Politicizing military history: A monumental mistake

President Yudhoyono, while officiating the latest war monuments in Jakarta, asked that all of us cherish and reflect on Indonesia? military history, reminding us that while we may prefer ?oft power? we should also be ?eady for war? Some notes can then be offered here.
Last Friday, President Yudhoyono, while officiating the latest war monuments in Jakarta, asked that all of us cherish and reflect on Indonesia? military history, reminding us that while we may prefer ?oft power? we should also be ?eady for war?
Here, the three monuments were meant to commemorate our ?truggles?with Malaysia, East Timor and the Dutch.

Some notes can then be offered here.

First, there is no doubt that history of crucial importance to the military profession. Ignoring history or not educating officers to have a ?istorical mind?can have disastrous consequences ?this much military history has taught us ?and the mess in Iraq is a vivid reminder.

The President is right to promote an appreciation of history, and in saying that ?he past is the prologue?to our present and future strategic circumstances.

Although, it must be remembered that the future, as Macgregor Knox claims, is not an object of knowledge, and no amount of ?rocessing power will make the owl of history a daytime bird?

Thus, military history should be studied (not just read) by officers and civilians alike, for its ability to help shape our intellectual fitness ?and not to find ready-made ?chools of solutions?

Second, military history should not be politicized ?even though the military (like other state institutions) often become hostages to the political sensitivities and prejudices of those they serve, and history has a bad habit of upsetting both.

However, to then politicize military history, whether to simply glorify parts of our past while ignoring others, or to serve realpolitik interests, would not only be disrespectful to the memories of our heroes, but also it would deny us crucial lessons that we might learn for future planning and wars.

Unfortunately for Indonesia, military history has taken a back seat to political interests.

One example, as historian Katharine Mcgregor argued, is when Soeharto? New Order regime used history to not only unify the military plagued with inter-service rivalries in the 1960s, but also to further legitimize his rule. It was this neglect of military history, combined with the intensive politicization of the officer corps, which led to the disastrous conditions surrounding Soeharto? fall in 1998.

Sadly, this politicization of military history is ?ollowed?by scholars studying the Indonesian military, who, for far too long, have focused on military politics and issues of civil-military relations ?though not without merit.

Consequently, there are very few scholarly studies that look at Indonesia? long and rich battlefield experiences (some claim to be within the hundreds) or why some of our joint-military operations were so successful in some cases and not in others.

With these three points in mind, there are three expectations in regards to our new monuments.

First, the memorials are nothing more than our sincere effort to honor our fallen heroes, and must not be used as a vehicle to politicize our military history for short-term political interests ?as has been implicitly argued by some observers recently. Especially since we consider that our neighbors might feel a little uneasy when reminded of our ?ggressive?behavior in the past ?which the three monuments symbolize.

Second, in terms of military history, we learn from both our failures and successes, or anything in between ?which I hope those three monuments would eventually lead to.

Here, there is much to learn from what scholars have described as one of our most successful post-independence military campaigns: the integrated joint-operations under Ahmad Yani to crush the PRRI-Permesta rebellion in the late 1950s.

The strategic, operational and tactical successes during this operation could provide us with ?ata richness?to develop our newly integrated joint-operations doctrine for example.

Meanwhile, there is also much to learn from our longest counter-insurgency campaign in East Timor that lasted for decades. Though it is hard to describe our experiences here as strategically or operationally successful, there is a wealth of information that we could study considering our ever-present focus on internal security and separatism.

On the other hand, we could also learn from those campaigns that were not clear victories or losses for us, as the case in our Konfrontasi with Malaysia and our planned operations against the Dutch. While it is hard to measure success or failure here, the planning stages of these operations that were plagued with difficulties could provide us lessons on future logistical planning for joint-operations.

Finally, no doubt we have lost our men during these operations and their memory should not be lost in vain. But for me, the best way to honor them is to continue on the long and winding road to inculcate a ?istorical mind?in our officers, which should be part of a strategic process to eventually incorporate the notion of a ?oldier-scholar?in our lexicon.

Ultimately, the increasingly complex strategic challenges facing us today and in the future require that we study military history for what it is and not for what political interests it could serve.

In the end, to paraphrase retired general Paul Van Riper, soldiers fight better when they fight smarter.

Military history is too serious a business to be left to politicians.

 Evan A. Laksmana
Published at The Jakarta Post and CSIS, http://www.csis.or.id/Publications-OpinionsDetail.php?id=753

Will a military coup happen in Indonesia?

Given Indonesia? turbulent history and past conflictual relationship between the military and political leadership, the question of whether a military coup could and will happen is certainly worth looking into.
In late August, the Indonesian press aired an age-old debate about the possibility of a military coup in Indonesia. The issue was sparked by President Yudhoyono? announcement of a 1.6 trillion rupiah (US$ 1.6 billion) budget cut in defence spending next year.
Observers have noted that a budget cut could hamper Indonesia? fledgling military reform as it slows down effort to create a minimum essential force. Some even went further by saying that if this trend continues, there is a possibility that the Indonesian military (TNI) could follow the coup path of the Thai military (Kompas, 25/08/08).

Subsequently, Defence Minister Juwono Sudarsono stated that a military coup is out of the question as the TNI are the ?eople? army? It was a sentiment shared by high-ranking military officers as they claim that any military coup was simply not in the TNI? lexicon.

However, given Indonesia? turbulent history and past conflictual relationship between the military and political leadership, the question of whether a military coup could and will happen is certainly worth looking into.

A military coup in the offing?

Let? look more closely at the argument that the recent budget cuts might lead to a military coup as it threatens the military? financial corporate interests. This argument however overlooks other factors that could inhibit a military takeover.

Theoretically, a military coup ?or other forms of military intervention in politics ?could occur if three factors are present. These are the supporting motives, the capacity of the officer corps, as well as the opportunity provided in the domestic political arena to do so.

Firstly, in terms of motive, a military? intention to launch a coup generally stems from two overlapping logics: the logic of rationality and the logic of appropriateness. In the former, the military might rationally intervene mainly to defend its ?orporate?interests. In the latter, military behaviour is measured in terms of the congruence with its internalized norms.

A coup might not be entirely acceptable to all members of the officer corps due to embedded and internalized norms within the corps which sees a military coup as unacceptable to the Indonesian people. This view stems from the TNI? ethos as the ?eople? army?and ?uardian?of the people.

Thus, any coup attempt might potentially shatter military cohesion and ruin its public image ?two things that the military leadership has been trying to recover gradually and painstakingly in the post-Suharto period.

The military? corporate interests cannot be measured solely by the level of military spending. If so, a coup could have happened decades ago since from the 1950s, Jakarta was never able to provide the military with adequate funding. Moreover, it has generally been acknowledged that the bulk of the military? financial sources comes from off-budget sources, especially its commercial activities. Efforts are being made to regulate these activities.

Thus, although recent budget cuts might affect the TNI? operational readiness, it does not necessarily threaten the military? corporate interests. Also, there are other multi-faceted issues that the military sees to be more ?undamental,?such as the promotion and appointment policies, the territorial command structure, or investigation into past human rights abuses.

