a matter of the law enforcement system in Indonesia. The main indicator of the problem is the decision-making process; the final verdict determined by the military judges was not in accordance with the principles of democracy and human rights. During the new order, the whole military justice process from investigation to prosecution by military prosecutors was extremely closed. In the reform era, this situation still occurs. In addition the military tribunals follow the line of command instead of acting as an institution of the public conscience.

In the past, the highest judicial power in a military court was under the Armed Forces Commander. This judicial power shifted to the Supreme Court in September 2004 and the change was reinforced by the Presidential Decree Number 56 in 2004 as well as the mandate of Law Number 49 Year 2009 regarding Judicial Power. Based on these two regulations, supervision of the military court is under the Supreme Court, while discipline and career guidance for the members of the military are supposed to be submitted to the Department of Defense. However, the typical verdicts delivered by military judges still tend to be based on the TNI command line rather than on considerations of the Supreme Court as the holder of the highest judicial authority in the country.

Under the oversight authority of the Supreme Court, the final judgment of the military tribunals should be based on a common criminal consideration, not a command line. Command influence occurs when a military authority tries to influence, obstruct or deliberately direct the administration of justice. In this regard, the Law Development Board (Babinkum) under the Indonesian Armed Forces (TNI) Headquarters controls the military corps system of law, including prosecutors and courts. Unfortunately, this structure leads to a legal process that is mostly influenced by the command of the military.

Safe Haven

Furthermore, the military court still is presumed to be a “safe haven” for officers who violate the country’s laws.  Based on Indonesian policy studies reports conducted by Imparsial, during the years 2001-2006 there were 46 cases of human rights violations committed by members of the military and police officers who received an average sentence of less than 4 years in prison. Whereas reports of the Indonesian Human Rights Commission found 11 cases of violations by the military against civilians in all provinces from 2009 until the beginning of 2011, only 5 were processed in military courts.

According to the two aforementioned reports, the significance of military justice for criminal acts committed by military personnel is still far from expectations. Military justice has become a safe haven for the resolution of these criminal cases. Disciplinary action taken by the judges of military courts is very minimal when compared to the acts themselves, including even those that have led to death. A typical sentence is merely adding external assignments to their institutional duties. Such sentences do not provide a deterrent effect for other soldiers even though a deterrent effect is one of the goals of justice in a democratic country.

The public expects fair and democratic values and human rights. Empowering the civilian justice and abolishing the military court as a safe haven would meet such public demands. Moreover, the Cebongan’s case is an opportunity to boost the spirit of military internal reforms launched after the ousted of the authoritarian regime in 1998.     

First published at The Jakarta Post Newspaper http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2013/04/09/reforming-military-justice-system.html 

Two Different Paths toward Democracy in Egypt and Indonesia

Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge

the 2012 Arryman Fellow and visiting scholar at Northwestern University Evanston, Illinois

Democracy does not automatically come after electing a new president and reforming a constitution as happened in Egypt. There are many challenges following the transition and consolidation period. One of biggest obstacles during transition and consolidation period in newly democratizing countries is controlling and redirecting the military as a legacy of the authoritarian regime. This is often easier said than done. However, only a few countries can overcome legacies of military intervention during the transition and consolidation period. Indonesia is one of the success stories in transforming from an authoritarian regime to a democracy regime by redirecting the military to focus on its primary function. In Egypt and Indonesia, the role of the military was the same during the transition but different in the consolidation period. I will highlight the role of the military in a transition period and at the earliest of the consolidation period in both countries.

During the transitional period earlier in January 2011, Egypt’s military stood with the people in ousting the former president Hosni Mubarak. The signature event of the people’s movement was 18 days uprising. The military was in charge from that period through the emergence of a democratically elected civilian government. The military also supported to charge Hosni Mubarak in jail, even though Mubarak was a former military officer. However, the most important role of the military was its not shooting the demonstrators. It was a crucial decision for the future of democracy in Egypt.

