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Thursday, December 12, 2013

Similar Problems with Reconciliation in Thailand and Indonesia

Both Thailand and Indonesia have been in a period of transition to more progressive form of government. On the one hand, in Thailand, the concept of democracy has repeatedly been tested. Even though several prime ministers have been elected constitutionally since the 1980s, the problem of military coups and strong grassroots protest against governments remain steady. On the other hand, Indonesia has generally been undertaking tremendous efforts to reform its political system.

Since the collapse of long-time ruler Suharto in 1998, Indonesia has transformed itself to become an example of modern democracy among other developing countries across the world. Additionally, these two countries differ in their treatment of long-ruling leaders. Interestingly, though he faced public anger at times, Suharto could head back to his beloved house in Cendana peacefully after handing over the presidency to his successor. In sharp contrast, former prime minister of Thailand, Thaksin Shinawatra has been in exile since a military coup toppled him in 2006.

However, both countries face deep grievances within society after an era of corrupt governments. In Thailand, Thaksin has been creating a sharp division within society by splitting the country into two camps, namely his proponents, a group known as the Red Shirts as his opponents, the Yellow shirts.  In Indonesia, for Suharto, there has been a clear demarcation between the victims of past gross violations of human rights and the alleged perpetrators of those violations.

Furthermore, these cases show how the democratic governments deal with the national reconciliation process.  Reconciliation depends on the capacity of elected government to establish or restore democratic relationships; it is critical to the pursuit of peacemaking domestically. In the pursuit of reconciliation, the value of justice has to be upheld together with the value of national stability. To achieve this, two important steps can be undertaken, namely proposing a genuine apology and enforcing a legal prosecution.

In the case of Thailand, Yinluck has failed to build a national reconciliation by issuing an apology as she promised in her first address as prime minister. The Yinluck administration has no political will to prosecute those responsible for the 2010 crisis that brought Thailand to deep political stand-off. A bloody crisis in 2010, in which 98 people died, was initially expected to be turning point for Yinluck Shinawatra’s government to achieve a national reconciliation. Yet, the result has been slower progress. No one from the military or the previous government has been held accountable for the violent suppression of the protests. While the Yinluck administration has provided monetary compensation to the effected families, it has given no official apology.

Meanwhile, of the 1,019 protesters that were arrested during the crackdown, 20 still remain in prison (World Politics Review, 2013). This situation has been aggravated by the government’s arrangement to “protect” the military by granting them a major role in security matters without exercising much oversight, including of its annual budget allocation. 

On the other hand, the intention of Yinluck administration’s intention to reconcile Thailand by granting amnesty, instead triggering political opposition. This is the irony of democracy in which a worthy intention of the elected leader to reconcile the country instead draws strong protests from society. The main reason for this rejection is that Thaksin, Yinluck’s brother, will be allowed to return to Bangkok. This intention instantly received strong protest from the elite and educated people who have long been seen as initiators of local protests against the Thaksin’ backed government since 2006. They view Yinluck as similar as his brother who governed amid corruption and constrained citizens’ freedom.

In the Indonesian cases, the reconciliation is also still easier said than done. Since the end of Suharto government, the Indonesian government has failed to achieve reconciliation at the national level.  There is no genuine apology from the current government for what have been seen as past shocking abuses of human rights, particularly during the Suharto period. One particular case is sided in the report completed by the National Commission on Human Rights (Komnas Ham) regarding the 1965 massacre carried out by the state. This report’s recommendation that the government issue an apology but it was overlooked, and there was no further investigation by the government.

In terms of pursuing legal prosecution, neither Thailand nor Indonesia ever shows strong political will to consistently enforce laws. There are a number of initiatives since the end of Suharto rule to deal with grassroots human rights violations, such as forming a truth and reconciliation commission and introducing human rights bill, but these have served particular interest groups. In this regard, the two countries have aims to “protect” particular groups, such as the military who are known to have a constant impunity. In Papua’s case for instance, no apology has been offered by the Indonesian government for the state’s exploitation and intimidation of Papuans since they became part of Indonesia.

Ironically, instead of declaring a genuine apology and enforcing legal prosecution, the current government has initiated giving national hero status to Sarwo Edhie Wibowo, a former special forced commander and also father-in-law of the current president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono. Wibowo is considered responsible for ordering the death of thousands of Indonesians in 1965. This fact amplifies the assumption that impunity in Indonesia has become very much embedded into the nation’s political culture.

Both countries have been practicing a similar refusal to seek a national reconciliation. If Thailand has been facing a prolonged crisis due to the absence of a genuine apology and legal prosecution, Indonesia also has the potential to have long-term deep grievances turn unexpectedly into social conflict. Eventually, these two countries cannot build a strong transition and consolidation, if reconciliation is still absent, particularly at the national level.

By: Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge
    published in the Jakarta Post, Dec. 9, 2013

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