Secondly, in terms of capacity, any coup attempt will be determined by the degree of cohesion among the officer corps, since a coup ?essentially a showdown with the political leadership ?requires a unified front to be effective and acceptable to the military leadership. In this regard, as scholars have argued, the TNI has been divided throughout its history, especially during President Suharto? last decade.

Takashi Shiraishi, a professor at Kyoto University, argued that during the New Order, Mr. Suharto took measures to ensure that the officer corps never developed into a unified front ?a tactic of divide and rule that some attributed to President Abdurrahman Wahid as well. Hence, to some extent, the shadow of a divided military lingers on that could hinder a coup attempt.

Finally, in terms of opportunity, a coup move is usually preceded by a deep domestic political and economic crisis ?often cited as reasons that ?ropel?the military to intervene. Today however the TNI is in a cordial working partnership with the President, who himself is a retired general, and the domestic conditions are more stable than before. Thus, the opportunity, and justification, to launch a coup is almost non-existent today.

Therefore, even if one could argue that the military were ?orced?to contemplate a coup, the military? organizational norms, its multi-faceted institutional interests, and the legacies of a divided military, might hinder such eventuality in the near future.

Implications for civil-military relations

However, the historically turbulent, and often conflictual, relationship between the political and military leaderships indicates that the balance between the two is delicate, and often reflects a mutual distrust.

Thus, to safeguard against future conflicts, a new balance is needed to preserve a working relationship in a post-Suharto democratic setting. In this regard, a civilian defence community could complement the existing balance between the political and military leaderships.

The triangular balance might create what scholars call a ?oncordance?civil-military relation where the government, officer corps, and civil society have a cooperative relationship stressing dialogue, accommodation, and shared values. This could be initiated through several steps.

First, the political leadership should reduce the suspicion and grievances among the officer corps by not politicizing the military and not interfering excessively into internal military affairs. Excessive politicization and interference in internal military affairs could, as it did before, factionalize the officer corps and deepen grievances.

Second, the military should maintain the trust extended by the political leadership by continuing the momentum of military reform, including the regulations of military commercial activities and military tribunals. Abrupt and outright rejection of reform efforts might increase mistrust among the political leadership.

Finally, the civilian defence community should bridge any differences between the political and military leaderships. This could be done for example by assisting both leaderships in formulating defence strategies, while at the same time providing checks and balances. The absence of a credible civilian defence community instead might hinder communication between the two leaderships which could bring back old feuds.

In the end, the urgency for such a balance perhaps could be seen in the warning made by Andi Widjajanto, a noted Indonesia military observer, that the TNI is currently ?aiting in the wings?and simply ?bserving?the political arena ?a situation which could change if domestic conditions deteriorate further.

 Evan A. Laksmana
Available from http://www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/perspective/rsis1202008.pdf

The Indonesian Military Court Reform : Bridging the Gap among Justice Values

Military court reform in Indonesia is part of the national security sector reform. As  part of the entire national agenda, improvement of military justice has to be an element of the effort to reorganize the functions, structure and culture of institutions responsible for security, in accordance with the values of democracy and human rights.

Aspects of fairness in the military justice scheme has been the main focus since the commencement of security sector reform in 1998. In addition to the separation of the TNI (National Army) -Police in 2000 and the abolition of dual function of ABRI (Former Name of National Army) in 2004, following the reform agenda is the reform of military justice in Indonesia is the legal umbrella of Act No. 31 of 1997 on Military Justice.

That agenda should be performed soon, as a countermeasure to several cases of military misconduct by members of the TNI. While in the other hand, the status quo tend to immunize TNI from the logic of the society. One of the highlights is the case of the military judicial process on nine members of the Battalion 744/Satya Bhakti Yuda, who committed maltreatment against civilians. The tragedy was resulted in several death-toll in Atambua, Belu regency, West Timor. on March 11, 2011.

Following the verdict of the Military Court judges Kupang against the nine members of the Military Justice Infantry Battalion (Yonif) 744/Satya Bhakti Yuda, ENT public spotlight focused on Indonesia's military justice system, particularly drawn from the military tribunal process that occurs in Kupang, on Tuesday, July 21, 2011. At the very least, the family of Charles Mali (21 years) was saddened by the decision of the judges, which was considered away from the principle of fairness and equality before the law. Pro-democracy community groups and human rights actvists expressed rejection of the court decision.
Then, the batallion members were punished by an average sentence in prison under 1 year, with jail term cut and only one member who was disabled from active duty Army. This decision was based on the fact the trial that there had been a negligence committed by 9 Infantry Battalion soldiers 744/SYB and wounded in that task by persecuting civil institutions which lead to casualties (vivanews.com).

It’s lucid that Indonesian Military Trial is likely similar to the civil one, which is far from justice fundamentals and law impartiality. The verdict has broken the people’s heart, particularly the victims’ families. That case of military misconduct has left one with wonder, will this injustice continues?
There are reasons why problem of the military court reform still lingers. The court is supposed to become a securing place for those army members who committ crimes, including violation of human rights. While on the other side, the Law no.31/1997 --which already existed to maintain the court—has less sufficient contextual rule.


Military Law Enforcement Issues
Military justice in Indonesia is still a matter of law enforcement system in Indonesia. The main indicators of the problem are the decision making process and the final verdict read by military judges are not in accordance with the principles of democracy and human rights. During the whole new order of military justice process, from investigation to prosecution by military prosecutors are very closed. In the reform era, the closure of military courts is still happening. Another difference was wounded justice communities are in the process of reform era military tribunals prefer the command line instead of an institution of public conscience, which became the main considerations in the process. It boils down to read the decision by the judges.

The verdict delivered yesterday judges tend to be based on the TNI command line rather than on considerations of the Supreme Court as the holder of the highest judicial authority in the country. The highest judicial power in a military court under the Supreme Court held the delivery of judicial power by a military court in September 2004 the Armed Forces Commander and the Presidential Decree. 56 of 2004, as well as the mandate of Law Number 49 Year 2009 regarding Judicial Power. Based on these three rules of law, supervision of the military court under the Supreme Court, while the discipline and career guidance should be submitted to the Department of Defense.

Under the oversight authority of the Supreme Court, the final decision should be based on the military tribunal process judgment common criminal, not a command line. Coaching Corps Military Law committed by TNI headquarters through Law Development Board (Babinkum) associated with the military career of military personnel in the environment likely influenced the command of Military Justice in law enforcement and justice in the military environment. Command influence occurs when a military authority to influence, obstruct or deliberately directed to the incorrect administration of justice. Influence of the military command not only in military courts, but military prosecutors are in organization and administration which is part of Babinkum TNI based in TNI Headquarter.


Safe Haven
Based on reports in Indonesia policy studies conducted by Imparsial, during the years 2001-2006 there were 46 cases of human rights violations committed by military and police officers with an average sentence under 4 years in prison. While reports of Komnas Ham, kekrasan conducted military against civilians in the province from 2009 until the beginning of 2011 reached 11 cases, only 5 of which are processed in a military court.

