Heading into the 2014 election, Indonesian society
is being faced with certain political figures, ranging from businessmen and
office holders, to military background figures. However, given many poll
surveys, two prominent figures have emerged as the most likely to be the next
Indonesian president, namely Joko Widodo and Prabowo Subianto. Joko Widodo,
affectionately known as Jokowi, is Jakarta’s current governor, whereas Prabowo
is the chief patron of the Greatest Indonesian Movement Party (Gerindra) as well
as a former general of the late President Suharto. Recently, Jokowi has been
announced as the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (PDIP) candidate.
Thus, the governor Jokowi and former military general, Prabowo will likely
dominate the Indonesian political landscape prior to presidential election in
September 2014.
After 15 years of democratic consolidation, the big
inquiry is whether Indonesia still needs the military style leadership. In the
last three general elections, the military candidates have always been involved
to run for office. The current president is the former Suharto general who has
been in office for two terms. In this 2014 election, at least two former
generals have announced their candidacies beside Prabowo, namely former Indonesian
military commander Wiranto supported by his party, the Peoples Conscience Party
(Hanura) and Sutiyoso, retired army lieutenant general cum Chairman of the
Indonesian Justice and Unity Party (PKPI). The ruling party, Democrat,
also is presenting former army chief of staff Pramono Edhie Wibowo as one of
its presidential candidates. All of these generals, except Pramono Edhie,
served during Suharto’s waning days. And these three generals are also widely
believed to have been involved in human rights violations.
Ironically, on the one hand, Indonesian society is
hoping to have clean and good leaders, such as Jokowi and Tri Rismaharini, the
Surabaya Mayor. On the other hand, as a recent survey shows,
many Indonesian voters still prefer a presidential or vice presidential
candidate with a military background over a civilian. Three characteristics
have been advanced for this preference, namely decisiveness, discipline and
firmness. This tendency exemplifies the romance of the Suharto-backed military
regime among Indonesians.
The military in Indonesia has two prominent reasons
why they have to meddle in daily political life. First, the Indonesian military
(TNI) still criticizes the current democratic system. As attributed by Indonesia’s army strategic command head, Lieutenant General Gatot
Nurmayanto, Indonesian democracy is not always right for Indonesia.
Accordingly, democracy based on popular vote does not always lead to the
strengthening of the nation. For some political analysts, this is the picture
of a hard-line faction within the TNI to push for more military involvement in
Indonesia’s daily politics.
Second, the TNI has doubted the ability of civilian
government to govern. Corruption and immorality have become chronic diseases in
the civilian government. As a result, certain political regulations can risk
national stabilization, such as the current dispute over the legitimacy of Law
No. 42/2008 on presidential and vice presidential elections. As former army
intelligence head, Soleman B. Ponto argues, the potential of national chaos is
high, given that the law was dismissed by the constitutional court in January
2014. If national chaos develops, the military will launch what Ponto calls a “constitutional coup”. In
addition, during my personal interview in 2012 with former Vice Chief Staff of
Army, retired Major General Kiki Syanahkri, he expressed the same concern. He
thought that the quality degradation of civilian government and intended to
take political steps necessary to return to the original version of the 1945
constitution. To support his idea, Kiki and his colleges in the Retired Army
Association (PPAD), proposed to form a “national council”. This would allow the
military to legitimately engage directly in politics. These statements raise the
question about the military’s relentless tendency to take any opportunity to
influence or even to take over the civilian government.
Democracy allows for every individual, regardless of
their background, to run for office. However, after the downfall of authoritarian
regime and the beginning of democratic consolidation, the remnants of a former
authoritarian regime, including the military, should be restricted from
participating in politics. The former regime was highly backed up by the
military in Indonesia during the new order period for over 30 years. This
history can give the military the desire to re-engage in the new political
system. If it does, there is high possibility for the military to bring back an
authoritarian spirit, such as in Egypt and Thailand.
According to the Indonesian constitution, military
figures can run for office after resigning from active duty. However, the close
relations between former officers and active officers are difficult to
overlook. Former officers support the core interests of their institution. This
again brings up the question of the future of the TNI reformation that has
stalled during the second term of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY). Three crucial
areas of the TNI’s internal reform could be “blocked” by former senior officers
if they get elected.
First and foremost is the uplifting of human rights
values among officers. The TNI has been globally known for its human rights
record toward its own people. The military internal reformation failed to deal
with this issue, particularly in Papua province. The military candidates are
likely to defend their former institution. For instance, the prison raid by
army special forces (Kopassus) that killed four detainees in Cebongan, drew
support and even praise from Prabowo and other former generals, including SBY.
In addition, Pramono Edhie Wibowo recently called to forget past violations of human rights conducted
by the TNI.
The second area of army reform which might be left
undone is the reorganization or even liquidation of some army territorial
commands across country. Many territorial commands at the regional level have
been widely alleged to be used for political and economic purposes. As a
leading general during the early days of TNI’s reformation, Wiranto supported and
defended the existence of the commands. In present day, there are no military
candidates have questioned these commands in light of charges of misuse for
political purpose and human rights violations.
The third area of military reform needed is the management
of its businesses, particularly the illegal ones, such as illegal logging,
gambling, and the security business. It seems hard to tackle this issue if some
former generals get elected in September, given the fact that the military
still highly depends on these off-budget resources.
Given the uncertainty at the national level,
Indonesian democracy will arguably allow the military figures to continue their
role as decisive political actors as happened during the new order. In
contrast, after the era of strong military regimes, certain Latin America
countries have produced many strong populist leaders, such as Lula Da Silva and
Dilma Rousseff in Brazil; Cristina Fernández de Kirchner in Argentine and Evo
Morales in Bolivia. These figures can restrict constitutionally military
ambition in their countries. They can channel effectively people’s aspirations
to support government policies, instead of paving the way to the military to
get its second opportunity to govern.
Indonesian politics has never gotten out from under
military influence, and certain populist leaders, such as Jokowi and Risma,
also appear to rely on military support.
As a result, the future of the Indonesian democratic system remains
uncertain.
Published in the Eurasia Review, March 21, 2014
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