Military Ambition in Indonesia

Heading into the 2014 election, Indonesian society is being faced with certain political figures, ranging from businessmen and office holders, to military background figures. However, given many poll surveys, two prominent figures have emerged as the most likely to be the next Indonesian president, namely Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto. Joko Widodo, affectionately known as Jokowi, is Jakarta’s current governor, whereas Prabowo is the chief patron of the Greatest Indonesian Movement Party (Gerindra) as well as a former general of the late President Suharto. Recently, Jokowi has been announced as the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) candidate. Thus, the governor Jokowi and former military general, Prabowo will likely dominate the Indonesian political landscape prior to presidential election in September 2014.

After 15 years of democratic consolidation, the big inquiry is whether Indonesia still needs the military style leadership. In the last three general elections, the military candidates have always been involved to run for office. The current president is the former Suharto general who has been in office for two terms. In this 2014 election, at least two former generals have announced their candidacies beside Prabowo, namely former Indonesian military commander Wiranto supported by his party, the Peoples Conscience Party (Hanura) and Sutiyoso, retired army lieutenant general cum Chairman of the Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI). The ruling party, Democrat, also is presenting former army chief of staff Pramono Edhie Wibowo as one of its presidential candidates. All of these generals, except Pramono Edhie, served during Suharto’s waning days. And these three generals are also widely believed to have been involved in human rights violations.

Ironically, on the one hand, Indonesian society is hoping to have clean and good leaders, such as Jokowi and Tri Rismaharini, the Surabaya Mayor. On the other hand, as a recent survey shows, many Indonesian voters still prefer a presidential or vice presidential candidate with a military background over a civilian. Three characteristics have been advanced for this preference, namely decisiveness, discipline and firmness. This tendency exemplifies the romance of the Suharto-backed military regime among Indonesians.

The military in Indonesia has two prominent reasons why they have to meddle in daily political life. First, the Indonesian military (TNI) still criticizes the current democratic system. As attributed by Indonesia’s army strategic command head, Lieutenant General Gatot Nurmayanto, Indonesian democracy is not always right for Indonesia. Accordingly, democracy based on popular vote does not always lead to the strengthening of the nation. For some political analysts, this is the picture of a hard-line faction within the TNI to push for more military involvement in Indonesia’s daily politics. 

Second, the TNI has doubted the ability of civilian government to govern. Corruption and immorality have become chronic diseases in the civilian government. As a result, certain political regulations can risk national stabilization, such as the current dispute over the legitimacy of Law No. 42/2008 on presidential and vice presidential elections. As former army intelligence head, Soleman B. Ponto argues, the potential of national chaos is high, given that the law was dismissed by the constitutional court in January 2014. If national chaos develops, the military will launch what Ponto calls a “constitutional coup”. In addition, during my personal interview in 2012 with former Vice Chief Staff of Army, retired Major General Kiki Syanahkri, he expressed the same concern. He thought that the quality degradation of civilian government and intended to take political steps necessary to return to the original version of the 1945 constitution. To support his idea, Kiki and his colleges in the Retired Army Association (PPAD), proposed to form a “national council”. This would allow the military to legitimately engage directly in politics. These statements raise the question about the military’s relentless tendency to take any opportunity to influence or even to take over the civilian government.

Democracy allows for every individual, regardless of their background, to run for office. However, after the downfall of authoritarian regime and the beginning of democratic consolidation, the remnants of a former authoritarian regime, including the military, should be restricted from participating in politics. The former regime was highly backed up by the military in Indonesia during the new order period for over 30 years. This history can give the military the desire to re-engage in the new political system. If it does, there is high possibility for the military to bring back an authoritarian spirit, such as in Egypt and Thailand.

According to the Indonesian constitution, military figures can run for office after resigning from active duty. However, the close relations between former officers and active officers are difficult to overlook. Former officers support the core interests of their institution. This again brings up the question of the future of the TNI reformation that has stalled during the second term of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Three crucial areas of the TNI’s internal reform could be “blocked” by former senior officers if they get elected.