Based on the two reports shows that the significance of military justice for criminal acts of the military personnel are still far from expectations. Military justice become safe haven for the resolution of criminal cases committed by military members. Disciplinary action taken by the judges of military courts is very low when compared to the criminal acts committed by members of the military, and even lead to death. The same sentence was given to military members, both in capacity and institutional duty assignment outside the institution. Given sentence is not automatically provide a deterrent effect to the soldiers who did this crime. In fact, the deterrent effect is one of the goals of justice in a democratic country. It is a domino effect on the emergence of a variety of other criminal acts, such as that experienced by Charles Mali and his colleagues, even very open to future possibilities of violence that afflicts other civil society rights violations, particularly in West Timor.

The credibility of the military justice is tarnished in the public eye, because in some cases, including in the case of the death of Charles Mali has been unable to capture the sense of justice and put it in the judge's decision.

Law No. 31 of 1997
One of the main legal basis of military justice in Indonesia are Law No. 31 of 1997, in addition to Law No. 49 of 2009 on Judicial Power. The law of military justice should now be changed, because the rule of law is a product of the regime established by the military domination. In the New Order era, the military court is part of the military hegemony in various areas of community life of Indonesia.

In the early period of the security sector reform, various laws new order dominated by the military to change. The emergence of MPR-RI No.: VI/MPR/2000 of Separation Military and Police, Law No. 3 of 2002 on the TNI and Law No. 34 of National Defence is attempting to regulate the governance of military institutions, including the military court order accordance with the spirit of reform and democracy. Mandate to make changes to military justice is reflected in the TAP MPR No. VII of 2000 on the role of the TNI and the Police Role. In Article 3 (4) (a) declare the Indonesian National Army soldier is subject to the authority of the military justice in violation of military law and subject to the general judicial power in terms of the general criminal law violations. However, to this day attempt to change the Military Justice Act is still confronted with obstacles. One major obstacle is the strong desire to distinguish the TNI military personnel with civilians. In fact, the bill is addressed to the Military Tribunal in 2007 was hit by the strength of the military status quo in the current logic of democracy that give priority to civilian rule and respect for human rights.

Looking at the military court in Kupang on 9 members of Battalion 744 encourages community efforts to revive the spirit of changes in Law No. 31 of 1997 is. General crime committed military forces should use the logic of civil penalty to put the military as an ordinary citizen who has the same status in the eyes of the law (equality before the law). The military is part of ordinary citizens who have the same status in the eyes of the law. Therefore, it should in general crime, such as assault causing death, the verdict is given based on the logic of common criminal.

Military judicial process against the nine members of Battalion 744 and the penalty imposed, encourage the holding of the correction of military justice in Indonesia. Various considerations above are simple considerations that are expected to arouse consciences of all components, especially the NTT law enforcement efforts to encourage a fair and democratic values and human rights.


Hipolitus Wangge, 
Researcher at  Pacivis University of Indonesia
This piece is formerly published at Pos Kupang, August 27, 2011

The US Political Stance on TNI’s Reform Agenda

On these previous few weeks, the media reports the US diplomats’ lobby to match the military retirees to the former ministry of finance, Sri mulyani Indrawati (SMI), now served as Excutive Director of World Bank. The mix and match strategies is on purpose for the next presidential election. The lobby continues on, approximately since a year ago. It’s considered as a part of trial-and-error negotiation with the military cliques, to map the support of the military to SMI.

The aspects of the negotiaion could be divided into three parts : the support of US lobby to the military, the US preference to the military, and the influence of the compromise to the efforts of military reform.


Support of US lobby to the military
National history of Indonesia is strongly linked to the foreign countries intervention. Clandestinely, foreign parties often act as free riders, using the military as a vehicle to support their own goals. While, the military stands as one of the sturdiest political powers in this country.

On 1958, a group of military higher-ups lead by Commander Ahmad Husein and Colonel Maludin Simbolon, rejected the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), government centralization in Java, as well as refusing the AH Nasution leadership over the Army. The most fundamental strike over this country is to build the Republic of Indonesia’s Revolutionary Government (PRRI) on Bukittinggi, West Sumatera.

This intrusion created an open door for US intervention to crush the communist entities and President Sukarno’s leadership. Following the financial and military aid, the US government under President Eisenhower and Secretary of State John Foster Dulles, fully supported PRRI/Permesta to overthrow the Soekarno’s Leadership. However, the AH Nasution’s troops could take control over the rush.

The role of military politics on the dual function of the Army (1959-1998), has a legitimate sustain from the US government trhough the RAND’s seminars on Forth Leavenworth, Kansas on 1959. The product of the seminars is a book titled The Role of the Military Underdeveloped Countries, edited by John J. Johnson. The book depicts the role of military as the agent of modernization in developing countries. The book was even used as a reading material to the US Military schools in Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. Essentially, the military function like that is ignoring the fundamental philosophy on civil-military relations on the west. The relations should be an objective civil control, which placed the military as the subordinate of the civilian.
On 1965, the US involvement was re-detected to indirectly support the defeat of PKI, by providing the think-tanks for the coup d’etat attempt by the September 30 Faction. It is strange that the coup d’etat, which was executed by the military criminals, did not receive international action or embargo from the US, a human rights and democracy champion.

The support of US lobby to the military
There are motives to take the military. First, due to its anti-fundamentalism and anti-communism posture. The September 30 coup d’etat reflected the US maintain over the military role to disband the PKI. On the other side, on 50’s decade, the military was also able to contain thr Darul Islam movement under SM Kartosoewiryo. The Islamic Fundamentalism was on the spotlight of US foreign policy on southeast Asia, which also become the second front of the US national policy (Rice : 2006).

The Fundamentalist faction has uncovered again their momentum since the previous one decade, especially post new-order era. Several series of violence, including the bombing case and destroying worship buildings, stand as a serious threat to US foreign policy in Indonesia, and generally in South East Asia.

Secondly, some of the military high officers (active or have retired) had tasted the US education overseas. Eventually, some of TNI’s executive doctrine were adapted from The US under the Pentagon arrangement (Syahnakri : 2011). A fraction of the military retirees is also identified to have received US education in its school of Commanding. The Command of Special Militia (Kopassus) had ever practiced routinely in the US before it was suspended following the Santa Cruz tragedy in Dili, East Timor on 1991. The military experiences in the US are then be seen as a psychological familiarity and key to have a same comprehensive view towards the national government succession on 2014.

The TNI Military Reform
The initial move to actualize the TNI to become the professional power in this country will be conflicted if there are any retiree taking part in government jobs. As a retiree, those people are acknowledged to have political rights under the constitution. Nevertheless, the TNI might as well provide indirect support to the senior retirees who are pursuing government position. Even though there are no command powers for the retired army members, the emotional and cultural bond have the potential to draw sympathy and preservation from active military members.

The TNI reform serves as a re-maintenance of its function as a main defense component in defending the Republic of Indonesia’s sovereignity, professionally and proportionally. It should have noticed that eventhough the reform attempt from 1998-2004 in considered sucsessfull, the spirit of the reform should keep on proliferated. In the middle of its improvement, the US lobby intention to draw the military support has an oblique obstacles to the spirit of reform. The government jobs which are filled by military retirees, in a way contradicts with the courage to reform. It’s due to some possibilities to restore the military networks to draw support for 2014 presidential election.