In Bahrain, by contrast, the military stood by the ruling monarchy. Because it repressed civilian demonstrators brutally, the Bahraini monarchy survived. In Libya, the military split with some officers refusing to fire on civilians, others willing to shoot in defense of Muammar Gaddafi. The result was civil war. In Syria, the story is still unfolding, the military have managed to hold together the regime and continued to repress.

Indonesia’s process of transition was similar as happened in Egypt in terms of the role of the military. In Indonesia the military had played a key role in organizing controlled transfer of power from the authoritarian regime to the democratic regime. People were out in the streets. A large number of people took an opposition stance against the regime under President Soeharto. In May 1998 the central question was how the Indonesian Armed Forces would position itself vis a vis the instability surrounding the succession as in Egypt. In Indonesia at that time, the critical role of the military was whether to shoot or support the people. Moreover, the Indonesian’s military had the legitimacy that was given by Soeharto to stabilize the country. That role was proved after the former commander in chief general Wiranto has been given a letter by Soeharto to impose the order within the state (Winters, 2012). It means at that time, the military actually has the legitimacy to run the country, but they did not want to use it. Eventually, as we saw at the end of Soeharto’s period, the military took the stand not to shoot the people. It means they had the capacity even legitimacy, but not the will. If they had the will to shoot the people and stand with the regime, the path to democracy would never have occurred in Indonesia or it might have taken a much longer time to achieve democracy.

The decision not to shoot people relates to the capacity and the will of the military. The capacity of the military relates to its coercive apparatus includes some elements, such as good training, expertise in using weapon systems, and assistance from international countries. The will of the military relates to the level of institutionalization of the coercive apparatus. The military has the institutional interests, such as to maintain internal cohesion, discipline, and morale within the corps, to protect its image, prestige, and national legitimacy (Bellin 2012). Shooting civilians would have been potentially costly for the military in Egypt. In Indonesia, we know that with the support of the people, TNI defended the constitution and successfully contained a potentially calamitous slide into widespread domestic instability and violence. 

In general, using lethal force against civilians threatens to undermine the image of the military as defender of the nation. Immediately following the preparation of the first general election since 1957, the Supreme Council of Armed Forces (SCAF) and the army took crucial steps by introducing a compulsory constitution and disbanding the People’s Assembly. The compulsory constitution gave the military more power than other institutional agencies. This fact showed that the SCAF and the army in general constitute a significant component of the state’s political apparatus beyond their primary function as the guardian of the state from outside threats. Given this condition, the military still maintains its role to control the regime, even though Egyptians disagree with the new constitution. For those who do not like the changes to the constitution, they will be dealt with harshly by the military.

In Indonesia, the election took place in 1999 involving 48 parties with different platforms. The winner was a secular party, Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP). With that election, Indonesia completely finished its transition process by electing a new government. Indonesia started to enter the consolidation period by strengthening the newly-elected government. At the beginning of the consolidation period, the military made its internal reforms, such as leaving the parliament, liquidating positions related to political affairs, and starting to give some businesses they owned to support the civilian government. These reforms stemming from the consciousness of the internal officers followed the crucial decision not to shoot people as aforementioned. Some officers realized that the military no longer was a dominant actor in political and social life beyond its traditional function. In contrast, the military leaders in Egypt protected the army’s interest at the beginning of consolidation period.

In both countries, the role of the military is one of the crucial aspects in transforming the regime to democracy. In Egypt the future of democracy still remains a question about when the military is willing to give power to the civilian government.  In Indonesia, although the military no longer plays a role in political life, they still have a potency to turn back as one actor in the decision making process within the state. As mentioned by Edward Gibson, once you give a political chance to the military, it is hard to deprive it at all even in the well-established democratic countries (Gibson, 2012).

First published at the Jakarta Post (http://www2.thejakartapost.com/news/2012/12/28/different-paths-toward-democracy-egypt-and-indonesia.html)