First and foremost is the uplifting of human rights values among officers. The TNI has been globally known for its human rights record toward its own people. The military internal reformation failed to deal with this issue, particularly in Papua province. The military candidates are likely to defend their former institution. For instance, the prison raid by army special forces (Kopassus) that killed four detainees in Cebongan, drew support and even praise from Prabowo and other former generals, including SBY. In addition, Pramono Edhie Wibowo recently called to forget past violations of human rights conducted by the TNI. 

The second area of army reform which might be left undone is the reorganization or even liquidation of some army territorial commands across country. Many territorial commands at the regional level have been widely alleged to be used for political and economic purposes. As a leading general during the early days of TNI’s reformation, Wiranto supported and defended the existence of the commands. In present day, there are no military candidates have questioned these commands in light of charges of misuse for political purpose and human rights violations.

The third area of military reform needed is the management of its businesses, particularly the illegal ones, such as illegal logging, gambling, and the security business. It seems hard to tackle this issue if some former generals get elected in September, given the fact that the military still highly depends on these off-budget resources.

Given the uncertainty at the national level, Indonesian democracy will arguably allow the military figures to continue their role as decisive political actors as happened during the new order. In contrast, after the era of strong military regimes, certain Latin America countries have produced many strong populist leaders, such as Lula Da Silva and Dilma Rousseff in Brazil; Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentine and Evo Morales in Bolivia. These figures can restrict constitutionally military ambition in their countries. They can channel effectively people’s aspirations to support government policies, instead of paving the way to the military to get its second opportunity to govern.

Indonesian politics has never gotten out from under military influence, and certain populist leaders, such as Jokowi and Risma, also appear to rely on military support.   As a result, the future of the Indonesian democratic system remains uncertain.

by Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge

Published in the Eurasia Review, March 21, 2014

Indonesia: Populist Leaders Must Maneuver Corrupt System

Why populist figures in Indonesia are being challenged to maneuver in a corrupt political system. This is a critical inquiry prior to the legislative and presidential elections in upcoming months. This question concerns the populist figures, current Jakarta governor Joko Widodo and Surabaya mayor,Tri Rismaharini. Nationally, both figures have a good and clean reputation, yet they have to face firm challenges from what they have done so far.  Two factors hampering the performance of these outstanding leaders, namely the elites and the oligarchs.

In this article, the phrase the “corrupt political system” refers to a political system which has been dominated and abused by a few powerful people or groups for their own interests. These people consist of elites and oligarchs. I make a clear distinction between these two political concepts. As Jeffrey Winters argues, elites are certain people or groups who have highly concentrated power, such as coercive power, mobilizational power, official or party position, which has been distributed in a highly exclusive way. In contrast, oligarchs are those with significant fortunes who have been attained from the accumulation of economic wealth.

Both elites and oligarchs can have a similar interest in inhibiting potential challenges or radical demands that may pose threats toward them. They can form a collective action through political institution, such as a political party (Slater, 2010). In the case of Joko Widodo, affectionately known as Jokowi, the party “detains” him to meet public desire. Similarly, in Risma’s case, it is not only local parliament but also her own party that has been dominated by businessmen and party elites to take stand against her populist policies.

Party & Oligarch Interests

Jokowi has been performing well to manage Indonesia’s most populated city. In terms of tackling down the problem of severe traffic in Jakarta, Jokowi has been battling the national government regarding the cheap car policy. He prefers to improve the quality of public transportation. Accordingly, Jokowi has turned down the intention of Vice-President Budiono’s offer to sell a low cost green car to Jakarta’s residents. It was widely believed that automobile businessmen were behind this proposal, targeting Indonesia as a potential market for low-priced car.

Above all, the public are looking forward to knowing whether he will run as the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle’s (PDIP) presidential candidate. The key, as nationally known, is in the hands of Megawati, the PDIP’s chairwoman. Apparently, Megawati has not given up the possibility of making her third bid to run as the party’s candidate, even though this option is unlikely to increase party’s odds of winning the election.