By that means, one should view what lies beneath US agenda in the midst of Indonesian civic conducts. For the betterment of the country, each nation’s element should respect the constitution by knowing their constituted position and duty.

Hipolitus Wangge, 
Writter as a Project Officer Civil Society Advocacy-Researcher at Pacivis University of Indonesia.

Published at Jawa Pos 3rd September 2011

Masa Depan Timor Leste Pasca Horta

Timor Leste akan memasuki babak baru pemerintahan, pasca kemunculan dua calon pemimpin yang diprediksikan mengisi jabatan presiden pada Juli 2012. Berdasarkan perhitungan sementara yang dikeluarkan kantor berita Associated Press (19/03) menempatkan pemimpin partai Fretilin, Francisco Gutteres dan mantan pemimpin pasukan gerilyawan, Taur  Matan Ruak yang didukung Partai Konggres Pembangunan Kembali Timor Leste (CNRT), sebagai dua calon presiden yang akan bertarung pada putaran kedua pada bulan April mendatang.

Kemunculan Gutteres dan Matan Ruak mengeliminasi 10 calon lainnya, termasuk Presiden Jose Ramos Horta. Kinerja Horta sejak menjadi presiden pada tahun 2007, dinilai belum maksimal, bahkan justru menimbulkan friksi internal dengan sejumlah elit, termasuk Xanana Gusmao. Di satu sisi,  kemampuan diplomasi luar negeri Horta yang handal mampu mendatangkan sejumlah investasi luar negeri untuk pembangunan nasional. Namun, di sisi lain, kemampuan diplomasi tersebut justru menimbulkan pertentangan dari dalam negeri, khususnya terkait dua kebijakan yang dinilai merugikan masyarakat Timor Leste, yakni pembangunan tempat penampungan pencari suaka Australia di Dili dan proyek gas alam cair (liquified natural gas/LNG) Woodside Petroleum dengan Australia.

Kinerja yang tidak maksimal dari Horta membuat sebagian besar masyarakat Timor Leste mengalihkan kepemimpinan terhadap tokoh-tokoh baru. Terdapat tiga tantangan yang harus diselesaikan oleh para calon presiden, yakni proses konsolidasi demokrasi di negara pasca konflik, meningkatkan kesejahteraan rakyat dan menjadikan Timor Leste sebagai negara yang berdaulat terhadap keamanan nasionalnya.

Sejak menjadi negara berdaulat pada tahun 2002, Timor Leste menghadapi persoalan konsolidasi demokrasi, khususnya perpecahan di antara para elit nasional yang berimbas pada ketidakpuasan sejumlah lembaga negara. Pasca peristiwa perpecahan tentara dan kepolisian pada tahun 2006, Timor Leste dirundung sejumlah aksi kekerasan yang berpuncak pada penembakan Presiden Ramos Horta pada tahun 2008.  Krisis tersebut menyebabkan jatuhnya pemerintahan  Perdana Menteri Mari Alkatiri.  Sejauh ini peta kepemimpinan masih berada di tangan kekuatan-kekuatan tradisional yang berperan dalam proses kemerdekaan Timor Leste.

 Ironisnya, sumber konflik justru berasal dari perpecahan di antara para elit nasional tersebut. Oleh karena itu, tugas pertama adalah membentuk pemerintahan yang mampu mengakomodir kepentingan berbagai elemen nasional. Pembentukan pemerintahan yang kuat  menjadi kunci awal pembangunan Timor Leste, pasca friksi internal selama kepemimpinan Horta.

Akibat perpecahan elit tersebut, kondisi masyarakat semakin memprihatinkan. Timor Leste menjadi negara dengan index pembangunan manusia terendah di kawasan Asia Pasifik. Tingkat pengangguran mencapai 600.000 ribu orang sejak tahun 2009, dari total penduduk Timor Leste yang mencapai 1,1 juta jiwa.  Tingkat kemiskinan mencapai 60-70 persen pada tahun 2011. Dengan potensi sumber daya alam yang terbatas, yakni minyak dan gas alam, maka pemerintahan terpilih harus berusaha keras mendistribusikan hasil dari kekayaan alam tersebut bagi masayarakat setempat.

 Ketergantungan terhadap ekspor sumber daya alam harus segera dikonversi kepada pembentukan basis-basis ekonomi kerakyatan, seperti pertanian non-subsisten dan perikanan. Selain itu, investasi asing langsung ke Timor Leste selama ini hanya dititikberatkan pada pembangunan infrastruktur, namun tidak diikuiti dengan pemberdayaan masyarakat setempat. Akibatnya lebih dari 50% penduduk Timor Leste masih berada di bawah garis kemiskinan. Ketimpangan tersebut harus segera diatasi dengan memberikan alokasi anggaran yang besar dalam peningkatan sumber daya masyarakat setempat.

Proses pemilu yang aman, tanpa menimbulkan konflik akan menjadi kunci bagi stabilitas nasional pada masa mendatang. Hal tersebut juga akan mempercepat transisi keamanan nasional yang selama ini berada di bawah kewenangan Pasukan Stabilitas  Internasional yang dipimpin Australia.  Sejauh ini Australia sudah berkomitmen untuk meninggalkan Timor Leste pada akhir tahun ini. Namun, hal tersebut akan sangat bergantung dari proses pemilihan umum baik presiden maupun parlemen yang akan berlangsung pada pertengahan tahun ini. Transisi keamanan dari pasukan internasional kepada otoritas keamanan lokal menjadi faktor yang sangat penting terhadap seluruh proses pembangunan di Timor Leste. Krisis 2006 telah menunjukkan bagaimana instabilitas nasional menganggu seluruh proses pembangunan negara termuda tersebut.

Bagi Indonesia sendiri transisi kepemimpinan di Timor Leste akan sangat membantu dalam  menjaga stabilitas regional Asia Tenggara maupun domestik, dimana Indonesia memiliki batas teritorial darat dan laut dengan negara tersebut. Stabilitas di Timor Leste pasca pemilu tahun ini, akan menentukan dalam proses bergabungnya Timor Leste sebagai anggota ASEAN, dimana Indonesia adalah promotor utamanya. Pemilu Timor Leste yang damai tanpa menimbulkan gejolak juga  akan sangat berpengaruh terhadap stabilitas perbatasan kedua negara. Apalagi sampai sekarang, belum terdapat perjanjian perbatasan resmi di antara kedua negara, sehingga pergantian kepemimpinan di Timor Leste akan sangat menentukkan dalam perundingan perbatasan kedua negara pada masa mendatang.

Hipolitus Wangge
Peneliti Pacivis, Universitas Indonesia

Time to Develop The Domestic Defense Industry

Asian states lead a global increase in weapons imports, according to a study released by the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI). The report was published on 19th March 2012.  Over the past five years, Asia and Oceania accounted for 44 per cent in volume of conventional arms imports, according to the institute. That compared with 19 per cent for Europe, 17 per cent for the Middle East, 11 per cent for North and South America, and nine per cent for Africa, said the report.