In the case of Risma, a collaboration of the elite’s party and the oligarchs in parliament was a strong challenge to her public service policies. For instance, as reported by the weekly magazine, Tempo, three cases have prompted Risma to step down as Surabaya’s mayor. The battle over the construction of a toll road across Surabaya was the opening case. Instead of this this project, Risma favored improving the city’s public transportation.  Following this, Surabaya’s city council, supported by the PDIP attempted to oust her, but failed. The rejection by PDIP and its oligarchs’ component continued, when Risma wanted to raise the billboard advertising tax and further angered the city council. In these two cases, the shared interest of businessmen and political elites was obvious motivation behind the rejections. And the strong “punch” to shake Risma’s position was the covert appointment of PDIP’s local head and deputy speaker of the city council: Wisnu Sakti Buana as the new deputy mayor. This decision instantly disappointed Risma, because she knew Wisnu was another attempt to topple her from her position as mayor.

Populism Challenges

Given these facts, the populist figures have apparently been captured by the corrupt political system. On the one hand, they are personality-based figures which differ from mass mobilizational figures, such as Lula Da Silva and Evo Morales in Latin America. Indeed, the cases of Latin America and Indonesia cannot be directly compared, due to their different political and economic systems and societal characteristic. However, as witnessed currently, the personality populist figures have been unable to block political elites and oligarchs as has been done by mass-based figures in Latin America. Lula and Morales could transform their societal support into populist parties. Accordingly, they received full support to impose many populist policies without getting strong resistance from parliament or their own parties.

 In slightly contrast, Jokowi and Risma are elites since they received official positions. Prior to their current positions, these two prominent leaders emerged from the middle class. Jokowi was a carpenter turned politician and Risma was a true-blue bureaucrat. They had no mass political mobilization to challenge established political elites and oligarchs. The only way they had was to enter well-established political party, namely the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) to be eligible to run for governmental positions.

There is a huge gap between elites and grassroots in terms of building strong political influence. In the Indonesia’s modern history, the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) had been widely known for its intimate relationship with the grassroots. The masses could be mobilized to support certain party policies whether in favor or against the government.  However, since the Suharto took over the government in 1966 and built his regime, Indonesian society has been distanced from politics. The concept “floating mass” was widely disseminated by Ali Murtopo, Suharto’s right-hand man. According to it, people would not play any political role or organize any political organization and therefore they would devote all their efforts to economic development. Since then, no populist figures have arisen from the grassroots.

What we are seeing today on the Indonesian political landscape are politician who have come from the middle class. On the on hand, the emergence of populist figures is the answer of a deficient political system. People for a long time have been neglected by the current government, so they need figures to address their problems, creating condition ripe for populism. On the other hand, these figures have no owned political-based organization that can continually draw support from society to impose populist policies. They must frequently abide by party’s rules. Occasionally, the pro-people policies were at odds with the party interests. In this regard, populist policies have to fall in line with the party’s instruction. So far, Risma has been an obvious case of this pattern.

Electoral Figures

Furthermore, populist figures in a corrupt political system risk being used by other political parties. It has nationally been known that certain parties, such as PAN, Democrat and Golkar were trying to take Jokowi from PDIP and make him their own candidate. However, this move was blocked by PDIP. Similarly, Risma if she steeps as Surabaya’s mayor, Gerinda, Golkar, and even Democrat are willing to propose her as a strong running-mate.  They are still in the circle of a corrupt political system. This is possible because they do not have their own political organization. As Max Lane’s argues, Jokowi and also Risma are electoral political figures (ISEAS, 2013). For these parties, Jokowi and Risma are vote magnets which can increase the party image and support sufficiently to win the election. This is a very pragmatic objective, yet it cannot guarantee that in the future the party elites will not continue to threaten the performance of these two leading populist figures.

By: Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge

Published in the Jakarta Post, March 5, 2014

Republished in the Eurasia Review, March 12, 2014

Papua’s response to the gift of Special Autonomy plus

Many Papuans are concerned about what the impact will be of the current president’s so-called “gift” to the province, ‘special autonomy plus’ or 'Otsus plus'.

        Indonesia’s easternmost province Papua has long been the scene of political discontent. Former President Abdurahman “Gus Dur” Wahid restored the name, Papua, in place of ‘Irian Jaya’, the name chosen by former longstanding ruler, Suharto. His successor, Megawati Soekarnoputri passed what is known as the 2001 Special Autonomy Law No.21 (Otsus) as part of his plan to improve the welfare of the Papuans. Otsus is meant to transfer political, economic and cultural authority to the Papuans, the majority of whom however, regard Otsus at best as the pouring of an abundance of cash into the province.

           What will be the legacy of President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) for the Papuan people? Given the fact that SBY will remain in power for only less than a year, many Papuans are concerned about what his so-called “gift” to the province, ‘special autonomy plus’ or Otsus plus.  It is his gift because this regulation was proposed following a meeting between local leaders and President SBY on April 2013 in Jakarta. This regulation would modify previous policy dealing with Papuan issues in the political and security spheres.

          During his 10 years in office, SBY has been undertaking a number of policies to solve Papuan problems ranging from poverty, education, health, and corruption to security. In 2011, in order to calm the growing distrust among Papuans toward the central government, SBY launched The Unit for the Acceleration of Development in Papua and West Papua (UP4PB). UP4PB’s main duty is to build a basis for sustainable development, in line with the aspirations of local communities, leading toward social integration. Another high profile programme is The Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE), initially aimed at providing sufficient food and energy for Indonesians. These two programmes have been amplified by a vast amount of money per year.

          Such programes and extensive funding have so far been ineffective when it comes to tackling Papuans’ basic problems, in particular, the aspiration for independence from Indonesia. Otsus plus was widely rejected by the Papuans themselves as one way to silence their aspirations for Merdeka (freedom), as can be seen from a rising number of social and student protests.

          Internationally, the Free West Papua Campaign conducted by leading figures, such as Benny Wenda and Timothy Mote, have succeeded in raising concern about what is happening in Papua. On the local side, the Papuans regularly launch protests against the central government, but have been continuously muffled by the government’s security apparatus. This activity has been exacerbated by the central government’s tight censorship of international media over Papuan issues.

         One crucial demand by Papuans is to set up a dialogue between Papuans and the central government. There are many contesting factions in Papua, but they share one ambition: the need for a constructive dialogue. Central government, however, will not accept the referendum which would be the logical end result of such a dialogue. The central government knows full well that its every single policy initiative in Papua has to be assessed according to the effect it has on separatist feeling. So, late in his tenure, SBY is trying to give Papuans more authority to manage their daily activities.

          However, the majority of Papuans suspect that this is yet another trick to suppress the idea of independence. They have witnessed the fact that so far, implementation of special autonomy amounts to no more than the handing over of vast amounts of money that ironically end up in the hands of corrupt local political leaders, bureaucrats, and their cronies. In addition, Papuans see in Otsus plus an attempt to divide Papuans into several provinces, regions, districts and villages, without a strong political will from the central government to amplify the local capacity to govern.

           Otsus plus is also seen as a covert method of further increasing the massive militarization of Papua.  After the military operation zone (DOM) in Papua was dismantled in 1998, the hope was that the level of militarisation would slowly decrease. However, the military presence in Papua has steadily increased. 

          By imposing Otsus plus, Papua would be divided into three more provinces, giving the military the excuse to put more combat troops into each. This would in line with Indonesian army structural command. The army is able to maintain a presence and administrative structure that parallels the civil administration, from the provincial all the way down to the sub district and village levels – a presence extending deep into very isolated areas in Papua.  

          The estimated combat troops in Papua are already roughly 12,000 under the Trikora Military Command (Davies, 2007 & Imparsial, 2011). With the enforcement of Otsus plus, each new region automatically gains its own military and policy company, and each further province gains their own battalions of military and police. Even today, military soldiers are more frequently to be seen in remote areas than the presence of teachers, doctors, and nurses. Deliberately or not, this fact will steadily lead to increasing clashes between the military and civilians. In addition, as is well known, the military in Papua has been associated with human rights violations.

         The growing distrust among Papuans cannot be solved merely by extending the current policy. Otsus plus should be reconsidered. If the central government wants to build trust, there are two feasible solutions worth immediate consideration.  First, imposing a moratorium on pouring money into local governments until people’s representatives can control the use of the money. The second solution is to reduce the number of military troops in Papua. In doing so, the central government will create the basis for a mutual trust which is essential for a successful modification and implementation of the current special autonomy regulation. 

by: Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge

published at open democracy and republished at Scoop media