For Southeast Asia nations, arms deliveries increased by 185 percent between 2002-2006 and 2007-2011. Indonesia it self, sitting on 26th largest importer of  conventional weapons in the world of a total of 152 countries. In 2012, Indonesia is spending USD 8 billion on defence, it is  up sharply from USD 2.6 billion in 2009. Much is going on new hardware and spare parts. Starting with cooperation to jointly make 3 German-made diesel-electric submarines, 2  unmanned aerial vehicles  (UAV) from the Philippines , 8  AH-64 Apache attack helicopters from the United States , and the most controversial procurements of this year, such as 100 Leopard Main Battle Tanks (MBT) from the Netherlands and 6 Sukhoi fighter jets from Russia. The whole procurement programs as the commitment of the government in strengthening the weapon systems of  the Indonesian Armed Force (TNI).

A number of procurement plans for TNI above are a reflections of the  role and strategic national responsibility of national defence manufacturing industry . In the middle of the whole procurements  of  weapon systems for TNI, a fundamental question that must be made is how the contributions of the national defence industry to provide armaments system needs within the country. This question becomes important considering based on two reasons.  On the one hand,  the lack of guidance on the development of national defense industry, but the other hand the availability of funds of USD 70 billion for purchasing armed weapon systems for the next five years.

Based on research conducted by Jane's Defence and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) in 2010, there are three global defense industry models, such as  autharchy techo-nationalist model, nitche production model, and global production networks  model.

First , autharchy techo-nationalist is a model of self-reliance defense.  This model refers to  the development of industry on the basis of national capabilities,thereby reducing the level of reliance weapon system from overseas . This model requires the strengthening of the role of state in protecting the development of domestic defense industry and strengthening national technology , especially in the field of research and development . This model also requires the importance of the existence of private companies which have a capacity of large-scale international capital and technology in order to support the development of national defense industry.  Countries that are doing development on the basis of this model are Russia, China, Brazil and South Korean.

Second , nitche production is a model of the competitive level for defence industry. The form of defense industry development that attempted to fill a vacancy market weapons , particularly on regional level . The main terms of the defense industry development based on this model is the level of a country's competitive products to produce armaments, such as an increase in high-tech research and technological innovation. Countries that have developed a model of the competitive level are Taiwan, Finland, Sweden, and Indonesia when produced commercial aircraft N520  CN235 at the 1990s.

Third, the model of global production network. This model  is a development of the defense industry by forming chains of production system of weaponry scattered around the world. This model requires the establishment of global consortium system weaponry . The global arms market trend nowdays is the merger of defense industry into a global consortium.  Countries that are doing development on the basis of this model are United States , some countries European Union and Australia .

Based on third model above , defense industry in Indonesia directed to achieve independence defense (autharchy techo-nationalist) .However , before reaching the stage of the independence of defense , so far in meeting the needs of national weapon systems , Indonesian government did  weaponry diversify. It was done , considering Indonesia did not yet have a strong technological base, so the easiest way executed is to buy conventional arms  from a several  weapons manufacturers globally.

Self-reliance on defense industry is  needed, because up to now 80 percent national armament systems still depend of the international arms market, dominated by global  weapon companies, such as Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Thales, BAE System, Daewoo , and several other global arms producers . Consequently, Indonesia became one of the largest importer in the world. To reduce the level of  arms interdependence, it is necessary to promote political regulation related with defense industry .

Until now,  the development of the defense industry does not have a legal basis of integrating the interests among stakeholders, namely the government, manufacturers and users. So, there is strong exhortation to make a regulation deals with defense industry.  The  Strategic Defense Industry Bill currently being delibareted at House of Representatives (The Jakarta Post, 3/22). The Strategic Defense Industry  must set three main things, such as the placement of defense industry as a strategic industry that requires large role of state in conducting protection (infant industry), the placement of the defense industry as the main parties in the procurement of weapon systems, and a strong commitment to buy local weapon systems from indigenous industry.

First , defense industry in Indonesia should be made nationally strategic industries that must be protected . As a strategic industry , the government must provide protection , such as financial support and tax reduction . Financial support can be used to conduct research and development of products for defense, which admittedly is still far from the expectations of the users.  In addition the support costs can be used to nourish the back a number of business entities of strategic Industries (BUMNIS) who suffered losses. Tax reduction attempted in marketing the products of domestic-made armaments abroad .

Second , the placement of the defense industry as the lead actors in procurement mechanisms of main weapon systems.  The current global trend is the ownership of weapon systems by multinational companies. Apart from it, the leading defense industry must be the main actor in weapon systems procurements , starting from the stage of negotiations to purchase stage. It aims to improve the bargaining position of national defense industry and also reduces the involvement weapon brokers in the process of procurements .
Third budget availability for purchasing main weapon systems is large enough. It is about USD 70 billion for the next five years. The budget must be prioritized for purchasing the indigenous products resulted by major defense manufacturing industries , such as arms and vehicle manufacturer Pindad, aircraft manufacturer Dirgantara Indonesia , and  shipbuilder PAL Indonesia . Those products must comply with a weapon systems request from TNI. Additional, it will increase public welfare with creating new job opportunities. (The Jakarta Globe 24/3).

In the end, the development of  defense industry is highly determined by Goverment’s commitment to strengthen the national defense in the middle of the level of dependency of global armament's products are so high. The strength of the defense of a country is highly determined by the national defense industry.


Hipolitus Wangge
Writter is a  Program Officer of civil society advocacy at Pacivis, University of Indonesia

STRENGTHENING TNI’s PROFESSIONALISM

Indonesia National Army (TNI) is the frontline in defending the territorial sovereignty of the Unitary Republic of Indonesia (NKRI). As a major defense component, the military sought to strengthen its military capability into a more respected and formidable form of military force in the world, particularly in Southeast Asia.

However, despite some efforts to build a solid force, the military also must improve itself, given the number of problems that tarnished the professionalism of the TNI in this country.

Amid a number of problems facing the nation today, the TNI continues to conduct internal reforms. The process is still ongoing, although some people still doubt that the internal reforms. There are some records that need to be seen

However, a number of achievements can be seen from several indicators. First, this year, The Defense Ministry with the TNI Headquarters finalizes the plan of Indonesia's defense (which defense strategy should meet the minimum essential force / MEF) until 2024. The main obstacle which had been inhibited in the realization of the MEF is the budget requirements. Since 1966 until now, the defense budget tends to decrease, even no more than 1% of GNP. Ironic, considering that the average defense budget of the other countries in the Asia Pacific region have reached up to more than 1% of their GNP.

However, in 2012, the national defense budget will increase, although not significant. Good faith of the Government and Parliament should be appreciated. In the 2012 draft budget, defense spending is allocated to 64, 4 trillion rupiah. The budget is 35.7% up from the year 2011, which was 47, 5 trillion rupiah. In the Ministry / Agency Work Plan and Budget (RKA-KL) 2012, Ministry of Defense to obtain share for 3.33 trillion rupiah budget, Headquarters to obtain a budget of 7.12 trillion rupiah, the Army Headquarters to acquire a budget of 28.8 trillion dollars, the Navy Headquarters to obtain a budget of 13.6 trillion rupiah, and the Air Force Headquarters would get for about 11.4 trillion rupiah. For the next five years, the government will distribute 150 billion for strengthening major weapons systems equipment. By increasing the budget, it means that the implementation of planning MEF will be well-facilitated.

Second, this year, the ministry of defense attempts to re-invigorate the performance of national defense industries. Increasing the quantity and quality of the domestic defense industrial production will greatly affect the performance of the TNI as a major component of defense in performing their duties. Commitment of government and Parliament to strengthen the defense industries is clearly visible in meeting the needs of military defense equipment. Fulfillment of defense equipment, the bulk should come from domestic defense industries than those imported from abroad. It could be seen from the demand from the army for military rockets in 1000 to be produced by PT. Pindad for the next 3 years.

Third, this year, third-generation update of military weapon system has gained in maintaining the sovereignty of the Republic of Indonesia territory. Army personnel had had six multipurpose transport helicopter of type M1-17 V5 from Russia. Helicopter air wing will strengthen the ground forces, and will be served to support military operations of war (OMP) or military operations other than war (OMSP). This year the Navy successfully tested Russian-made supersonic anti-ship missiles Yakhont, last April. These missiles are a medium range types that can achieve a maximum distance of 350 miles in six minutes. The missile is capable of providing vibration effects for countries around Indonesia. Meanwhile, for the Air Force itself, this year is the momentum of the resurrection. Moreover, the Air Force awarded a grant 24 types of aircraft the F-16 Block 25, where 6 of them will be upgraded to F-16 block 52 of the United States. F-16 fighter aircraft will then be used to keep the Homeland airspace by conducting observations and monitoring, especially in the points leading the Homeland. Furthermore, this year, the Air Force has also inaugurated the use of helicopter simulators Superpuma NAS 332. That is the first simulator for the Air Force that will support the skills and abilities in performing tasks of military and non-military helicopter pilots.

Besides the three above progress, this year marks 13 years of national security sector reform. Security sector reform is an attempt to put all components of national security to perform the role and functions as mandated by the constitution. TNI becomes a major actor, given the task of national defense become the principal task of the TNI, while the role of police is safeguarding national security.

Some of the reformation agenda that has not been resolved among other things is the implementation of a number of national regulations related to the military, such as military businesses, reform of military justice, and abuse of human rights.

Mandate related to the military takeover by the government and the abolition of the military's business contained in Law no. 32/2004 on the TNI. In Article 2 of the law explains that the professionalism of the TNI is not business related. Meanwhile, in article 76 the same law, requiring all military businesses takeover shall be conducted over 5 years since enacted in 2004. Following up on the mandate of the law, the President established the National Team of Military Business takeover through Presidential Instruction (Inpres) No.7/2008. In 2009 before the deadline for the takeover, the government issued Presidential Regulation No. 43/2009 related to military business conquest. So far, in the field, there still contained a number of military businesses that have not been touched, such as Engineering at private firms, foundations and some other forms.

In two recent regulations, there has not seen a strong commitment from the government to take over the military's business. This example can be seen from lack of transparency from the takeover team, especially on data related to a number of military businesses.

Second, reform of military court of justice. So far, the military court in Indonesia is still far from the standard of equal justice before the law. In some cases a trial of gross violations of human rights committed by military forces, the final verdict is still heavily influenced by the command line, not based on the principles of justice and fairness before the law. The result, many military personnel involved in the case, such severe persecution that resulted in death, just gets a prison sentence of not more than 3 years. Ironic, because it’s based on Act number 49 of 2009, the military court should be under the authority of the judiciary and is under the supervision of the Supreme Court.

Third, human rights abuse committed by military forces against civilians. Based on data from National Human Rights Commission, in March 2011, the number of military violence is reported to reach 38 cases. The amount still describes the maintained repressive cultures approach towards civil society. Despite the inclusion of the concept of human rights in military education curriculum, however, the correlation of education and human rights implementation in the field is still not connected.

In times to come, the military is expected to not only become a major defense component in implementing the task of maintaining the sovereignty of Republic of Indonesia, but also able to run it professionally and proportionately according to the spirit of Sapta Marga.

Hipolitus Yolisandry Ringgi Wangge

The writter is a Project Officer for Civil Society Studies at Pacivis, University of Indonesia

Indonesian Military returns to politics?

A debate surrounding the 2009 general elections has revolved around the role of the Indonesian Military (TNI) in political parties where almost every major political party has former military officers sitting as board members or as chairman. This begs the question: Is the Indonesian Military returning to politics?
In the past few weeks, a debate surrounding the 2009 general elections has revolved around the role of the Indonesian Military (TNI) in political parties where almost every major political party has former military officers sitting as board members or as chairman.
For example, the Golkar Party is now spearheaded by Vice President Jusuf Kalla as chairman and Lt. Gen. (ret) Sumarsono as secretary-general, while former military officers are filling the Hanura and Gerindra party leadership under retired generals Wiranto and Prabowo, respectively.

In addition, this military ?omeback?coincides with the growing trend of former military men contesting local elections. Marcus Mietzner, a lecturer at the Australian National University, found that in 2006, 8 percent of the candidates contesting 50 local polls were retired military and police officers.

This begs the question: Is the Indonesian Military returning to politics? Although officially banned from day-to-day politics, the military has always been considered Indonesia? most powerful political institution by virtue of its institutional strength, especially its territorial command structure.

In this regard, it might not be a question of whether the military has returned to politics, but a question of how it plays politics under the new rules of the game. In other words, one could argue it never actually left the political scene.

If this is the case, what then explains the phenomenon of an apparent military ?omeback?in politics?

First, as argued by Ikrar Nusa Bhakti, a professor at the National Institute of Sciences, it might be an indication of a post-power syndrome among officers who were once part of the ruling elite ?or it might only involve a handful of high-ranking former officers rather than indicate a general trend plaguing the entire officer corps.

Second, it could also be seen as the result of politicization, and even commercialization, of the officer corps, which is instigated not only by the political leadership? intervention in internal military affairs ?as was the case during the terms of presidents Sukarno, Soeharto, and Abdurrahman Wahid ?but also due to the nature of the military education and its territorial command system.

The fact that the majority of the Army is utilized for staff positions in the territorial command structure suggests that the career experience of the majority of the officer corps is actually related to social, business, and political issues in the regions.

Although the process of military education reform is currently underway, the curricula at the military academies all the way through the staff and command colleges since the 1960s have always emphasized social-political subjects. This suggests that some, if not most, military officers would be prepared for ?ociopolitical?tasks, and hence, by implication, might not be well trained in other skills required for an alternative livelihood after retirement other than politics or business.

Finally, the military prevalence in politics highlights the failure of the civilian leadership ?whether to provide stability and improve welfare, or to overcome their lack of political confidence ?because they continue to drag the military back in.

On the one hand, we hear the oft-repeated accusation from the military establishment that the civilian politicians are a prime source of the nation? problems ?which the public seems to agree with. A Kompas poll in 2007 noted that 46.6 percent of the public would vote for a military figure as the next president. On the other hand, the charge might not have credibility had it not been for the fact that corruption among civilian politicians is increasing while basic prices are skyrocketing.

Meanwhile, the ?nferiority syndrome?suffered by civilian politicians highlights two points: First, the weakness of the civilian defense community to adequately support the civilian leadership; and second, the cliche that military men are financially and politically omnipotent ?regardless of the current debate challenging the leadership skills possessed by former military officers.

What does all this mean for Indonesia? fledgling military reform and delicate civilian-military relations?

First, although the focus on removing the military from day-to-day politics and regulating their commercial activities is certainly a worthy cause, the issue of military education reform should be the top priority of decision makers in Jakarta.

Without a complete overhaul and integration of the military curricula ?as well as a civilian teaching staff ?military officers will always reserve the potential to play a sociopolitical role.

Second, although the territorial command structure cannot be plausibly erased entirely due to the prevalence of internal security threats and separatism, a mechanism should be enforced within the existing regulations to ?solate?military men assigned to regional staff positions to prevent them from being utilized or dragged into local social, political and business activities.

When it comes to civilian-military relations, observers have noted this ?omeback?phenomenon could be seen positively as far as military politics are concerned because with former generals running their own campaigns, the military might not be able to present a unified front. Hence, as the argument goes, civilian leadership could be strengthened at the expense of a ?ractured?military establishment.

However, a strong civilian leadership cannot be fully achieved without the strengthening of a civilian defense community that could bridge the civilian-military divide while assisting both sides in dealing with national security issues. At the same time, the civilian leadership also needs to overcome its ?nferiority syndrome?and stop bringing the military back into politics.

Finally, public exhaustion over corrupt civilian politicians might lead to disillusionment with democratic ideals and civilian supremacy over the military ?premised upon distinct ?ivilian?and ?ilitary?realms.

Eventually, if this dichotomy is increasingly blurred, a reconsideration of civilian-military relations that for the past decade has been centered upon establishing a civilian supremacy over the military might be required.

In the end, whether a civilian-military ?artnership?would be the best form of relationship and whether such partnership would prove more productive for Indonesia? future in the long run remains to be seen.

 Evan A. Laksmana

Published at The Jakarta Post and CSIS, http://www.csis.or.id/Publications-OpinionsDetail.php?id=757

Military postings are now less political

Though personnel management may stabilise in the next few years as the 1976-1981 classes take charge, the fact that subsequent classes, from 1983 to 1991, are larger, averaging around 250 officers per year, means that post availability and promotion policies will remain a potential time bomb.
AWAY from the glare of the headlines, a fundamental shift has quietly taken place in the Indonesian military (TNI).

In the last three months, there have been at least four waves of personnel changes. The first, on Oct 23, involved 46 officers. Another reshuffle on Nov 17 involved 11 officers; on Nov 30, 72 officers; and Dec 29, 51 officers.

The transfers affected a wide range of commands and brought about changes in posts across the board, including those of the three service chiefs, the chief of general staff, the chief of military intelligence, the commander of army special forces (Kopassus), and the regional commanders of Papua, Sulawesi, Aceh, West Java and Central Java, to name a few.

The changes arise from trends in the TNI's personnel system over the past five years, sparked initially by President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's election in 2004; the new TNI Law of 2004, which raised the military retirement age from 55 to 58; and the end of the Aceh insurgency in 2005.

A 2008 study by the editors of Cornell University's Indonesia journal showed that between September 2005 and March 2008, there were at least three big waves of personnel moves in which President Yudhoyono and then-army chief Djoko Santoso slotted their classmates from the 1974 and 1975 classes of the Indonesian Military Academy into strategic posts.

The decision to favour these two classes could be seen as a way to relieve their frustration: Though the classes were large (the class of 1974 had 434 members and 1975, 304), the number of strategic posts had shrunk.

The end of the Aceh insurgency in 2005, as well as the abolishment of many socio-political posts after former leader Suharto's fall, did not make things easier. Logjams in promotions began to appear.

The Cornell Indonesia journal study argues that it was the need to provide new posts that prompted the greater use of postings to the defence and non-military ministries as well as the expansion of the territorial command structure in the last few years.

The shortage of posts also explains the frequency of personnel reshuffles in the last few months, so officers can be cycled through posts more rapidly. Younger officers from the classes of 1976 to 1980 have been moved into many key positions in the recent reshuffles.

From the class of 1976, we have generals George Toisutta (army chief) and Suryo Prabowo (deputy army chief). From the class of 1977, there are generals Hotma Marbun (Papua commander) and Hotmangaradja Pandjaitan (Bali commander).

The class of 1978 is represented by generals Soenarko (infantry centre commander), Hari Krisnomo (Sulawesi regional commander), Gerhan Lentara (commander of 2nd Division of the Army Strategic Reserve), Budiman (Central Java regional commander) and Marciano Norman (presidential guard commander).

The first officer from the 1980s generation to win a general's star is Pramono Edhie Wibowo (class of 1980), Dr Yudhoyono's brother-in-law who was recently appointed the West Java commander after his tenure in Kopassus. The new Kopassus chief Lodewijk Freidrich Paulus is from the class of 1981. Many from the classes of 1980 and 1981 fill the sub-regional military commander posts.

Given the smaller sizes of the 1976-1981 classes, which averaged around 100 officers per class, their members are likely to feel more secure about their careers than their seniors. They realise that as long as they do their jobs well, strategic posts are within their grasp.

In another change from the Suharto era, when intelligence officers were favoured, the Strategic Reserve Command (Kostrad) and Kopassus have become the most prestigious postings. It is interesting to note that Dr Yudhoyono, TNI commander Djoko Santoso, army chief George Toisutta, as well as his predecessor Agustadi Sasongko, all served in Kostrad.

Officers from the navy and air force - two services known for technically oriented professionalism - are also playing a growing role. Rear-Admiral Tedjo Edhy Purdijanto was appointed the TNI's chief of general staff in 2007. Indeed, from 2006-2007, the number of non-army generals in strategic inter-service positions has risen dramatically.

Such developments suggest that there has been a slow shift in the military's personnel selection system away from what used to be a highly political process, with those with good elite connections or who hailed from domestic intelligence being favoured.

If this trend continues, the younger generation of officers may be more inclined to prove themselves professionally. They may even seek new areas, such as counter-terrorism and border security, where they can shine.

Though personnel management may stabilise in the next few years as the 1976-1981 classes take charge, the fact that subsequent classes, from 1983 to 1991, are larger, averaging around 250 officers per year, means that post availability and promotion policies will remain a potential time bomb.

In the absence of a complete overhaul of the military's personnel planning system, the road to a stable form of renewal appears a long and winding one.

Evan A. Laksmana
Published at The Straits Times - 01 February 2010 and CSIS, http://www.csis.or.id/Publications-OpinionsDetail.php?id=764

Reforming Indonesia's Military: Going Beyond Cash, Guns, and Ballots

The depoliticisation and defence management reforms represent short- and medium-term solutions which overlook the fundamental problems of professional military capacity building.

THIS month, Indonesia celebrates the 10th anniversary of the reformasi movement that toppled president Suharto and ushered in democracy. One of the key issues then was reforming the country? military.
Reform has focused thus far on three major areas: bringing the military under democratic civilian control, curbing the military? economic activities and restructuring the defence management process.

Although much remains to be done ?reforming of the territorial command structure, for instance ?there has also been much progress.

Serving military officers are now required to step down before holding political office. Also, the military? ?ual function?doctrine as well as its ?ocial political?offices have been officially abolished.

Meanwhile, military-run businesses have been banned and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has established a team to take over these. The government is also trying to raise the annual defence budget.

But the depoliticisation and defence management reforms represent short- and medium-term solutions which overlook the fundamental problems of professional military capacity building.

There are two issues here: military education and the strengthening of a civilian defence community. Education is perhaps the single most important long-term issue that can change the military? underlying culture and behaviour, as well as its ability to function as a professional force.

Of special concern are the curricula of the Military Academy, Staff and Command Colleges and National Resilience Institute. A recent study notes that, since the 1960s, 53 per cent of the academy? curriculum and 64 per cent of the command staff and college curriculum covered political and social subjects. This suggests that military education was not aimed at producing professional soldiers but rather at preparing them to play a ?ocial-political?role.

Thus, one can surmise that while there are many politically savvy officers in Jakarta, there are few technical experts. One indicator of the impact of such politically heavy curricula can be seen in the fact that the Defence White Paper is mostly formulated by civilian academics.

The percentage of technical military courses should be raised and integrated into Indonesia? national defence and military doctrines.

The welfare of the rank-and-file soldiers must also be improved. Reform will be pointless if soldiers are preoccupied with securing additional funding to support their families.

Another aspect of military education reform is the need to gradually ?ivilianise?the teaching staff of the military academies. But this cannot be accomplished without a strong civilian defence community.

Unfortunately, Indonesian civil society is lacking in this regard. Although there are some highly qualified defence academicians, very few are trained in technical, strategic or military studies.

Civilians need to move away from their ?nti-military?attitude. If they do, perhaps more civilians would be willing to study military- related subjects, thereby providing a pool of people able to assist the military in policy-making.

For example, such a community could conduct studies on issues that practical military officers may not be able to carry out themselves. They could also help distinguish between short-term and long-term strategic issues, as well as project trends and future threats.

A strong civilian defence community is sorely needed to overcome the inferiority syndrome which civilians seem to suffer from whenever they have to deal with the military.

Reforming military education and creating a strong civilian defence community are important.

A large budget, plenty of weapons and a politically neutral officer corps are not enough to ensure that Indonesia? military functions as a thoroughly professional and modern force.

Evan A. Laksmana
Published at The Straits Times and CSIS, http://www.csis.or.id/Publications-OpinionsDetail.php?id=759

Looking For National Security System

Purchasing of 100 main battle tank  with the type A26 Germany-made, into one of two issues seized public attention related to defence and security since the end of 2011. Other issues of interest to be listened to and examined the Draft national security legislation ( RUU Kamnas)). The bill became one of four Kamnas regulatory politics in the field of defence and security in the national legislation program in 2012. Three other bills are  a reserve component of the Bill, the Bill’s defense industry and security, and the Bill’s State secrets.

In recent months occurred many cases of violence involving national security actors in some areas, such as Papua, Mesuji, Bima, as well as the deaths of two sisters in the Sijunjung, West Sumatra. A number of events were increasingly expresses the need of a national security-related regulations in the country.

However, the public debate concerning Draft national security legislation tends to be the primary substance only on reducing the substansives of the Bill. National security issues just described as the question of the authority of one institution in this country. Whereas, pursuant to the bill submitted to the Ministry of Defense, main substance which must be known and discussed the public is looking at the creation of a national security system (siskamnas).

National security system should be a major debate in view of the nation-state, in the process of political transition and democratization regime. Currently, Indonesia can be categorized as vulnerable, because of the weakness of the regime's power of the nation-state that is in the process of transitioning democratization. One proof of the insecurity is a distrust of the community of a number of State institutions, in particular the institutes which have the functions and responsibilities in the fields of defence and national security. It is envisaged in various cases of violence that occurred from Aceh to Papua's district but involves the security apparatus,. Therefore, it takes a pretty public space to discuss the concept of the ideal related national security for the country.

National security system is a system of mapping, arrangement, coordination, implementation and monitoring of the various threats the multidimensional, doing by different actors on the basis of the principles of security's sourced from national values. National security system provides an instrument for the State to take measures to safeguard the sovereignty of the State's strategic, territorial integrity, the safety of the nation and the State of any form of threat.

In the bill, there are three main substance in understanding the direction of national security systems. First, the setting up of a national security dimension and the actors of defense and security were involved. The bill’s national security rests on national security terminology which became the central concept in the national security system. Security is seen as a multidimensional concept that features four interconnected dimensions, namely the defence dimension, the dimension of the stability of the country, the dimension of public order, and safety dimension of human. Four of these dimensions should be an integral part of the national security system by not eliminating the possibility of developing national systems developed by other countries that can be used to solve security problems in the lower levels of escalation.

In the exercise of these paradigms is required security actors. In managing national security system, the President is assisted by the National Security Council (NSC). NSC function assists the President in determining problems can be categorized as a national security issue and recommend alternative policies in addressing national security concerns. Based on recommendations of such policy, the President can use institutions that already exist (such as Armed Forces, Police, intelligence agencies, and departments) to address the issue of national security.

Second, the national security system will build mechanisms and work procedures that are specific in each level of danger or a State of emergency escalation. The mechanism and procedure of the security work can be developed to establish a State of emergency that different for each level of conflict escalation. Establishment of a State of civil emergency, orderly, civil, martial law, and war emergency need to be formulated in detail.

In addition, mechanisms and procedures for national security work also needs to be developed having regard to the security functions that would take precedence at each level of escalation. Security functions include early warning functions, action, recovery, and stabilization. Early warning and prevention functions should have been more escalation levels take precedence when conflicts are still in normal levels or crisis. The function of action was forced to rely on the escalation of conflict escalates toward open conflict. Recovery and stabilization functions should be performed when the parties have an agreement to leave the conflicted already violent methods and entry to the stage of the peace.

Thirdly, the involvement of the national security actors. Basically, the deployment and use of national security forces should be based on a political decision based on the statutory rules applicable. Setting about the deployment and use of the national security force is needed to provide certainty as to the form of authorization, the time and the deployment of the forces of the Indonesian situation. Such certainty is needed to ensure that any use of the national security forces carried out within the framework of a democratic political system. The certainty it also needed to ensure that any use of the national security forces received strong political support from the State institutions, in particular the Executive and the legislature.

So far, Police are likely to join hands with the members of Parliament and civil society components to resist the process of formulation of the bill national security. It is due to the perception of Police that the Bill reduces the role of the national police and shaking the internal organization of Police.

Should go hand in hand with the Indonesian National Police and Indonesian Armed Forces will be (as well as BIN) to offer a strong network of institutional work which effectively can solve the problems of national security. While the People’s Representative Council (DPR) will build alliances with civil society components in order to prevent the accumulation of repressive national security instrument in the hands of the State and offer the principles of human rights, civil liberties, transparency and accountability.

Hipolitus Wangge
Program Officer Civil Society Studies at Center for Global Civil Society Studies (Pacivis), University of Indonesia